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Abstract 
 This thesis examines the role of cognitive content biases in cultural transmission. 
The concept of cognitive content biases suggests that humans preferentially attend to, 
recall and transmit certain types of information over others, and that this bias influences 
the transmission and evolution of cultural artefacts. A number of studies are presented 
which primarily use genuine urban legends as material. In using ‘real world’ material such 
as urban legends these studies expand our knowledge of how content biases operate and 
shed light on the cultural success of these legends. Methodology included qualitative 
analyses, experiments using participants in linear transmission chains and computational 
phylogenetic techniques. The studies demonstrate that content biases are an effective force 
in cultural transmission but that different biases may not necessarily operate in exactly the 
same manner. It is argued that the cultural success of urban legends can be explained by 
their exploitation of cognitive content biases. The studies also demonstrate the efficacy of 
using ‘real-world’ material such as urban legends in the examination of the mechanisms of 
cultural transmission and evolution.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Cultural Evolution and Transmission 
Culture is ubiquitous in humans and our capacity for extensive and cumulative 
culture can be considered unique to our species and has allowed humans to survive in 
every environment on Earth (Henrich & McElreath, 2003). Culture is considered to be any 
information (referring here to ideas, knowledge, beliefs, values, practices, skills and 
attitudes) which is acquired by individuals through social learning mechanisms such as 
imitation, teaching or language (Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008). 
The process by which culture accumulates can be considered an evolutionary process as it 
features the basic characteristics of Darwinian evolution: variation, differential fitness and 
inheritance (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavelli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Mesoudi & 
Whiten, 2008; Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland 2004, 2006). Variation can be observed in the 
manner in which cultural traits vary between groups and individuals; differential fitness is 
demonstrated by the fact that cultural traits are not equally likely to be transmitted and held 
by individuals or groups; inheritance can be observed through the transmission of cultural 
traits from one individual (model) to another (learner) through various social learning 
mechanisms.  
Starting with Darwin (1871/2004), there is now a long history of researchers 
drawing parallels between biological evolution and cultural evolution and over recent years 
researchers have shown a great deal of interest in the processes of cultural evolution 
(Boyd, Richerson & Henrich, 2011; Mesoudi, 2011; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008; Whiten, 
Hinde, Laland & Stringer, 2011). Of course, the processes of cultural evolution are not 
exact parallels of biological evolution as there are a number of key differences. First, in 
biological evolution, inheritance of genetic information primarily occurs through vertical 
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descent via reproduction or replication processes (Zhaxybayeva & Doolittle, 2011). 
Horizontal (or lateral) gene transfer has been found to commonly occur in bacteria and 
archaea, as well as less commonly in certain unicellular eukaryotes, plants and insects, but 
its contribution to biological evolution in general remains controversial (Boto, 2010; 
Dunning Hotopp, 2011; Richardson & Palmer, 2007). In cultural evolution, inheritance 
processes beyond vertical transmission play a greater role, as an individual can inherit 
cultural information from their parents (vertical transmission), from non-kin individuals of 
their parents’ generation (oblique transmission) and from individuals of their own 
generation (horizontal transmission)(Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). This range of 
inheritance patterns allows cultural evolution to occur at a pace that surpasses genetic 
evolution and has allowed humans to adapt to a diverse range of circumstances. Second, in 
biological evolution high fidelity replication of genetic information is common; cultural 
evolution, however, is more frequently a transformative process in which traits are 
reconstructed through transmission rather than replicated (Henrich & McElreath, 2003; 
Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Sperber, 1996). Despite this reconstructive process, human 
culture is relatively stable, suggesting processes which maintain this stability, to be 
discussed later (Sperber, 1996). Although there are key differences between cultural and 
biological evolution cumulative culture can still be considered an evolutionary process, but 
one which features a unique system of inheritance and is subject to much greater 
mutational forces than biological evolution.  
It is argued that human cognition uses a number of heuristics and mechanisms 
which facilitate the acquisition of useful information (Henrich & McElreath, 2003). These 
mechanisms are generally referred to as ‘cognitive biases’ and examination and 
identification of these biases has been the focus of several studies. Cognitive biases are 
generally separated into ‘context biases’ (Who to copy?) and ‘content biases’ (What to 
copy?). Figure 1 illustrates how these biases have been organised. Context biases exploit 
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features of potential models or the frequency of alternative cultural traits and can be further 
divided into model-based and frequency-dependent biases. Model-based biases respond to 
the cues or characteristics of a potential model and a number of them have been suggested 
by research (for a review, see Wood, Kendal & Flynn, 2013). One example of a model-
based bias is success or prestige bias, this suggests that humans preferentially acquire 
cultural information from more successful or more prestigious models within their social 
group (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Frequency-based biases respond to the relative 
frequency of alternative cultural traits; one such bias is conformity bias which suggests that 
humans preferentially copy cultural traits which are held by the majority of individuals 
within their social group (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Content biases result from an 
interaction between the cognitive psychology of the individual and the characteristics of 
the cultural information being transmitted and these biases cause humans to preferentially 
attend to, recall and transmit certain types of information over others (Barrett & Nyhof, 
2001; Henrich & McElreath, 2003). It is also suggested that these biases will act upon 
information in transmission and alter it to better exploit the bias (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001).  
Content biases can be seen as somewhat analogous to the ‘cognitive attractors’ 
suggested by Claidière and Sperber (2007), which are argued to explain the relative 
stability of cultural traits despite the lack of high fidelity replication in cultural 
transmission, however, the approaches from which these terms are drawn are often thought 
to be somewhat in opposition. The two approaches are the ‘cultural attraction’ approach, 
shared by Atran (1990, 2002), Boyer (1994, 2001), Hirschfeld (1996), Sperber (1996), 
Claidière (Claidière & Sperber, 2007) and their collaborators and the ‘biased transmission’ 
approach of Boyd, Richerson (1985; Richerson & Boyd, 2005), Henrich (Henrich & Boyd, 
2002; Henrich & McElreath, 2003) and their collaborators. These two approaches have 
been described as “different but mutually compatible and possibly complementary” (p. 40, 
Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004) and many of the perceived divergences and opposition arises 
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from the approaches being originally “pursued in mutual ignorance” (p. 89, Claidière & 
Sperber, 2007). Both approaches agree on several key points in the field of cultural 
evolution. They agree that culture evolves through a Darwinian evolutionary process 
determined by both psychological, cognitive processes and by social and ecological 
processes (Claidière, Kirby & Sperber, 2012; Claidière, Scott-Phillips & Sperber, 2014; 
Henrich & Boyd, 2002; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004) and that social learning involves 
domain-specific cognitive mechanisms or heuristics that facilitate the acquisition of culture 
(Atran, 2002; Boyer, 1998; Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Sperber, 1996; Sperber & 
Hirschfeld, 2004). Although the extent to which the process is considered Darwinian is a 
matter of debate (Claidière et al. 2014). Both also reject the concept of memetics, arguing 
that culture does not feature the discrete units necessary for replication (Atran, 2001, 2002; 
Boyer, 1998; Henrich & Boyd, 2002; Henrich, Boyd & Richerson, 2008; Sperber, 1996), 
although Henrich, Boyd and Richerson (2008) do accept that models which assume 
discrete cultural units can be useful in explaining cultural evolution.  
Their divergences currently lie primarily in what elements best explain the stability 
of culture. While both accept that cultural evolution involves both psychological and social 
processes, the biased transmission approach argues that the stability of culture, despite the 
inaccuracy of cultural transmission, is best explained by selective pressures and that 
context biases, such as prestige or conformist bias, at a micro level can lead to more 
accurate replication at the macro level, resulting in cultural stability (Henrich & Boyd, 
2002). The cultural attraction approach argues that the stability of culture is better 
explained by the concept that culture converges on attractors which are determined by 
shared domain specific cognitive dispositions (Claidière et al, 2014; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 
2004). Although they have gone on to state that attractors are not exclusively cognitive and 
can also include environmental constraints (Claidière & Sperber, 2007). Essentially, the 
biased transmission approach can be said to place emphasis on the source or context of 
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culture to explain its success or stability, while the cultural attraction approach places 
emphasis on how properties of the culture itself exploit dispositions in those transmitting it 
to explain cultural success or stability. The two approaches have provided valuable insight 
into cultural evolution and this thesis draws influence from them both.  
When compared to context biases in social learning, content biases have received 
relatively little examination (although there are several notable examples which will be 
discussed in the next section). As such they provide a fascinating avenue for research and 
will be the focus of this thesis. The fact that they are the focus of this thesis should not be 
taken as an argument that they should be considered more relevant to cultural evolution 
than context biases, just that they are as yet somewhat under-researched. Both context and 
content biases contribute to culture evolution and their relative level of influence is not 
examined in this thesis and remains an interesting avenue for future research. The term 
content bias here refers to shared biases or dispositions in human cognition that respond to 
the properties of a cultural item itself rather than the model. The term cultural attractor is 
not used to refer to this for two reasons. First, attractors are not considered to be 
exclusively cognitive and can also include environmental constraints (Claidière & Sperber, 
2007), in this thesis I choose to focus on content biases that, while they may be socially 
influenced to some extent, can be argued to have evolved in order to facilitate the 
acquisition of fitness-enhancing information or as a by-product of this process (Henrich & 
McElreath, 2003). Second, attractors are not considered to be causal explanations of 
cultural phenomena but rather statistical observations which can be explained by other 
factors such as cognitive content biases or ecological factors (Claidière et al., 2014; 
Sperber, 1996), as such the focus here is on the content biases themselves.   
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Figure 1.Psychological biases in social learning (adapted from Henrich & McElreath, 
2003) 
1.2 Content Biases 
The key aim of this thesis is to utilise research focusing on the roles of content 
biases in cultural transmission to provide insight into how cognitive psychology can 
influence the transmission of information. The content biases of interest in this thesis are as 
follows: 
 Ecological survival information bias (Nairne, 2010). 
 Social information bias (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar 2006). 
 Emotional bias (Heath et al., 2001). 
  Minimally counter-intuitive (MCI) bias (Boyer & Ramble, 2001). 
 Stereotype consistency bias (Kashima, 2000). Each of these is now described in 
turn. 
Ecological survival information bias comes from an ecological hypothesis of 
primate intelligence evolution (Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1980), suggesting that human 
memory has evolved to be ‘tuned’ towards encoding and recalling ecological information 
related to survival and fitness better than other forms of information (Nairne & Pandeirada, 
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2008). Therefore, ecological survival bias suggests that humans will be biased towards 
ecological information relevant to survival. Social information bias has its origins in the 
Machiavellian Intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988, Whiten 1999) or Social Brain 
(Dunbar, 1998, 2003) hypotheses suggest that primates evolved greater intelligence in 
order to deal with complex social interactions and suggests, therefore that humans will be 
biased towards information related to social interaction (Mesoudi, Whiten & Dunbar, 
2006). Content which evokes a greater emotional response has been shown to grant a 
mnemonic advantage (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006) and content eliciting a greater level of 
disgust has been shown to have an advantage in transmission (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; 
Heath, Bell & Sternberg, 2001), as such emotional content bias suggests that humans are 
biased in transmission towards content that evokes a greater emotional response. MCI bias 
has its origins in the suggestion that humans hold a number of intuitive assumptions about 
the properties of different entities generally described as ‘folk biology’, ‘folk physics’ and 
‘folk psychology’ (Boyer, 1994). Concepts and narratives which strike a balance between 
satisfying these intuitive assumptions while violating some of them are thought to have an 
advantage in transmission (Boyer, 1994). MCI bias, therefore, suggests that humans are 
biased towards content which meets this cognitive optimum balance between a small 
number of counter-intuitive concepts and a majority of intuitive concepts, hence minimally 
counter-intuitive. Cultural stereotypes are social representations about social groups which 
are likely to arise from the cognitive processes of sense-making and conventionalisation 
(Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 2000). Stereotype consistency bias suggests that humans are 
biased towards content which is consistent with these cultural stereotypes.  
While it is not examined in the studies presented in this thesis, a sixth content bias, 
hierarchical bias, has also been suggested by research. Evidence for this bias comes from 
research demonstrating that humans, from pre-verbal infants to adults, represent and recall 
events in the form of hierarchical scripts (Bauer & Mandler, 1989; Bower, Black & Turner, 
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1979; Nelson & Gruendel, 1986; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Thorndyke, 1977). Mesoudi 
and Whiten (2004) demonstrated that a hierarchical structure can be imposed on a narrative 
through transmission and that information higher in a hierarchical structure will be more 
successful in transmission than information lower in a hierarchical structure, suggesting a 
hierarchical bias in cultural transmission.   
As indicated above the content biases discussed in this thesis can be argued to have 
their origins in the evolution of human cognition. Both social information bias and survival 
information bias are argued to be functionally adaptive in that they increase the degree to 
which fitness enhancing information is salient. Whether that information is about our 
social or ecological environment, natural selection would favour the attention and 
recollection of these forms of information (Mesoudi, Whiten & Dunbar, 2006; Nairne & 
Pandeirada, 2008). Emotions are thought to have functionally adaptive origins (Eckman, 
1992; Keltner & Gross, 1999) and it has been found that the adrenal hormones related to 
emotional arousal can enhance memory consolidation (Cahill & McCaugh, 1998). These 
hormones have two adaptive functions; first, they aid an immediate response to the 
arousing event and, second, they aid future responses by enhancing the recall of the 
previously arousing event (Cahill & McCaugh, 1998). As such, emotional content bias is a 
product of the adaptive function of emotional arousal on memory. MCI bias is considered 
to be the by-product of adaptive cognitive architecture which evolved to solve adaptive 
problems unrelated to counterintuitive narratives or concepts (Norenzayan, Atran, Faulkner 
& Schakker, 2006). MCI concepts are expectation incongruent or expectation violating and 
Upal (2005, 2010) argues that when expectations are violated it presents the agent with a 
learning opportunity. Natural selection would have favoured cognitive architecture which 
devoted more memory and cognitive resources to concepts which offered potentially more 
information about the environment, therefore expectation violating concepts would be 
particularly salient (Upal, 2005). This may also explain why MCI concepts become less 
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memorable as they become more familiar (Willard, Henrich & Norenzayan, under review). 
The process of stereotyping is argued to be a product of cognitive biases towards internal 
consistency (Schacter, 1999), sense-making (Bartlett, 1932) and categorical structure 
(Medin & Smith, 1981). Stereotypes themselves are functional in that they are mental 
shortcuts which ease the cognitive burden by providing easily learnable structural 
relationships where group membership indicates possession of certain characteristics 
(Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Martin, Hutchinson, Slessor, Urquhart, Cunningham & 
Smith, 2014). As such the processes of cultural transmission and evolution are likely to 
produce material consistent with cultural stereotypes (Martin et al., 2014).  
 That content biases are either functionally adaptive themselves or the by-products 
of functionally adaptive cognitive systems does not necessarily explain why they would be 
exploited by fictional narratives such as urban legends. In fact, attending to such material 
could be considered maladaptive. Sperber and Hirschfield (2004) argue that cognitive 
systems can be activated by material from outside of their ‘proper’ domain. For example a 
cognitive module for face-recognition can be activated by any face-like stimuli such as 
portraits or masks (Sperber & Hirschfield, 2004). Evolved cognitive content biases will 
dispose humans to certain types of information but this in turn leads them to be susceptible 
to material which exploits those dispositions, leading humans to preferentially attend to, 
recall and transmit material even if it may be functionally useless.  
1.3 Urban Legends 
Previous research examining content biases has used a wide range of materials and 
methods, from word lists in individual memory tests (e.g. Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008) to 
coding naturally occurring folktales with a longstanding oral history (e.g. Barrett, Burdett 
& Porter, 2009) and includes using original narratives in linear transmission chain 
experiments (e.g. Mesoudi et al., 2006). For the purposes of the studies presented in this 
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thesis, it was decided that urban legends would provide excellent material for examination. 
Urban legends are defined as short, apocryphal tales which are told as true, involve a 
contemporary setting and feature a single event, usually an individual experience, as the 
core of the narrative (Brunvand, 2000; Heath et al., 2001; Tangherlini, 1990). Culturally 
successful urban legends often share a number of features, such as a suspenseful or 
humorous narrative that contains surprising information or a twist ending and/or a warning 
or moral message that is either explicit or implied (Brunvand, 2000; Fox Tree & Weldon, 
2007). Often they are attributed to a ‘friend of a friend’ (Brunvand, 2000). The majority of 
popular urban legends have their origins in post-World War II America and for much of 
their history have been orally transmitted. Over the last two decades, however, their 
transmission has increasingly been through electronic means such as email, internet forums 
and other electronic media (Brunvand, 2000; Fox Tree & Weldon, 2007). These legends 
were thought to be a useful means of examining content biases for five key reasons: 
1. They exploit known content biases.  
As a genre urban legends can be seen to exploit a number of biases that have been 
previously demonstrated by studies and this exploitation is likely to be key to their success. 
Most obviously they would seem to exploit social information bias, survival information 
bias and emotional content bias.  
2. They are culturally successful.  
The cultural success of urban legends and their effect should not be underestimated. 
To illustrate this I will use the example that in 1985 ABC News found that 60% of 
American parents believed that anonymous sadists were contaminating trick or treating 
children’s food. This belief led American schools to train children to check their sweets, 
hospitals to X-ray sweets and several communities attempted to ban children from 
Halloween trick or treating. This was done despite the fact that no greater injury than small 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
11 
 
cuts (and not from ingestion) have been reported since 1958 and that the vast majority of 
incidents similar to the belief were hoaxes (Best, 1990; Best & Horiuchi, 1985). More 
recently a Chinese restaurant in Bawtry, UK faced bankruptcy after a local urban legend 
spread describing a woman choking on a dog’s identification microchip while she was 
eating at the restaurant; the microchip supposedly coming from a dog which had been 
served in her meal (“Chinese restaurant bankruptcy fear”, 2011). Their cultural success 
suggests examination of why they might be successful and cultural evolution provides 
excellent means to explain it. An added benefit of their cultural success and the public’s 
interest in urban legends means they are readily available, with websites such as the Urban 
Legends Reference Pages (www.snopes.com) dedicated to collecting them.  
3. They are real world material that is actively transmitted. 
Studies examining content biases often use some form of narrative ranging from 
original material created by the experimenters that is unlikely to be transmitted in a natural 
setting, such as a description of a woman asking for directions to a swimming pool (see 
Mesoudi et al., 2006) to folklore which has a long oral history, such as Native American 
folktales (see Barret & Nyhof, 2001). As contemporary folklore, urban legends are actively 
transmitted between individuals today and as such represent material with a high degree of 
ecological validity when used in experiments examining cultural transmission. Also, unlike 
traditional western folklore there are no ‘canonised’ versions which people are likely to be 
particularly familiar with.  
4. There is a precedent for their use in content bias studies. 
Heath et al. (2001) and Eriksson and Coultas (2014) have both successfully used 
urban legends as material in their studies examining emotional content bias, demonstrating 
the efficacy of using these legends as experimental material.  
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5. Cultural evolution can add to the existing body of research examining them. 
As highly successful cultural artefacts, urban legends have already been the subject 
of research by a number of anthropologists and sociologists. Until recently, however, 
academic explanations for the cultural success of urban legends have relied on a 
psychoanalytic approach (e.g. Dundes, 1998, Tucker, 2005) or have discussed the 
ecological dimensions of their transmission. A typical approach has been ‘symbolic 
interactionism’, which sees legends as collective attempts to make meaning out of 
confusing or disturbing events, particularly during periods of rapid social and economic 
change. For example, the success of the ‘Halloween food contamination’ legend discussed 
above has been attributed to increased fears about child safety, crime and other social 
issues (Best & Horuichi, 1985). While symbolic interactionism and related approaches 
have proved to be valuable in providing insights into the ecological and socio-cultural 
factors that can increase the transmission of an individual legend, they do not address the 
psychological factors at play in this transmission. Drawing on the theories of cultural 
evolution and transmission to explain the cultural success of urban legends will provide 
useful contributions to an existing body of research.  
1.4 Overview of Methods 
 Three of the experiments presented in this thesis (in Chapters 4, 5 and 6) 
use a linear transmission chain design. The transmission chain design was originally 
developed by Bartlett (1932) in his experiment demonstrating the constructive nature of 
memory using Native American folktales. The design resembles the children’s game 
known as ‘Chinese Whispers’ or ‘Broken Telephone’ with the first participant receiving 
the original material, then transmitting it to the next participant, who transmits it, in turn, to 
the following participant. The original material is passed along a chain of participants 
allowing the researcher to examine the cumulative effect of transmission. Generally the 
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material is read and then recalled (sometimes after a distraction task) and it is the product 
of this recall which is passed on to the next participant. The transmission chain method has 
been used successfully to examine the effect of content biases in cultural transmission 
(Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008) and has been used to empirically demonstrate a number of the 
content biases discussed in this thesis. Stereotype consistency bias has been demonstrated 
using a transmission chain design by Bangerter (2000) and Kashima (2000), social 
information bias has been demonstrated by Mesoudi et al. (2006) and emotional bias has 
been demonstrated by Eriksson and Coultas (2014). In the experiments presented here each 
transmission chain is comprised of three participants (or ‘generations’). Three generations 
was judged to be a length capable of capturing the cumulative effects of transmission while 
still being practical in terms of recruiting participants. Transmission chains of three 
generations have been used successfully in previous research (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; 
Nielsen, Cucchiaro & Mohamedally, 2012).  
The original material given to the first generation of a transmission chain in two of 
the experiments (Chapters 4 and 5) were urban legends, re-written to match for number of 
words and central propositions. One of the key intentions of the studies in this thesis is to 
use ‘real world’ material. By using material that actually reflects stories that are actively 
transmitted between people the experiments provide a greater insight into the cultural 
transmission of urban legends and retain a high degree of ecological validity while 
examining content biases. In order to control as much as possible for the potential 
confounds present in the content of the different legends their selection was based on 
ratings provided by participants. The means of selecting this material is discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
The other method used in this thesis is a qualitative analyses of naturally occurring 
urban legends and a computational phylogenetic analysis. Phylogenetic analysis uses an 
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explicit evolutionary model whereby new entities arise by descent with modification from 
existing ones. In this context, phylogenetic analysis provides a useful means for estimating 
relationships of common ancestry among existing variants and examining which traits tend 
to be preserved and which ones modified. This method has been used successfully to 
examine the cultural evolution of the folktale ‘Red Riding Hood’ (Tehrani, 2013) and here 
it is used in Chapter 7 to explore the influence of MCI elements in the cultural evolution 
of the urban legend ‘Bloody Mary’.  
1.5 Aims and Structure of Thesis 
In using content biases as a means to examine the cultural success of urban legends 
it is intended that the studies presented here will also shed light on how these biases 
operate and, as a result, will extend our current knowledge of content biases in general. 
Previous research has focused on single content biases and has largely used recall-based 
experimental paradigms. In contrast some of the work in this thesis examines how biases 
interact and can be combined in a single ‘successfully-transmitted’ narrative. It also uses 
paradigms beyond those based on recall, including both a computational approach and a 
unique non-recall based transmission chain paradigm.  
The chapters of this thesis are presented in a publication manuscript format. Before 
each chapter there will be a cover sheet, displaying the publication status of each paper. 
Chapter references are presented at the end of each corresponding chapter. Appendices are 
presented at the end of the thesis. 
 In Chapter 2 previous research examining urban legends is reviewed. This 
review includes a discussion of literature that has explained the cultural success of urban 
legends by focusing on the ecological dimensions of their transmission, epitomised by the 
‘symbolic interactionist’ approach which served as the key focus of research examining 
urban legends throughout the 80s and 90s. In this chapter I present an alternative 
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explanation for the cultural success of urban legends by drawing on Sperber’s (1996) 
‘epidemiology of representations’, in which the distributions of cultural traits in a 
population are seen as the outcome of both social-ecological and psychological processes. 
To do this I review literature examining content biases in cultural transmission. I argue that 
a key reason for the success of urban legends lies in their ability to exploit cognitive biases 
arising from our disposition to learn and transmit certain kinds of content. This proposal is 
complemented by an analysis of 254 naturally occurring urban legends collected from the 
internet. This analysis found that almost all legends featured at least one known content 
bias, with emotional information (occurring in 78% of the sampled legends) and social 
information (occurring in 77% of the sampled legends) being the most frequently coded as 
present.  
Content biases in cultural transmission have been demonstrated experimentally 
using a range of different materials as stimulus. In Chapter 3 the material used in previous 
experiments is reviewed and a study used to aid in selecting stimuli for the subsequent 
experiments in this thesis is presented. Using a questionnaire-based study, participants’ 
ratings based on content biases were collected for seventeen different urban legends. These 
ratings were then used to inform the selection of stimulus material for the transmission 
chain experiments presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
Previous experiments that have used urban legends to examine content biases in 
cultural transmission have both used them to investigate emotional content bias, focusing 
on the single emotion of disgust. Chapter 4 uses a linear transmission chain design to 
examine this bias but without focusing on a single emotion. A significant effect of emotion 
level on transmission fidelity was found with high emotion legends being recalled with 
significantly greater accuracy than low emotion legends. The emotional valence of a 
legend, positive or negative, was found not to have any effect on transmission. Based on 
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this result it is argued that emotional biases in transmission go beyond disgust and can 
incorporate other emotions such as amusement, interest and surprise.  
Two of the biases demonstrated in previous research, a social information bias and 
a survival information bias have their theoretical origins in two seemingly oppositional 
theories regarding the evolution of human intelligence and memory: (i) the ecological 
hypothesis of primate intelligence evolution (Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1980) and (ii) the 
Machiavellian Intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988, Whiten 1999) or Social Brain 
(Dunbar, 1998, 2003) hypotheses. Chapter 5 seeks to examine these two content biases by 
pitting them against each other in a linear transmission chain experiment. The effects of 
combining both biases in a single narrative are also examined. As well as investigating the 
effects of social information bias and survival information bias in a transmission chain 
which focuses on the encode-and-retrieve phase of transmission, their effect on 
transmission at the choose-to-receive and choose-to-transmit phases are also examined. 
Legends that contained social information were shown to have a transmission advantage 
over survival information legends at the ‘encode-and-retrieve’ phase of transmission, 
although survival information legends were transmitted with greater accuracy than the 
control material.  
Two forms of mutation in cultural evolution have been suggested: ‘copying error’, 
where the learner makes non-intentional modifications and ‘guided variation’ where the 
learner’s modifications are intentional. The decision-making processes underlying guided 
variation may produce similar results to cultural transmission as both are likely to be 
influenced by cognitive biases. Previous research has compared the products of guided 
variation with those produced by context biases in transmission (Mesoudi & Whiten, 
2008); Chapter 6 presents the first study to examine guided variation and content biases. 
Participants in a linear transmission chain received news stories and then were given the 
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opportunity to alter them however they wished without having to recall the material. The 
next participant in the chain then received the material produced by the previous 
participant and they altered it in turn. The results showed that guided variation was 
somewhat effective in increasing the degree to which material exploits content biases but 
only when the original material did not already exploit biases to a greater extent. The 
suggested content biases of social information was increased in one story and MCI content 
was added in a number of examples. No other content biases were increased. Material 
which already exploits biases to a greater degree was found not to be enhanced through 
guided variation.  
Transmission chain experiments represent an excellent means to examine content 
biases in cultural transmission by creating micro-cultures; however, other means of 
examining these biases are worthy of pursuit. The study presented in Chapter 7 used 
computational methods for analysing cultural transmission and presents the first study to 
use computational phylogenetic analysis in the study of urban legends. This method uses 
an explicitly evolution-based model of descent with modification. Phylogenies function as 
naturally occurring transmission chains and allow the researcher to examine the fidelity in 
transmission of content within a narrative across a number of generations. The study used 
the ‘Bloody Mary’ urban legend in a computational analysis to examine Boyer’s (1994) 
MCI bias. MCI bias provides an interesting point of investigation for urban legends 
because, while MCI content occurs less frequently in urban legends, some of the most 
culturally successful urban legends feature MCI content. Previous research using 
traditional folklore and religious texts to examine MCI bias has suggested a cognitively 
optimum number of 1-2 or 2-3 counterintuitive concepts. The research presented here 
found that counterintuitive and intuitive concepts were equally stable in transmission, 
suggesting that MCI bias may function on the narrative as a whole, rather than the 
individual concepts within it.  
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Chapter 8 presents an overview of the thesis with discussion of the findings of the 
studies in the broader context of cultural transmission and evolution. The theoretical and 
practical implications of the studies are discussed in the context of content biases in 
cultural transmission and the study of urban legends. Avenues for future research implied 
by these findings are also discussed.  
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Abstract 
The popularity of urban legends is explained by drawing on Sperber’s (1996) 
‘epidemiology of representations’, in which the distributions of cultural traits in a 
population are seen as the outcome of both social-ecological and psychological processes. 
To date, most explanations for the success of urban legends have focused on social-
ecological contexts and ignored the psychological mechanisms involved in learning, 
remembering and transmitting narratives. Light is shed on the latter by invoking Sperber’s 
distinction between dispositions (preferences that were positively selected over 
evolutionary time) and susceptibilities (non-adaptive by-products of those preferences). It 
is argued that a key reason for the success of urban legends lies in their ability to exploit 
cognitive susceptibilities arising from our disposition to learn and transmit certain kinds of 
information. Analyses of 254 urban legends found that almost all legends featured at least 
one known content bias, with emotional information (occurring in 78% of the sampled 
legends) and social information (77%) being the most common. Most legends contained 
two to three biases, suggesting that there is an optimum number of biases to be combined 
for a transmission advantage. The findings highlight the value of an epidemiological 
approach to urban legends and cultural transmission more generally. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Urban legends, also referred to as ‘contemporary legends’ (Simpson, 1981), ‘urban 
belief tales’ (Fine, 1979) and ‘modern legends’ (Mullen, 1972) are generally defined as 
apocryphal stories that are told as true (Brunvand, 2000; Heath, Bell, & Sternberg 2001; 
Tangherlini, 1990), involve a contemporary setting (Brunvand, 2000) and feature a single 
event, usually an individual experience, as the core of the narrative (Tangherlini, 1990). 
Successful legends often share a number of features, such as a suspenseful or humorous 
narrative (Brunvand, 2000) containing surprising information or a twist ending (Fox Tree 
& Weldon, 2007), a warning or moral message that is either explicit or implied and they 
are often attributed to a ‘friend of a friend’ (Brunvand, 2000). Historically, these legends 
have been transmitted through word-of-mouth in the same manner as other oral narratives, 
but more recently their transmission has been accelerated by modern technology such as 
email, internet forums and other electronic media (Brunvand, 2000; Fox Tree & Weldon 
2007). 
The cultural success of urban legends can be illustrated with a number of examples. 
One such example is the widely believed legend that anonymous sadists contaminate 
“trick-or-treating” children’s food at Halloween. A 1985 poll by ABC News found that 
60% of parents in the USA were concerned that their children might become the victims of 
sharp items such as razor blades, sewing needles and shards of glass being purposefully 
placed in food by adults (cited in Best, 1990). This urban legend led American schools to 
train children to check their sweets, hospitals to X-ray sweets and several communities 
attempted to ban children from Halloween trick or treating despite the fact that no greater 
injury than small cuts (and not from ingestion) have been reported since 1958 and that the 
vast majority of incidents similar to the belief were hoaxes (Best, 1990; Best & Horiuchi, 
1985).  
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Urban legends can also have a significant negative impact on companies and 
businesses. In 1995 Proctor and Gamble removed their longstanding man-in-the-moon 
logo from their products after a widespread urban legend claimed that the company 
president had appeared on American television and declared the company’s association 
with the Church of Satan, the logo was thought to be a satanic symbol (Kapferer, 1990). As 
recently as 2007 the company successfully sued individuals who revived and propagated 
the original legend. In 2011 a Chinese restaurant in Bawtry, UK, faced bankruptcy after a 
local urban legend spread involving a woman choking on a dog’s identification microchip 
while eating at the restaurant, the microchip supposedly coming from a retired racing 
greyhound that had been served in her meal (“Chinese restaurant bankruptcy fear”, 2011). 
Widespread urban legends have also gone on to inspire horror movies such as Candyman 
(Barker & Golin, 1992) and Urban Legend (Mattews, McDonnell, & Monitz, 1998). 
Given that most urban legends are not based on true events (and are often easy to 
disprove), their popularity cannot be explained in simple utilitarian terms. On the surface, 
they do not appear to contain useful information worth remembering and sharing – in fact, 
insofar as they can promote unwarranted fear and mistrust, they may even have 
maladaptive influences on behaviour. To understand how such narratives spread, it is 
useful to invoke Sperber’s (e.g. 1996) important distinction between dispositions and 
susceptibilities in cultural transmission. Dispositions are preferences that have been 
positively selected for in the evolution of an organism because they contribute to survival 
and reproduction; susceptibilities are the by-products of those dispositions, and are either 
neutral with regards to fitness, or sometimes even harmful. For example, humans have an 
evolved disposition for sweet tasting foods such as fruits because they had important 
nutritional value to the diets of our ancestors. However, in the age of mass-produced foods, 
this disposition has created a susceptibility to over-consume sugary foods, contributing to 
widespread problems with obesity in the developed world (Sperber, 1985: 81). Similarly, 
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dispositions to attend to, remember and transmit certain kinds of information may make us 
susceptible to non-adaptive or even maladaptive ideas, beliefs, narratives and other cultural 
representations that exploit those evolved preferences (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). 
Sperber (1996) argues that psychological susceptibilities are as important to the 
transmission of culture as immunological susceptibilities are to the transmission of disease. 
Thus, just as the epidemiology of diseases incorporates both ecological and immunological 
determinants of contagion, the ‘epidemiology of representations’ demands an 
understanding of both the socio-environmental context of cultural transmission, as well as 
the psychological biases involved in learning, storing and communicating information (e.g. 
perception, inference, memory, etc.) (Claidière & Sperber, 2007; Sperber, 1996). 
To date, most efforts to explain the popularity of urban legends have focused 
almost exclusively on the ecological dimensions of their transmission. This is epitomised 
by the ‘symbolic interactionist’ approach, which sees legends as collective attempts to 
make meaning out of confusing or disturbing events, particularly during periods of rapid 
social and economic change. A classic example is Fine’s analysis of the highly persistent 
and popular legend of the ‘Kentucky fried rat’ (Fine, 1980). In this legend, a person 
(almost consistently female) buys some fried chicken from a popular fast food outlet and 
later discovers a deep-fried rat amongst the chicken pieces. In some variations this causes 
her death by shock but in more modern version she sues the fast food company for a 
substantial amount of money. Fine (1980) found that 76% of respondents believed the 
legend to be true or at least probably true and some had even changed their eating habits 
because of it, despite the fact that such an event has never taken place. Drawing on Dundes 
(1971) and Shibutani (1966), Fine argues that urban legends such as the ‘Kentucky fried 
rat’ arise from what folklorist Warren (1972) called ‘the Great Change’ in American 
society following WWII. Fine argues that changes to society, such as impersonalisation, 
the transfer of functions to profit enterprises, urbanisation, suburbanisation and shifting 
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moral values created a conflict between the traditional social order and the complexities of 
modern society that urban legends are a response to. In the case of the ‘Kentucky fried rat’ 
legend the expansion of the fast food industry represents a threat to the traditional home-
cooked meal and the legend expresses society’s anxiety over this conflict (Fine, 1980). 
Ellis (1983) takes a similar approach in his analysis of the ‘ritual murder of a child’ 
legend, which has existed in many different forms for over two-thousand years. Early 
variations attribute the ritual murder of children to Christians (Ellis, 1983), later the 
murderers became Jews in Medieval Europe (Hsia, 1988, cited in Victor, 1990), aristocrats 
in Revolutionary France (Victor, 1990) and hippies, Satanists or black and Latino gang 
members over the past fifty years (Ellis, 1983; Victor, 1990). Ellis (1983) suggests that this 
legend becomes most popular during periods of social change where a minority group is 
appearing to be gathering greater prominence, for example, during the growth of 
Christianity in ancient Rome (Ellis 1983). Similarly, Best and Horuichi (1985) have argued 
that the ‘Halloween food contamination’ legend mentioned above came to prominence in 
the 1970s as a reflection of increased fear about child safety, crime and other social strains. 
Victor (1990) came to similar conclusions in his examination of various satanic cult urban 
legends that found prevalence during the 1980s in the USA, suggesting that these legends 
are metaphors for social stresses related to societal changes in the family and economics. 
Thus, in each of these case studies urban legends are viewed as responses to social strain 
and shaped by the perception of threat to the traditional social order. 
 While symbolic interactionist and related approaches (e.g. Dundes, 1971) support 
rich interpretive insights into the ecological factors that promote the spread of specific 
individual legends, they do not directly address the underlying psychological factors that 
make people susceptible to them and which explain the general success of urban legends as 
a genre (see also Heath et al., 2001). To bridge this gap in the literature recent research 
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focusing on the roles of ‘content biases’ (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001) or ‘cognitive attractors’ 
(Claidière & Sperber, 2007) in cultural transmission is drawn upon. This work suggests 
that humans are disposed to learn, remember and transmit certain types of information 
more easily than others, and that any information that is passed between people will be 
subjected to cognitive selective pressures which alter the content and structure so as to 
make it maximally transmittable (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001). Potential cognitive content 
biases which could make us susceptible to urban legends include an ecological survival 
information bias (Nairne, 2010), a social information bias (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 
2006); an emotional bias (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001), a minimally counter-intuitive 
(MCI) bias (Boyer & Ramble, 2001), and a stereotype consistency bias (Kashima, 2000).  
Ecological Survival Information Bias 
Nairne and colleagues (Nairne 2010; Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada, 2007; 
Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008) argue that, as human memory is an evolved trait that must 
have been shaped by selection pressures to achieve specific fitness-related goals, memory 
should display functional specialisation. They argue that human memory is unlikely to 
have evolved to be domain general, as some information, such as the locations of food 
sources or predators, would be more beneficial to remember than random events. Human 
memory, therefore, has evolved to be ‘tuned’ towards encoding and recalling fitness 
related information better than other forms of information. Nairne, Thompson and 
Pandeirada (2007) had participants imagine themselves stranded in a foreign grassland 
scenario and then rate the relevance of words to finding food, water and protection from 
predators; they refer to this as ‘survival processing’. Later, surprise free-recall tests 
revealed an advantage for survival processing. Nairne, Pandeirada and Thompson (2008) 
found a similar result as words processed within a survival context (e.g. relating to food 
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and predators) were more likely to be recalled than when presented in a non-survival 
context.  
In Nairne and Pandeirada (2008) participants were asked to make either survival 
relevance decisions or pleasantness ratings about words in the same categorised list. They 
found that survival processing produced the best recall in both within- and between-subject 
designs, despite the fact that the pleasantness rating of words in a categorised list is 
considered one of the best methods for enhancing free-recall. Kang, McDermott and Cohen 
(2008) found that survival processing produced better recall than a control scenario chosen 
to match the novelty and potential excitement of the survival scenario.  
A number of studies, using a variety of experimental designs and materials (Nairne 
& Pandeirada, 2008; Nairne et al., 2007; Kang et al., 2008; Otgaar, Smeets, & van Bergen, 
2010; Weinstein, Bugg, & Roediger, 2008) have demonstrated the strong mnemonic 
advantage that survival processing grants participants over other forms of processing and 
that this effect is robust within and between participants. The recall advantage for 
ecological survival information found in these studies suggests a potential bias for 
ecological information relevant to survival in human cultural transmission.  
Traditional folklore from different cultures provides examples of narratives which 
contain ecological information relevant to survival (Sugiyama, 2001). Information relevant 
to hunting game, gathering edible plants and avoiding dangerous carnivores can be found 
in the oral narratives of the Ju/’hoansi (Biesele, 1993), !Kung (Biesele, 1978), White 
Mountain Apache (Goodwin, 1939) and Yanomamö (Simoneau, 1990). Sugiyama (2001) 
argues that oral narratives among foraging peoples are used as a means to transmit this 
survival relevant information. Since these folktales are likely to have been passed down 
over many generations, the presence of this content supports the results of experimental 
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studies suggesting that ecological survival information is transmitted with a high degree of 
fidelity.  
Social Information Bias 
The Machiavellian Intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Whiten, 1999) or Social 
Brain (Dunbar, 1998; 2003) hypothesis suggests that primates evolved greater intelligence 
in order to deal with complex social interactions, rather than to deal with non-social 
challenges in their ecological environment. These hypotheses oppose an ecological 
hypothesis of the evolution of primate intelligence (Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1980) by 
emphasising the importance of social interaction. These hypotheses are complemented by 
Dunbar’s Social Gossip Theory (1993) of human language evolution, which argues that 
language evolved as a means to maintain social cohesion in the complex social groups that 
are characteristic of modern humans. Together they suggest that greater intelligence and 
language were necessary for tracking social relationships and interactions in complex 
social groups, and therefore evolved in response to social selection.  
 Mesoudi, Whiten and Dunbar (2006) argue that if human cognition evolved to deal 
with social relationships and interactions, then humans should preferentially attend to, 
recall and transmit social information over equivalent non-social information. They tested 
this proposal by comparing the transmission of social and non-social information along 
linear transmission chains. For Mesoudi, Whiten and Dunbar (2006) social information 
was defined as information which concerned the interactions and relationships between a 
number of third parties, while non-social information was defined as concerning a single 
individual’s interactions with the physical environment, or solely concerning the physical 
environment. For the purposes of their study social information was divided into two 
categories: gossip, which involved intense and salient social interactions or relationships, 
such as an illicit sexual affair, and social non-gossip, which involved ‘everyday’ 
Chapter 2 – The Epidemiology of Urban Legends 
 
36 
 
interactions and relationships, such as someone receiving directions. They found that social 
information was transmitted with greater accuracy and in greater quantity than equivalent 
non-social information. Social non-gossip was transmitted to a similar degree as gossip, 
suggesting that the intensity of social relationships described in the information has no 
effect on the fidelity of transmission but what is important is some form of third party 
interactions. These results are consistent with the Machiavellian Intelligence or Social 
Brain hypotheses and suggest that humans are biased towards social information, 
explaining the bias for social information seen in popular media, such as gossip magazines, 
reality television and tabloid newspapers (Mesoudi et al., 2006). 
While a bias for social information is evidenced by the prevalence of gossip and 
rumour in human communities, it is also thought to play an important role in the success of 
fictional narratives. According to Mar and Oatley (2008), good stories are engaging and 
entertaining because they simulate the tensions and dilemmas inherent in real social 
relationships, providing an imaginative context in which one can explore their possibilities. 
This claim is supported by evidence from traditional folktales, which, as Sugiyama (2001) 
points out, frequently concern topics such as kinship, marriage, sex, friendship, betrayal, 
social status, interpersonal conflict and deception. In a similar vein, it might be expected 
that urban legends which exploit the social bias suggested by Mesoudi et al. (2006) will 
have an advantage in transmission and recall. 
Emotional Bias 
Emotional arousal is known to be an important factor in the storage and recall of 
memories (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006), and is thought to play a major role in the transmission 
of cultural knowledge and beliefs. For example, Whitehouse (2004) has described how 
‘imagistic’ religions (i.e. religions that are based on esoteric experiences of the divine, 
rather than formal doctrines and institutions) are reproduced through highly arousing, 
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climatic rituals, such as traumatic initiation rites and ecstatic trances. Heath, Bell and 
Sternberg (2001) investigated whether fictional narratives were similarly affected by 
emotional content, focusing specifically on the importance of disgust in urban legends. 
They designed experiments in which participants were asked to rate urban legends for 
emotional, informational and story characteristics and how likely they would be to pass the 
story on. It was found that, while informational characteristics, such as plausibility, were 
important in the likelihood of passing on a legend, legends were also more likely to be 
passed on if they elicited a greater level of disgust. When the number and level of disgust 
evoking motifs in a legend was manipulated, participants preferred, and were more likely 
to pass on, legends which produced the highest level of disgust. As the high level disgust 
legends were less plausible, this finding suggests that evoking emotion is more important 
to the transmission of a legend than informational content. Heath et al. (2001) also found 
that urban legends which featured a greater number of disgust evoking motifs were more 
widely distributed on urban legend websites. This suggests that urban legends are 
transmitted and retained in the social environment due to a bias for narratives which evoke 
emotions that are common across individuals, rather than any particular metaphorical 
representation of social stress.  
Eriksson and Coultas (2014) expanded on the work of Heath et al. (2001) and 
demonstrated a bias for urban legends which evoked higher levels of disgust across three 
phases of cultural transmission: ‘choose-to-receive’, ‘encode-and-retrieve’ and ‘choose-to-
transmit’. Further evidence for this bias in cultural transmission is provided by a study 
carried out by Berger and Milkman (2010), who analysed 6,956 articles published on the 
New York Times website for their emotional valence and how often they were forwarded 
by email. They found that articles which aroused emotions characterised by high arousal, 
such as anger, were more likely to be transmitted than articles which aroused emotions 
characterised by low arousal, such as sadness. 
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Minimally Counter-Intuitive (MCI) Bias 
Boyer (1994) has argued that humans have evolved a rich cognitive architecture for 
making intuitive assumptions about the properties of different categories of entities. These 
intuitive assumptions are generally described as ‘folk biology’, ‘folk physics’ and ‘folk 
psychology’. Concepts which violate these category-level expectations are considered to 
be counterintuitive and feature inherent transmission advantages that can increase the 
salience of a narrative (Boyer, 1994). Boyer, however, also argues that this effect is not 
linear and that a balance must be met between satisfying intuitive expectations and 
violating enough of them to be cognitively optimal. If a narrative features too many 
counterintuitive concepts it can render it incomprehensible and unmemorable (Boyer & 
Ramble 2001). Upal, Gonce, Tweney and Slone (2007) argue that humans evolved to 
preferentially remember and recall events or objects which violate expectations about the 
future but can be justified once they have been observed and that MCI concepts meet these 
requirements. 
Stories which are considered MCI will balance a minority of counterintuitive 
concepts with a majority of everyday, intuitive events. Several studies have supported the 
idea that MCI narratives are cognitively optimal, granting them an advantage in recall and 
transmission (Barrett, Burdett, & Porter, 2009; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 
2001; Norenzayan, Atran, Faulkner & Schaller, 2006; Upal et al. 2007; Upal 2011). While 
Barrett (2000) suggests that MCI concepts hold a transmission advantage because they can 
be understood and represented without the allocation of too many cognitive resources but 
are challenging enough to require increased attention in order to be assimilated into 
conceptual schemes 
Barrett and Nyhof (2001) examined whether MCI narratives have a cognitive 
advantage using linear transmission chains. Using both traditional Native American 
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folktales (as used in Bartlett 1932) and a science-fiction style story as material, they found 
that, after three generations of transmission, counterintuitive and intuitive but bizarre items 
were recalled in greater proportions than intuitive items. This recall of counterintuitive 
items was found both immediately and after a three month delay. They also replicated 
these findings using oral transmission in a group serving as a mock community. The fact 
that recall of counterintuitive items was upheld after a three month gap is important, as an 
idea that is immediately memorable but becomes significantly less memorable with time 
could not be as culturally successful as those ideas that retain memorability.  
Norenzayan et al. (2006) examined MCI bias using lists featuring intuitive and 
counterintuitive ideas and, while the intuitive ideas were better recalled in the short-term 
(similarly to the results of Bartlett 1932), MCI lists had a recall advantage over time. In a 
second study folktales collected by the Brothers Grimm were rated for MCI concepts, 
memorability and other psychological variables. They found that MCI tales were more 
likely to be culturally successful (determined by number of hits using a Google web 
search) and were perceived to be more memorable and more psychologically appealing in 
terms of comprehension and ease of transmission. They suggest that the cognitively 
optimum level is around two to three counterintuitive features in a narrative. Norenzayan et 
al. (2006) concluded that MCI narratives are culturally successful due to a stronger 
cognitive advantage in recall compared to other narrative templates. Upal et al. (2007; 
2011) refers to the hypothesis that the presence of a specific number of MCI concepts 
increases the memorability of a narrative as the Fixed MCI-narrative template (FMNT) 
hypothesis. Upal (2011) found that the inclusion of counterintuitive concepts only 
increases the memorability of a narrative if the concepts make the story more coherent. He 
suggests that the global cohesion of the narrative is a key mediating factor in its 
memorability and calls into question the idea that there is a specific cognitive optimum for 
all narratives. He argues that memorability is not a property of a concept but it is a property 
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of the concept, its context, and the background knowledge of the comprehender, therefore 
the memorability of a concept will vary depending upon its context and this context should 
not be ignored when examining transmission. The importance of the context in which 
counterintuitive concepts are presented is also supported by Atran and Norenzayan (2004) 
who found that recall for counterintuitive concepts only increased when they were 
surrounded by intuitive concepts, suggesting that the counterintuitive concepts were not 
inherently more memorable, they only became more memorable when placed in an 
intuitive context. The interaction between counterintuitive and intuitive concepts within a 
narrative and their joint influence on its cultural transmission is an area that is yet to be 
fully explored. 
To date, only one study has addressed the role played by MCI bias in the 
transmission of urban legends. Stubbersfield and Tehrani (2013, presented in Chapter 7) 
used computational phylogenetic methods to analyse the evolution of the urban legend 
‘Bloody Mary’, in which a violent ghost is summoned through a ritual involving a mirror. 
Counterintuitive and intuitive concepts were found to be equally stable in transmission, 
suggesting that MCI bias functions on the narrative as a whole, rather than on individual 
concepts within it, supporting Upal’s conceptualisation of how MCI bias operates and the 
importance of the narrative context. 
Stereotype Consistency Bias 
Cultural stereotypes are social representations about social groups which are likely 
to arise from the cognitive processes of sense-making and conventionalisation (Bangerter, 
2000; Kashima, 2000). It has been suggested that information that conforms to 
stereotypical assumptions is more likely to be transmitted than information that conflicts 
with them. Fyock and Stangor’s (1994) meta-analysis found that people recalled 
stereotype-consistent (SC) information better than stereotype-inconsistent (SI) information, 
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when presented with both. In contrast, Rojahn and Pettigrew’s (1992) meta-analysis found 
that expectation-inconsistent information is actually more likely to be remembered than 
expectation-consistent information in most social contexts; suggesting that, when recalling 
another person’s behaviour, SI information should be better recalled than SC information. 
Other studies into individual recall have found that when ability and motivation are high 
enough, SI information is better remembered than SC information (Dijksterhuisand & van 
Knippenberg, 1995; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993). The success of SI information 
in transmission relates to a bias for MCI information (discussed earlier), as it violates 
intuitive assumptions about groups of people and can be considered MCI. In terms of 
collective recall, however, Allport and Postman (1947) found that serial reproduction led to 
SI information regarding race being subject to conventionalisation and becoming SC.  
 Kashima (2000) investigated the effect of stereotype-based information on both 
individual and collective recall using a transmission chain method. A story about a man 
and a woman exhibiting gender-stereotype relevant behaviour was transmitted along a 
five-person chain. When remembering details relevant to the plot, participants in earlier 
positions in the chain recalled SI information better than SC information, however, SC 
information was retained better than SI information towards the end of the chain. 
Regarding background details, however, SC information was consistently recalled better 
than SI information across the chain. Bangerter (2000) found that scientific text describing 
the conception process was subject to transformation along diffusion chains, with the 
abstract scientific description becoming progressively more anthropomorphic, with 
stereotypical sex-role attributions being projected onto the sperm and ovum.  
 Thus, while on an individual level SI information is better recalled under certain 
circumstances, over a number of generations SC information is consistently retained and 
recalled better than SI information. Importantly however, the extent to which people hold 
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these stereotypes as true affects the degree of bias in transmission, as does an in-group out-
group effect; participants are more likely to view an out-group’s behaviour as homogenous 
compared to the behaviour of their in-group (Kashima, 2000). Transmission of SC 
information is also affected by an individual’s perception of how shared the stereotype is in 
the community, with individuals being more likely to transmit SC information if they 
believe others also hold that stereotype to be true (Clark & Kashima, 2007). 
The Present Research 
The research summarised above suggests there are a number of cognitive 
dispositions toward learning and passing on certain kinds of information that may make us 
susceptible to apocryphal and potentially even harmful narratives. With that in mind, the 
present study addresses three main questions concerning the epidemiology of urban 
legends: 
1. Do urban legends consistently feature content that exploits known cognitive biases? 
2. If so, which of the aforementioned biases are the most important in the transmission 
of urban legends? For example, based on the experimental studies reviewed above, 
one may expect social information to appear more frequently in urban legends than 
ecological information, and stereotype consistent content to be more frequent than 
stereotype inconsistent content. 
3. When content biases are present in legends do they tend to occur individually or in 
combination with other biases? If in combination, which combinations are common 
and which ones rare?  
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2.2 Method 
Material  
Two-hundred and sixty urban legends were collected from the Urban Legends 
Reference Pages (www.snopes.com) using the websites own ‘randomizer’ function which 
provides a random selection of one legend from their database of thousands. The Urban 
Legends Reference Pages is the most complete collection of urban legends available and 
has been praised by folklorists knowledgeable in the field such as Brunvand (Seipp, 2004). 
It has also been used as a source for material in studies examining biases in cultural 
evolution (see Fessler, Pisor, & Navarrete, 2014). For the purposes of this study urban 
legends were defined as apocryphal narratives, told as true, involving a contemporary 
setting and featuring or referencing a single event as the core of their narrative. As the 
Urban Legends Reference Pages applies a more expansive use of the term ‘urban legend’ 
than is used here, also including rumours, trivia, hoaxes, common misconceptions and 
misinformation, only legends which met the above criteria were used in analysis. A key 
intention of the Urban Legends Reference Pages is to ascertain the veracity of urban 
legends and each is rated as ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘a mixture of true and false information’, ‘true 
but outdated information’ or ‘legend’; these ratings are generally considered accurate 
(McNamara, 2009). To meet the criteria of being an ‘apocryphal narrative’ only those 
legends which have been rated by the Urban Legends Reference Pages as ‘False’ or 
‘Legend’ were used (complete details on the Urban Legends Reference Pages rating 
system can be found at http://www.snopes.com/info/ratings.asp). 
Two-hundred and sixty legends were originally collected as it was felt that this 
number was large enough to provide a representative sample with potentially all biases 
being represented. During analysis six of these were rejected for not matching the criteria 
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for an urban legend described above, leaving 254 legends in the final sample. Only one 
version of a legend was collected.  
Coding 
The collected legends were coded for the presence of biases using NVivo 10 (QSR 
International, 2012). These biases included emotional content (subdivided into anger, 
amusement, disgust and fear), MCI content, social content (subdivided into social, social 
context and social gossip), stereotype consistency (subdivided into male behaviour, female 
behaviour, race/nationality and regional), and survival information (subdivided into high 
and low). See Table 1 for the coded biases and the definitions used. 
The emotions coded were anger, disgust, fear and amusement. The first three of 
these emotions are taken directly from Ekman’s (1992) list of Basic Emotions which are 
defined as discrete, separate emotional states which differ in terms of expression, 
antecedents, behavioural responses and physiology. The six Basic Emotions are argued to 
be universal and to have evolved to deal with fundamental life tasks common to all humans 
(Ekman, 1992). Of the original six Basic Emotions sadness was not coded due to research 
suggesting it does not enhance transmission (Berger & Milkman, 2009) and surprise was 
not coded due to its neutral valence. Amusement (also referred to as mirth, exhilaration 
[McGhee, 1979; Ruch, 1993] or joy [Panksepp & Burgdorf, 2003]), was chosen for coding 
in place of happiness for a number of reasons. First, it was thought that material 
deliberately intending to elicit amusement would be easier for coders to recognise than 
happiness. Second, as in the other emotions coded, amusement is thought to have an 
adaptive function (Gervais & Wilson, 2005). Amusement is thought to be an adaptive part 
of the human communicative system which enhances social cohesion (Burling, 1993; 
Provine, 2000). Third, Ekman (1999) suggests that amusement shares characteristics with 
the six Basic Emotions and included it in an expanded list. All four of the emotions coded 
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are characterised by high-arousal, are cross-culturally recognised and have been included 
in studies examining emotion in transmission (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Meagher, Arnau 
& Rhudy, 2001; Ruch, 1993; Russell & Mehrabian, 1974).  
To assess inter-rater reliability an independent coder, blind to the hypothesis, coded 
a sample of 50 randomly selected legends. They were provided with the coding definitions 
(see Table 1) and instructed to code as present any biases that they believed were featured 
in the legends. The coding of the second coder and the researcher was highly consistent, 
being in 88% agreement for all biases coded.
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Table 1. Definitions of each of the content biases coded in this study. 
Bias Coding Definition 
Emotional Anger Content which is intended by the teller to evoke anger in the receiver.  
Emotional Amusement Content which is intended by the teller to evoke amusement in the receiver, e.g. ‘a funny story.’ 
Emotional Disgust Content which is intended by the teller to evoke disgust in the receiver. 
Emotional Fear Content which is intended by the teller to evoke fear in the receiver, e.g. ‘a scary story.’ 
Minimally Counter-Intuitive (MCI) Content which breaches category level expectations, such as acting against folk physics, folk biology, etc.* 
Social Content concerning third-party social relationships and interactions at the core of the narrative.
 † 
Social Context Third-party social relationships and interactions are present but are not at core of the narrative.
 
Social Gossip Content concerning intense third-party social relationships and interactions at the core of the narrative, e.g. sexual infidelity. 
†
 
Stereotype Consistent Male Behaviour Behaviour at the core of the narrative which is consistent with male cultural stereotypes. 
Stereotype Consistent Female 
Behaviour 
Behaviour at the core of the narrative which is consistent with female cultural stereotypes. 
Stereotype Consistent 
Race/Nationality Behaviour 
Behaviour at the core of the narrative which is consistent with cultural stereotypes based on race or nationality. 
Stereotype Consistent Regional 
Behaviour 
Behaviour at the core of the narrative which is consistent with regional cultural stereotypes. 
Stereotype Inconsistent Behaviour Behaviour at the core of the narrative which is inconsistent with cultural stereotypes. 
High Survival Information  Information relevant to serious injury or death. 
Low Survival Information Information relevant to injury or potential injury. 
Note. - * Definition based on Boyer (1994); 
†
 Definition based on Mesoudi, Whiten and Dunbar (2006). 
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2.3 Results 
The majority of urban legends coded were shown to feature content which exploits 
cognitive biases. Biases for emotional content, MCI, social information, ecological 
survival information and stereotype consistency were all represented, with 92% of legends 
featuring at least one bias (see Table 2 for frequency of biases coded). 
Table 2. Frequency of each bias coded in the urban legends and the percentage of total 
legends in which the bias was coded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotional Bias  
One of the two biases most frequently coded as present was emotional content bias, 
which was present in 78% of the legends. The bias was subdivided into four emotions, 
three which are characterised by negative valence and high arousal: anger, disgust and fear 
(Russell & Mehrabian, 1974; Meagher et al., 2001), and one which is characterised by 
positive valence and high arousal: amusement (Ruch, 1993). Of these, amusement was the 
most frequent, being present in 47% of legends. Fear and disgust occurred at a frequency 
of 14% and 13% respectively. Anger was the least frequent, present in only 4% of legends. 
An abridged example of a legend which was coded as featuring amusing content is given 
below (it was also coded as featuring social information): 
Bias Frequency Percentage of total (%) 
Emotional 198 78 
Social 195 77 
Survival 69 27 
Stereotype Consistent 58 23 
MCI 14 6 
Stereotype Inconsistent 0 0 
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 Example 1 (Amusing Legend) 
One of the funniest “most-embarrassing-moment” stories I’ve come upon in a long 
time was about a lady who picked up several items at a discount store. Imagine her 
embarrassment when the checker got on the intercom and boomed out for all the 
store to hear, “PRICE CHECK ON LANE THIRTEEN TAMPAX, 
SUPERSIZE.”That was bad enough, but somebody at the rear of the store 
apparently misinterpreted the word “tampax” for “thumbtax.” In a business-like 
tone, a voice boomed back over the intercom. “DO YOU WANT THE KIND YOU 
PUSH IN WITH YOUR THUMB, OR THE KIND YOU POUND IN WITH A 
HAMMER?” 
Social Information Bias 
Social information was one of the two most frequently coded biases, being coded as 
present in 77% of legends. Social information was subdivided into three levels: social 
context, social and social gossip (see Table 1 for definitions). Of these levels, social was 
the most frequently coded, present in 49% of legends. 18% of legends contained social 
context and 9% contained social gossip. Below is an example of a legend which was coded 
as featuring social information: 
 Example 2 (Social Information Legend) 
Have you heard the story about the Rockingham County farmer who bought an old 
Harley-Davidson motorcycle at a yard sale and discovered “To Elvis, Love 
Priscilla” written under the seat? Then he sold it to Jay Leno, late-night talk show 
host, who handed over $1 million for the bike? 
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Ecological Survival Information Bias 
Ecological survival information was present in 27% of legends. This bias was 
subdivided into two levels: high, concerning serious injury or death, and low, concerning 
injury or potential injury. Of these levels high survival information was the most frequently 
coded, being present in 20% of the legends, while low survival information was present in 
7% of legends. The abridged example below featured high survival information: 
 Example 3 (Survival Legend) 
This was a friend of my cousin’s husband…This is real, please be careful… 
Stuart Bidasoe was found slumped over dead in the drivers[sic]seat of his Silver 
1997 Saturn. Beside him was a bag of Halloween candy. It appears that in the 
dense fog, Thursday night, he had run off the road and hit a fence post causing the 
airbag to deploy…Stu Bidasoe had attended a Halloween Party and was on his way 
home. He had a lollypop in his mouth and in the dense fog ran off the road, hit the 
fence post inflating the airbag, pushing the lollypop into his throat. He suffocated 
before help could arrive… 
Stereotype Consistency Bias 
Stereotype consistent behaviour was present in 23% of the legends. Stereotypical 
behaviour based on race or nationality was the most frequent (9%). Other stereotypes 
included gender stereotypes, 7% contained stereotypical male behaviour and 5% contained 
stereotypical female behaviour. Only 2% contained stereotypical behaviour based on 
region. No legends were coded as featuring stereotype inconsistent behaviour. The 
example below was coded as featuring content consistent with racial and/or national 
stereotypes as well as amusement and social information: 
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 Example 4 (Stereotype Consistent Legend) 
A few Decembers ago Japanese department store, desperate to appear westernised 
and with-it, mounted an extravagant Christmas display, featuring a life-sized Santa 
Claus, crucified upon a cross. 
Minimally Counterintuitive (MCI) Bias 
MCI was the least frequently coded bias, present in only 6% of the legends. Below 
is a legend which has MCI content: 
 Example 5 (MCI Legend) 
… Apparently in the movie “Three Men and a Baby” there is one scene that 
revealed what appeared to be a young boy standing between curtains in a room. 
The scene had Ted Danson speaking to a woman I believe…The facts are, a young 
boy died in the house in which the movie was filmed. Some people think it was his 
spirit… 
Each MCI legend was coded for the number of counterintuitive objects or concepts. 
The number of counterintuitive features present ranged from 1-2. 93% of the MCI legends 
featured just one MCI object or concept. 
Multiple Biases 
76% of the legends featured two or more biases, with the majority of legends 
featuring two (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Chart showing the percentage of total legends coded with multiple biases. 
There were a number of common combinations (see Tables 3 and 4 for the 
frequency of combined biases).  
Table 3. Frequency of general biases coded as appearing together in the same legend (% 
of total legends). 
Bias Emotional MCI Social Stereotype Survival 
Emotional  7 (3) 164 (65) 58 (23) 58 (23) 
MCI   9 (4) 0 3 (1) 
Social    52 (20) 44 (17) 
Stereotype     13 (5) 
Survival      
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Table 4. Frequency of specific biases coded as appearing together in the same legend. 
Bias 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
1.Amuse.  1 8 2 2 78 10 20 9 13 16 4 7 5 
2. Anger   0 0 0 7 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
3.Disgust    8 0 8 11 4 3 4 4 0 13 4 
4.Fear     5 11 12 1 3 0 1 0 27 2 
5.MCI      4 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
6.Social       0 0 6 5 17 3 14 3 
7.Soc. Context        0 2 1 4 0 19 6 
8.Gossip         3 10 1 0 2 0 
9.Stereotype Female          4 1 1 4 0 
10.Stereotype Male           2 1 3 1 
11.Stereotype Race            1 5 0 
12.Stereotype 
Regional 
            0 0 
13.Survival High              0 
14.Survival Low               
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Amusement and Social Information were found together in 31% of the legends, 
Survival (High) and Fear were found together in 11% of the legends and Survival (High) 
and Disgust were found in 5% of the legends. The abridged example below is a legend 
which featured social information and amusing content: 
 Example 6 (Social-Amusement Legend) 
… Now, let me tell you something which really, truly happened to a friend of a 
friend, last Christmas… she decided to enclose some rather generous cheques with 
her Christmas cards, scribbling the message: “Have a lovely Christmas but, if you 
don’t mind, buy your own present this year!”…a week or so into January, having 
not received the customary thank-yous from her relatives and friends, she found all 
the cheques in a drawer. In the rush, she had neglected to enclose them. 
An abridged example of a legend featuring ecological survival information and fear 
content is below: 
 Example 7 (Survival-Fear Legend) 
Don’t forget to look !!! This is really scary ...the mystery behind a recent spate of 
deaths has been solved…3 women in Chicago, turned up at hospitals over a 5 day 
period, all with the same symptoms. Fever, chills, and vomiting, followed by 
muscular collapse, paralysis, and finally, death… It was discovered, however, that 
they had all visited the same restaurant……one toxicologist… drove out to the 
restaurant, went into the restroom, and lifted the toilet seat. Under the seat, out of 
normal view, was small spider……So please, before you use a public toilet, lift the 
seat to check for spiders. 
It can save your life!... 
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The example below featured survival information and disgusting content: 
 Example 8 (Survival-Disgust Legend) 
An old lady ordered out for Kentucky Fried Chicken. She was eating along when 
she noticed teeth; she pulled back the crust and discovered she was eating a rat. 
She had a heart attack and died, and her relatives sued Kentucky Fried Chicken for 
a lot of money. 
No Biases 
No biases were coded in 8% of the legends (n = 20). Below is a legend which was 
coded as not featuring any biased content. 
Example 9 (No Bias Legend) 
When I was a little girl, I would watch [Julia Child’s] show every Sunday afternoon 
on PBS. I still remember that episode. In fact I never forgot it. It was a topic of 
conversation with my Mom around Thanksgiving time. It was a raw turkey she was 
preparing. It slid right off the table. She bent down, picked it up, put it back on the 
table and kept on going with the show 
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2.4 Discussion 
This study set out to investigate the role of cognitive susceptibilities in the 
epidemiology of urban legends. To discuss these findings, let us return to the three key 
questions raised in the introduction. 
1. Do urban legends consistently feature content that exploits known cognitive 
biases?  
The results of this study provide compelling evidence that the content and 
popularity of urban legends has been influenced by cognitive biases in cultural 
transmission. Over 90% of the legends included in this analysis contained at least one bias. 
This is consistent with experimental studies demonstrating superior recall and fidelity of 
transmission of information that exploit biases for social and ecological information, 
emotionally arousing content and MCI concepts. They are also in line with studies of 
traditional folklore suggesting that successful tales and myths frequently reflect these 
biases (Barrett, Burdett, & Porter, 2009; Norenzayan et al., 2006; Sugiyama, 2001). 
Only a small minority of legends were coded as featuring no biases. One possible 
explanation of this relates to the individual version of a legend which was coded. Any 
legend, urban or traditional, is likely to exist in multiple versions due to the infidelity of 
cultural transmission. These versions will vary in content to some degree and some will be 
more culturally successful than others. The legend given in Example 9, for instance, more 
commonly ends with the television chef telling the audience at home “Remember you’re 
alone in the kitchen” or “What they don’t know won’t hurt them”, giving the legend a 
much more humorous slant. It is likely that when looking at multiple versions of the one 
legend more versions would exploit at least one bias than none. 
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2. Which biases are the most important in the transmission of urban legends?  
Content which would exploit emotional bias was one of the most frequently coded 
biases (78%), being found in the majority of legends, with all of the emotions coded 
characterised by high arousal. This provides good evidence for an emotional content bias 
in the transmission of narrative. This bias was rarely found on its own (3% of the legends 
were coded as only featuring emotional bias) suggesting that high emotional content grants 
a transmission advantage to a narrative but this is mostly in addition to another content 
bias. The most frequently coded emotion bias was amusement, being coded as present 
more frequently than both disgust and fear put together. The results suggest that ‘funny 
stories’ (Example 1) are found more frequently than ‘disgusting stories’ (Example 8) or 
‘scary stories’ (Example 7). Eriksson and Coultas (2014) found that participants were more 
willing to transmit stories which evoked positively valenced emotions, such as amusement, 
compared to stories which evoked negatively valenced emotions, such as anger, sadness 
and fear. Based on these results it is feasible that positively valenced narratives may 
feature a transmission advantage over negatively valenced narratives. Further research 
examining emotional bias is required to establish if and how it varies between emotions 
evoked and what effect this has on transmission.  
MCI was the least frequent bias, as only 6% of the legends were coded as 
containing this bias. This was unexpected as traditional folklore and myth commonly 
features MCI content (Barrett, Burdett, & Porter, 2009; Norenzayan et al., 2006).The 
number of counterintuitive characters found in each legend is consistent with the cognitive 
optimum of 1-2 suggested by Barrett, Burdett and Porter (2009), however, with the 
majority (93%) only featuring one counterintuitive character they generally fall below the 
cognitive optimum of 2-3 suggested by Norenzayan et al. (2006). Where MCI content is 
featured it is generally in reference to a ghost (see Example 5). Other, more widely known 
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urban legends which feature MCI content, such the ‘Bloody Mary’ or ‘Vanishing 
Hitchhiker’ legends, also refer to ghosts or ghost-like figures. References to other MCI 
characters which are found in traditional folklore, such as talking animals, are apparently 
non-existent in urban legends. The low frequency of legends containing MCI information 
could be explained by genre categorisation. Contemporary folklore which features MCI 
content is usually categorised as ‘ghost stories’ or cryptozoology and UFO tales rather than 
urban legends. Another possible explanation could be the relative ages of traditional 
folklore and urban legends, it is feasible that the MCI urban legends will survive 
transmission for many years longer than the non-MCI urban legends. 
23% of legends were coded as featuring behaviour consistent with cultural 
stereotypes of race, nationality, gender and region but none were coded as featuring 
stereotype inconsistent behaviour. This is generally consistent with the literature; Fyock 
and Stangor (1994) and Clark and Kashima (2007) suggest that SC content has a 
transmission advantage. Thus the results stand in contrast to Dijksterhuis and van 
Knippenberg (1995), Macrae, Hewstone, and Griffiths (1993) and Rojahn and Pettigrew 
(1992) as there was no evidence that SI content would be more frequent than SC content. 
The nature of stereotype consistent information means that it was never seen in isolation as 
a bias and has a strong association with social information and the emotion amusement. 
Example 4 is fairly typical of the legends which featured stereotype consistent content; 
they were almost consistently ‘funny stories’ with the amusement being found in cultural 
stereotypes. Future research needs to examine whether the transmission advantage 
provided by stereotype consistent content is actually due to the advantage provided by 
social information and if these two biases can be separated.  
Over a quarter of legends were coded as featuring ecological survival information. 
This provides support for a survival information bias (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008; Nairne 
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et al., 2007; Kang et al., 2008; Otgaar et al., 2010; Weinstein et al., 2008) and data on the 
oral narratives of foraging peoples (Sugiyama, 2001).The consistency with the latter is 
noteworthy, given the radical differences in the contexts of transmission. One might expect 
ecological information to be less salient to post-industrial populations than to foragers, 
who depend on detailed knowledge of their environments to survive. However, the 
popularity of urban legends concerned with health risks and environmental hazards, such 
as food contamination (e.g. the ‘Razor blade in the apple’ and ‘Kentucky fried rat’ legends 
discussed above) suggests that ecological survival bias still plays an important role in the 
spread and persistence of narratives in the modern world. In most cases, it seems unlikely 
that the legends actually contain useful survival-relevant information. Example 3, for 
instance, could be seen as a serious warning against having a lollypop in your mouth while 
driving, but such a cause of death would seem to be too random and improbable to be 
taken seriously by sweet-toothed road users. On the other hand, legends such as the ‘razor 
blade in the apple’ did affect behaviour on a wide scale (despite its false premises). In both 
cases, the successful transmission of the legend would appear to be based more on our 
susceptibility to information about survival, rather than the usefulness of the information 
itself.  
Over three quarters of urban legends contain social information, a finding 
consistent with experimental studies (Mesoudi, Whiten & Dunbar, 2006). This is a far 
greater than the number of legends containing ecological survival information. Social 
information bias was the bias most frequently coded as the sole bias in a narrative (9% of 
the legends were coded as only featuring social bias), suggesting that a social information 
bias provides enough of an advantage alone for transmission success. Celebrities (such as 
Elvis and Priscilla Presley in Example 2) were sometimes featured in legends containing 
social information, perhaps because they represent people that a large number of people are 
familiar with and therefore provide relevant social information to a wide audience.  
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One of the more unexpected results of Mesoudi, Whiten and Dunbar (2006) was that 
social non-gossip was transmitted just as well as gossip, suggesting that the intensity of 
social relationships described in the information has no effect on the fidelity of 
transmission but what is important is some form of third party interaction. A similar result 
was found in the current study as the social sub-category (which featured the same 
definition as Mesoudi et al.’s social non-gossip) was coded as present more frequently than 
the social gossip sub-category. This result is consistent with the expectation that gossip 
would not be more frequent than social non-gossip. In general, these results are consistent 
with the predictions based on the Machiavellian Intelligence or Social Brain hypotheses 
and suggest that humans are highly susceptible to narratives featuring social information 
content. 
3. When content biases are present in legends do they tend to occur individually 
or in combination with other biases? If so, which combinations are common 
and which rare? 
The majority of legends were coded as featuring more than one bias (see Figure 1), 
suggesting that exploiting multiple biases provides a greater transmission advantage to a 
narrative. In the majority of legends, however, a combination of two biases was the highest 
number featured, suggesting an optimum number of biases to be combined for a 
transmission advantage. One possible explanation for this is that biases are exploited by 
content and that with more biases there would be more content which could make the 
narrative overly complex and unmemorable. Another possible explanation is that different 
biases may conflict with each other, making the narrative nonsensical or unappealing. As 
Upal (2011) has suggested, with counterintuitive characters in a narrative, the legend must 
remain coherent to be memorable so there is likely to be a limit to the amount of biased 
content which can be included before the narrative loses coherence. Multiple biases 
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appearing together is also seen in model-based biases (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013).In 
this case children have been shown to calibrate across multiple model-based biases and 
certain biases will dominate over others. Content biases could function in a similar way, 
with certain biases granting a greater transmission advantage than others. Seeing which 
biases are combined and the frequency of their combination with other biases could 
suggest the relative strength of a bias in transmission.  
Social information was by far the most frequent single bias, suggesting it provides 
enough of a transmission advantage in itself. Other biases were also frequently combined 
with social information. As yet research into content biases has focused on a single bias, 
future research should examine how bias combination can affect the transmission of a 
narrative and to what extent this increases the transmission advantage. The most frequent 
combinations suggest certain common ‘story types’ which are culturally successful. The 
most common ‘story type’ among the legends collected for this study was the ‘funny 
story’; these legends combined social information and amusement. Generally the 
amusement would be generated by the social interaction (see Example 6). Another ‘story 
type’ would be the ‘scary story’ or ‘warning’ (see Example 7), combining survival 
information and fear and structured as a warning against certain behaviour. ‘Scary’ legends 
frequently emphasise the truth of the information and often urge the receiver to transmit 
the content (as in Example 7). Another common ‘story type’ that could be viewed as the 
stereotypical urban legend is the ‘disgusting story’ (see Example 8) which combines 
disgust and survival information. Example 8 is a version of the ‘Kentucky fried rat’ legend, 
which has proved to highly successful in cultural transmission (Fine, 1980). Its success 
could be explained by the fact that it exploits two cognitive biases, both survival 
information bias and emotional content bias. These different story types suggest that some 
biases may complement each other and generate a greater transmission advantage and 
therefore be frequently found together 
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Another question that arises from legends featuring multiple biases is: are the 
biases all contributing to a transmission advantage or is some biased content ‘riding’ on the 
transmission advantage of another? For example, the majority of survival information was 
coded as high survival (information relevant to serious injury or death) so feasibly the 
cultural success of urban legends which feature survival content owe their success to also 
exploiting emotional biases such as fear or disgust (77% of legends which were coded as 
featuring high survival information were also coded as evoking fear or disgust) rather than 
combining survival information and emotional content. Stubbersfield, Tehrani and Flynn 
(under review c, presented in Chapter 5) found that survival information granted less of an 
advantage along a transmission chain compared to social information and that urban 
legends which combined social information and survival information did not significantly 
differ in transmission fidelity from legends which just featured social information. These 
results suggest that the prevalence of threats and hazards found in urban legends may be 
due to their combination with social information bias or emotional bias, rather than a 
strong susceptibility to survival-related content per se. 
The assumption of content biases is that they exploit shared cognitive dispositions 
towards certain properties of cultural items. A criticism of this is that the majority of the 
research examining content biases has used participants from nations described by 
Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010a) as western, educated, industrialised, rich and 
democratic (WEIRD). People from WEIRD nations represent only 12% of the world’s 
population and are thought to be psychologically unusual (Arnett, 2008; Henrich, Heine & 
Norenzaya, 2010b). As such the results of such studies may not be generalisable to humans 
as a whole. The urban legends presented here are collected from western, English-speaking 
countries and as such may only reflect the content biases of people from WEIRD nations. 
There is evidence, however, to suggest that the same content biases are present in the 
folklore of non-WEIRD nations. Studies have found evidence for content biases using 
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traditional, pre-industrial folklore such as fairy tales (Barrett, Burdett, & Porter, 2009; 
Norenzayan et al., 2006) and, as discussed above, the oral narratives of foraging people can 
be seen to contain information relevant to survival and social interaction (Sugiyama, 2001). 
Some of the Setsuwa bungaku (tale literature) of Japan’s Kamakura period (1185-1333) 
frequently feature motifs related to survival information (i.e. food contamination stories or 
tales of unpleasant death) and social information (i.e. tales involving social interaction and 
social embarrassment) which bear striking similarities to contemporary, Western urban 
legends (Schaefer, 1990). Given the presence of biased content in this diverse, 
international range of folklore it is plausible to suggest that content biases (or some of 
them at least) are shared universally, however, the relative frequencies examined here may 
vary significantly. For instance, social information is likely to be particularly salient cross-
culturally, as humans live in social groups, but the frequency of survival information found 
in folklore may vary on how dangerous the ecological environment is, or how reliant on 
the local ecological environment one is for food. The relative frequency of other biases 
may also vary depending on the environment. As such the relative frequencies found here 
may not necessarily be found in non-WEIRD folklore. Examining how the relative 
frequency of content biases is reflected in folklore cross-culturally presents an interesting 
avenue for future research and would go towards examining how truly universal these 
biases are.   
Conclusions 
In sum, this study has found compelling evidence that the popularity and longevity 
of urban legends can be explained, at least in part, by cognitive dispositions to learn and 
transmit certain kinds of information. Following Sperber (1996), I have argued that 
although it is likely that most of these dispositions were selected for in our evolutionary 
past, they make us susceptible to narratives that may have no adaptive value in themselves, 
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such as urban legends. Evidence was found for all of the content biases which have been 
suggested by experimental research, with the exception of stereotype inconsistent content. 
The distributions of content biases suggest humans are especially susceptible to narratives 
containing social information, which was found in the majority of legends. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that human cognition was shaped to a greater degree by selective 
pressures from the social environment than the natural environment. The results further 
suggest that combining biases together in a single narrative could confer a greater 
transmission advantage than a single bias alone, although further research needs to be 
conducted to examine how biases can combine and the effects of this on transmission. Last 
of all, I emphasise that in discussing ‘susceptibilities’ I eschew any pejorative implications 
associated with the term. Occasionally urban legends may be harmful, but on the whole 
they are entertaining and fun (as evidenced by the frequency of amusing themes). 
Sometimes they may even be therapeutic, providing ways of making sense of a frightening 
or unpredictable world, as proponents of the symbolic interactionist school have 
emphasised. But above all, urban legends are catchy, and by investigating the underlying 
psychological factors that make them so, I have sought to demonstrate the value of an 
epidemiological approach to cultural phenomena. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 – The Epidemiology of Urban Legends 
 
64 
 
References 
Allport, G.W., & Postman, L. (1947).The Psychology of Rumor. New York: Holt, Rinehard
 and Winston. 
Arnett, J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%: why American psychology needs to become less 
 American. American Psychologist, 63, 602. 
Atran, S., & Norenzayan, A. (2004). Religion’s evolutionary landscape: Counterintuition, 
 commitment, compassion, communion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 713–
 770. 
Bangerter, A. (2000). Transformation between scientific and social representations of 
conception: The method of serial reproduction. British Journal of Psychology, 97, 
405-423. 
Barrett, J.L. (2000). Exploring the natural foundations of religion.Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 4, 29-34. 
Barrett, J.L. (2008). Coding and quantifying counterintuitiveness in religious concepts: 
Theoretical and methodological reflections. Method and Theory in the Study of 
Religion, 20, 308-338. 
Barrett, J.L., Burdett, E.R., & Porter, T.J. (2009).Counterintuitiveness in folktales: Finding 
the cognitive optimum. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 9, 271-287. 
Barrett, J.L., & Nyhof, M.A. (2001). Spreading of non-natural concepts: The role if 
intuitive conceptual structures in memory and transmission of cultural materials. 
Journal of Cognition and Culture, 1, 69-100. 
Bartlett, F.C. (1932). Remembering. Oxford, UK: Macmillan. 
Chapter 2 – The Epidemiology of Urban Legends 
 
65 
 
Berger, J., & Milkman, K. (2010).Social transmission, emotion, and the virality of online 
content.Wharton Research Paper. 
Best, J. (1990).Threatened Children: Rhetoric and Concern About Child Victims. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Best, J., & Horiuchi, G.T. (1985). The razor blade in the apple: The social construction of 
urban legends. Social Problems, 32, 488-499. 
Biesele, M. (1978). Sapience and scarce resources: Communication systems of the !Kung 
and other foragers. Social Science Information, 17, 921-947. 
Biesele, M. (1993).Women Like Meat: The Folklore and Foraging Ideology of the 
Kalahari Ju/’hoan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
Blanks, J. (Director), Matthews, G., McDonnell, M. & Monitz, N.H. (Producers). (1998). 
Urban Legend [Motion Picture]. United States: TriStar Pictures. 
Boyer, P. (1994). The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Religion. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Boyer, P., & Ramble, C. (2001). Cognitive templates for religious concepts: Cross-cultural 
evidence for recall of counter-intuitive representations. Cognitive Science, 25, 535-
564. 
Brunvard, J.H. (1981). The Vanishing Hitchhiker. New York: Norton. 
Brunvand, J.H. (2000). The Truth Never Stands in the Way of a Good Story. Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Burling, R. (1993). Primate calls, human language, and nonverbal communication. Current 
Anthropology, 34, 25-53. 
Chapter 2 – The Epidemiology of Urban Legends 
 
66 
 
Byrne, R.W., & Whiten, A. (Eds.). (1988). Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise 
and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes and Humans. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.  
Chinese restaurant bankruptcy fear after false dog meat rumour. (2011). Telegraph Online. 
Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/foodanddrink/8824481/Chinese-
restaurant-bankruptcy-fear-after-false-dog-meat-rumour.html. 
Claidière, N., & Sperber, D. (2007).The role of attraction in cultural evolution.Journal of 
Cognition and Culture, 7, 89-111. 
Clark, A.E., & Kashima, Y. (2007). Stereotypes help people connect with others in the 
community: A situated functional analysis of the stereotype consistency bias in 
communication. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 1028-1039.  
Clutton-Brock, T. H., & Harvey, P. H. (1980).Primates, brains and ecology.Journal of the 
Zoological Society of London, 190, 309–323. 
Dijksterhuis, A., & van Knippenberg, A. (1995). Memory for stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent information as a function of processing pace.European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 25, 689-693. 
Dunbar, R.I.M. (1993). Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and 
language.Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 16, 681-735. 
Dunbar, R.I.M. (1998). The social brain hypothesis.Evolutionary Anthropology, 6, 178-
190. 
Dunbar, R. I. M. (2003). The social brain: Mind, language, and society in evolutionary 
perspective. Annual Review of Anthropology, 32, 163–181. 
Chapter 2 – The Epidemiology of Urban Legends 
 
67 
 
Dundes, A. (1971). On the psychology of legend. In W.D. Hand (Ed.), American Folk 
Legend (pp. 21-22.). Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Ekman, P. (1992). An argument for basic emotions. Cognition & Emotion, 6, 169-200. 
Ekman, P. (1999). Basic emotions. In T. Dalgleish & M. Power (Eds.), Handbook of 
Cognition and Emotion (pp. 45-60). Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  
Ellis, B. (1983). De Legendis Urbis: Modern legends in ancient Rome. Journal of 
American Folklore, 96, 200-208. 
Eriksson, K., & Coultas, J. C. (2014). Corpses, maggots, poodles and rats: Emotional 
selection operating in three phases of cultural transmission of urban legends. 
Journal of Cognition and Culture, 14, 1-26. 
Fessler, D. M., Pisor, A. C., & Navarrete, C. D. (2014). Negatively-biased credulity and 
the cultural evolution of beliefs. PloS one, 9, e95167. 
Fine, G.A. (1979). Cokelore and Coke law: Urban belief tales and the problem of multiple 
origins. Journal of American Folklore, 92, 477-482.  
Fine, G.A. (1980). The Kentucky Fried Rat: Legends and modern society. Journal of the 
Folklore Institute, 17, 222-243. 
Fox Tree, J.E., & Weldon, M.S. (2007).Retelling urban legends.The American Journal of 
Psychology, 120, 459-476. 
Fyock, J., & Stangor, C. (1994). The role of memory biases in stereotype maintenance. 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 331-343. 
Gervais, M., & Wilson, D. S. (2005). The evolution and functions of laughter and humor: 
A synthetic approach. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 80, 395-430. 
Chapter 2 – The Epidemiology of Urban Legends 
 
68 
 
Goodwin, G. (1939). Myths and tales of the White Mountain Apache. In: Memoirs of the 
American Folk-Lore Society, vol. XXXIII (pp. 1-223). New York: J. J. Augustin.   
Heath, C., Bell, C., & Sternberg, E. (2001). Emotional selection in memes: The case of 
urban legends. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1028-1041. 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010a). Most people are not WEIRD. Nature, 
466, 29-29. 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010b). The weirdest people in the world?. 
Behavioral and brain sciences, 33, 61-83.  
Kang, S., McDermott, K. B., & Cohen, S. (2008). The mnemonic advantage of processing 
fitness-relevant information.Memory and Cognition, 36, 1151-1156. 
Kapferer, J-N. (1990). Rumors: Uses, Interpretations, and Images. New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction Publishers.  
Kashima, Y. (2000). Maintaining cultural stereotypes in the serial reproduction of 
narratives.Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 594-604. 
LaBar, K.S., & Cabeza, R. (2006). Cognitive neuroscience of emotional memory. Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 7, 54-64. 
Macrae, C.N., Hewstone, M., & Griffiths, R.J. (1993). Processing load and memory for 
stereotype-based information. European Journal of Social Psychology, 23, 77-87. 
MacGhee, P. E. (1979). Humor: Its origin and development. San Francisco, CA: WH 
Freeman and Company. 
Mar, R.A., & Oatley, K. (2008). The function of fiction is the abstraction and simulation of 
social experience, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 173-192. 
Chapter 2 – The Epidemiology of Urban Legends 
 
69 
 
McNamara, P. (2009, April 13). Fact-checking the fact-checkers: Snopes.com gets an 'A' 
[Web log post]. Retrieved 30 July, 2014, from http://www.networkworld.com.  
Meagher, M.W., Arnau, R.C., & Rhudy, J.L. (2001). Pain and emotion: Effects of affective 
picture modulation. Psychosomatic Medicine, 63, 79-90.  
Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A., & Dunbar, R.I.M. (2006). A bias for social information in human 
cultural transmission.British Journal of Psychology, 97, 405-423. 
Mullen , P.B. (1972). Modern legend and rumor theory.Journal of the Folklore Institute, 9, 
95. 
Nairne, J.S. (2010). Adaptive memory: Evolutionary constraints on remembering. 
Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 53, 1-32. 
Nairne, J.S., and Pandeirada, J.N.S. (2008). Adaptive memory: Is survival processing 
special? Journal of Memory and Language, 59, 377-385. 
Nairne, J.S., Pandeirada, J.N.S., & Thompson, S.R. (2008). Adaptive memory: The 
comparative value of survival processing. Psychological Science, 19, 176-180.  
Nairne, J.S., Thompson, S.R., & Pandeirada, J.N.S. (2007). Adaptive memory: Survival 
processing enhances retention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 33, 263-273.  
Norenzayan, A., Atran, S., Faulkner, J., & Schaller, M. (2006). Memory and mystery: The 
cultural selection of minimally counterintuitive narratives. Cognitive Science, 30, 
531-553. 
Otgaar, H., Smeets, T., & van Bergen, S. (2010). Picturing survival memories: Enhanced 
memory after fitness-relevant processing occurs for verbal and visual stimuli. 
Memory and Cognition, 38, 23–28. 
Chapter 2 – The Epidemiology of Urban Legends 
 
70 
 
Panksepp, J., & Burgdorf, J. (2003). “Laughing” rats and the evolutionary antecedents of 
human joy? Physiology & Behavior, 79, 533-547. 
Provine, R. R. (2001). Laughter: A scientific investigation. London: Penguin. 
QSR International.(2012). Nvivo 10 [Computer software].Available from 
http://www.qsrinternational.com. 
Rojahn, K., & Pettigrew, T.F. (1992). Memory of schema-relevent information: A meta-
analytic resolution. British Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 81-109. 
Rose, B. (Director), Barker, C., & Golin, S. (Producers). (1992). Candyman [Motion 
picture]. United States: Propaganda Films. 
Ruch , W. (1993). Exhilaration and humor. In M. Lewis and J.M. Haviland (Eds.), 
Handbook of Emotions (pp. 605-616). New York: Guilford Press. 
Russell, J.A., & Mehrabian, A. (1974).Distinguishing anger and anxiety in terms of 
emotional response factions.Journal of Consulting Clinical Psychology, 42, 79-83. 
Schaefer, D. (1990). Urban legends and the Japanese tale. Tumbridge Wells: Institute for 
Cultural Research.  
Seipp, C. (2004). Where urban legends fall.National Review Online, 21 July, viewed 19 
April 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/211560/where-urban-legends-
fall/catherine-seipp/. 
Shibutani, T. (1966).Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor. New York: Bobbs-
Merrill. 
Simpson, J. (1981). Rationalized motifs in urban legends.Folklore, 92, 203-207. 
Chapter 2 – The Epidemiology of Urban Legends 
 
71 
 
Sperber, D. (1985). On Anthropological Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Sperber, D. (1996). Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Sperber, D. & Hirschfeld, L. (2004). The cognitive foundations of cultural stability and 
diversity. TRENDS in Cognitive Science 8(1): 40-46 
Stubbersfield, J. & Tehrani, J. (2013). Expect the unexpected? Testing for minimally 
counterintuitive (MCI) bias in the transmission of contemporary legends: A 
computational phylogenetic approach. Social Science Computer Review, 31, 90-
102.   
Stubbersfield, J.M., Tehrani, J.J, & Flynn E.G. (under review c). Serial killers, spiders and 
cybersex: social and survival information bias in the transmission of urban legends. 
British Journal of Psychology. 
Sugiyama, M.S. (2001). Food, foragers, and folklore: The role of narrative in human 
subsistence. Evolution and Human Behaviour, 22, 221-240.  
Tangherlini, T.R. (1990). “It happened not too far from here...”: A survey of legend theory 
and characterization. Western Folklore, 49, 371-390. 
Upal, M.A. (2011). Memory, mystery and coherence: Does the presence of 2-3 
counterintuitive concepts predict cultural success of a narrative? Journal of 
Cognition and Culture, 11, 23-48. 
Upal, M.A., Gonce, L.O., Tweney, R.D., & Slone, D.J. (2007). Contextualising 
counterintuitiveness: How context affects comprehension and memorability of 
counterintuitive concepts. Cognitive Science, 31, 415-439. 
Chapter 2 – The Epidemiology of Urban Legends 
 
72 
 
Victor, J. (1990). Satanic cult rumors as contemporary legend. Western Folklore, 49, 51-
81. 
Warren, R. (1972). The Community in America. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Weinstein, Y., Bugg, J. M., & Roediger, H. L. (2008). Can the survival recall advantage be 
explained by basic memory processes? Memory and Cognition, 36, 913–919. 
Whitehouse, H. (2004) Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of Religious 
Transmission. Walnut Creek: Alta Mira. 
Whiten, A. (1999). Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis. In R. A. Wilson & F. C. Keil 
(Eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (pp. 495–497). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Wood, L. A., Kendal, R. L., & Flynn, E. G. (2013). Whom do children copy? Model-based 
biases in social learning. Developmental Review, 33, 341-356. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 – Experimental Material 
 
73 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Experimental Material and Rating Content Biases 
 
This chapter presents a study which involved rating urban legends on scales related to their 
content in order to generate material for future experiments. A version of this chapter has 
been published as Stubbersfield, J. M
1, 2
., Tehrani, J. J
1
., & Flynn, E. G
2
. (2014). Serial 
killers, spiders and cybersex: Social and survival information bias in the transmission of 
urban legends. British Journal of Psychology, DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12073.  
¹Centre for the Coevolution of Biology and Culture, Department of Anthropology, Durham 
University, Durham, DH1 3LE, U.K. 
²Centre for the Coevolution of Biology and Culture, School of Education/Department of 
Psychology, Durham University, Durham, U.K. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 – Experimental Material 
 
74 
 
Abstract 
 The experimental material used in studies examining content biases has varied 
considerably, ranging from word lists specifically created for the experiment to naturally 
occurring stories with a longstanding oral history. The narratives used range from stories 
that people would be unlikely to transmit in a natural setting to stories which are likely to 
be still actively transmitted today. The aim of this study is to collect ratings based on 
content biases for a number of urban legends so that some of these legends can be used in 
future experiments examining these biases. A questionnaire is used to collect the ratings 
and the results demonstrate that the urban legends vary significantly in bias-related 
content. The ratings provided by this study and the analysis of how the legends differ will 
be used to select legends to be used as material in future experiments.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Research has demonstrated that when material is transmitted from one person to 
another it is subject to cognitive selection pressures which alter its content and structure 
(Bartlett, 1932; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008; Mesoudi, Whiten & 
Dunbar, 2006; Sperber, 1996). Experimental studies have demonstrated that humans are 
biased to attend to, recall and transmit certain types of content. A number of ‘content 
biases’ have been demonstrated experimentally; these include an ecological survival 
information bias (Nairne 2010), a social information bias (Mesoudi et al., 2006), an 
emotional bias (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001), a minimally counter-intuitive (MCI) bias 
(Boyer & Ramble, 2001), and a stereotype consistency bias (Kashima, 2000).  
The experimental studies which have examined these content biases have used a 
range of experimental material. In demonstrating survival information bias Nairne and 
colleagues have used individual recall tests using word lists. For example, Nairne and 
Pandeirada (2008) used a list of thirty-two words, comprising of eight exemplars from four 
unique categories: four footed animals, fruits, vegetables and types of human dwelling. 
Social information bias, however, has mostly been demonstrated using short narratives. 
Mesoudi et al. (2006) used original paragraphs reflecting four types of information: social 
gossip, social non-gossip, individual and physical. The social gossip paragraph related a 
story about a female university student having an affair with her married professor and 
becoming pregnant. The social non-gossip paragraph described a female student asking a 
man for directions to a swimming pool. The individual paragraph gave details of a 
student’s everyday life with no social interaction. The physical paragraph related the 
physical description of a place. These paragraphs were matched for number of words, 
sentences and propositions and were rated for coherence, familiarity and realism by ten 
participants. Mesoudi et al.’s material was influenced by material used by Owens, Boyer 
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and Black (1979). Owens et al. used five written descriptions of a female student involved 
in five everyday events including making a cup of coffee, going to the doctors or attending 
a lecture. Participants were given either a social or non-social motivation for the student, 
with the social motivation being that she had had an affair with her professor. Similar 
material has also been used by Reysen, Talbert, Dominko, Jones and Kelley (2011), which 
used narrative paragraphs reflecting a range of social and non-social information including 
gossip implicit, gossip explicit and non-gossip implicit. Again, stories of a female student 
having an affair with her male professor were used, as well as stories describing a male 
student cheating on his girlfriend, people playing tennis, a student meeting Oprah Winfrey 
and a shoe salesman walking home from work.  
A bias for stereotype consistent content has been largely demonstrated using 
written narratives as experimental material. Bangerter (2000) used a short scientific text 
describing the conception process. Kashima (2000) used an original short narrative 
describing a couple’s plans to entertain the man’s employer by hosting a dinner party. The 
narrative had the couple displaying both stereotype consistent (SC) and stereotype 
inconsistent (SI) behaviour. Propositions were classified as plot relevant (central 
propositions) or background and stereotype relevant or stereotype neutral. Stereotype 
relevant propositions were then classified as either male SI, male SC, female SC or female 
SI. Unlike the studies investigating stereotypes in cultural transmission which followed, 
Allport and Postman (1947) used a picture as the original material, with the serial 
reproduction being based on participants’ recalled description of the picture.  
In demonstrating MCI bias, Barrett and Nyhof (2001) followed Bartlett (1932) in 
using Native American folktales. These stories were deliberately chosen as narratives 
which would be unfamiliar to the experiment’s participants. They also used two original 
stories, one describing an inter-galactic diplomat’s visit to an alien museum and the other 
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describing a brother and sister’s journey from school to home. Both of these stories could 
be manipulated to alter the number of counterintuitive and intuitive concepts, with the alien 
exhibits being altered in the alien museum story and items encountered during the journey 
altered in the brother and sister story. Essentially, these stories function as lists of 
counterintuitive and intuitive concepts within a narrative framework. Experimental 
material from Barrett and Nyhof (2001) has also been used as the material for experiments 
by Boyer and Ramble (2001) and Upal (2005; Upal, Gonce, Tweney, & Slone, 2007). Upal 
(2011) used three short narratives, matched for word length, with three versions of each 
story, each version having either one, three or six counterintuitive concepts. Rather than 
using a narrative form of experimental material, Norenzayan (2006) used lists which varied 
in the proportion of counterintuitive to intuitive ideas presented.  
In demonstrating a bias for content which evokes a higher level of emotion, Heath 
et al. (2001) used urban legends. As their experiment focused on the emotion of disgust, 
only urban legends featuring one or more disgust evoking motifs were used. These legends 
were rated by eight participants on their emotional content and a variety of characteristics 
such as informational value, plausibility and whether they contained a moral lesson. These 
urban legends were naturally occurring narratives and, due to the potential for confounding 
variables between the legends, in a second experiment a sample of twelve legends was 
manipulated in terms of the level of disgust evoked. Eriksson and Coultas (2014) also used 
urban legends to examine emotional content bias. In their study four separate, naturally 
occurring, urban legends were altered into paragraphs of a story about a person travelling 
and their experiences. Each paragraph was matched for number of sentences and rated for 
how humorous, surprising, interesting and plausible they were. Different versions of the 
story were created: high-disgust, low-disgust and social and asocial.  
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As discussed above, the experimental material used in studies demonstrating 
content biases are for the most part short narrative passages. These vary from original 
narratives created for the experiment with a high degree of manipulation, such as the alien 
museum story (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001), to naturally occurring stories with a longstanding 
oral history, such as Native American folktales (Barret & Nyhof, 2001). The narratives 
also range from stories that people would be unlikely to transmit in a natural setting, such 
as the description of a woman asking for directions to a swimming pool (Mesoudi et al., 
2006), to stories which are likely to be actively transmitted today, such as the urban 
legends used by Heath et al. (2001). For the purposes of the experimental studies 
examining content biases presented here, it was decided that urban legends would provide 
excellent experimental material.  
The use of urban legends presents several opportunities. The stories themselves are 
naturally occurring and are actively transmitted between people, as such they provide 
excellent ecological validity as experimental material. As multiple versions of each story 
exist they can also be manipulated to a degree while still reflecting the content of a 
naturally occurring story. Urban legends offer a wide range of readily available stories that 
exploit all of the biases that have been demonstrated thus far, and as such they can provide 
excellent material for examining these content biases. In order to provide a greater degree 
of experimental control, the urban legends used are re-written to match for number of 
words and number of central propositions (for the purposes of analysis). Here, central 
propositions are defined as plot-relevant propositions without which the overall legend 
would either change fundamentally or be rendered incoherent. Other propositions are 
considered to be those which can be removed without altering the plot. Only central 
propositions were used so as to avoid legends with more background details appearing to 
have poorer recall. 
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The aim of the study presented in this chapter is to rate the legends in various 
criteria relevant to transmission including ratings on each content bias that has been 
experimentally demonstrated (with the exception of MCI, the complex nature of defining 
MCI makes it unsuitable for ratings by naïve participants, although it may be reflected 
somewhat in the plausibility ratings). These ratings can then be used to select appropriate 
legends for studies examining content biases and provide information regarding potentially 
confounding variables between the legends so accurate conclusions can be drawn.  
3.2 Methods 
Participants  
 One-hundred-and-six participants (71 females) completed questionnaires. Their 
ages ranged from 19 to 58 years with a mean age of 23 years (SD = 5.75). The majority 
(73%) were undergraduate students studying psychology, others were not students and 
were recruited through opportunity sampling.  
Materials  
Seventeen urban legends were collected from the Urban Legend Reference Pages 
(www.snopes.com); these were selected based on how they reflected content biases. The 
legends were re-written to approximately match for word length (88-93 words) and number 
of central propositions (5-6). Control material was also created; this was adapted from a 
description of the formation of Cheddar Gorge from Wikipedia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheddar_gorge), re-written to match the legends in terms of 
word length and central propositions (see Appendix A for the full text of these legends and 
the control material). Questionnaires were created which contained eight questions asking 
about familiarity with each legend, emotional content, plausibility, survival information, 
social information and gender stereotypes. The questions were: 
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 Are you familiar with the story? (This was a multiple choice question. In the case 
that participants were familiar they were asked further questions related to who 
they heard it from and how they heard it). 
 What emotion or emotions did you feel while reading this story? 
 Please rate to what extent you felt each emotion (this questions was answered using 
a seven-point Likert scale from ‘1 = very little’ to ‘7 = very much’). 
 Please rate to what extent you you believe this story to be plausible (from ‘1= likely 
to be true’ to ‘7= very unlikely to have taken place’) 
 Please rate to what extent the story contains ‘information relevant to health and 
survival’ / ‘information concerning social interaction or relationships’ / ‘behaviour 
stereotypical for either gender’ (each of these was answered ‘1 = very little’ to ‘7 = 
a lot’. 
 Please rate how likely you would be to pass this story on as a true/interesting/funny 
story (each of these was answered ‘1 = not likely’ to ‘7 = very likely’). 
See Appendix B for the full questionnaire. These questions were intended to collect 
data on potential content biases that the legends may exploit (see Mesoudi & Whiten, 
2008). The order of legends presented was counterbalanced so no two participants received 
the same legends in the same order.  
Procedure 
Participants were asked to take part in a study regarding the cultural transmission of 
urban legends. Each participant was presented with a questionnaire and answered questions 
on three or four legends, or the control material. This number was chosen so as it be 
practical in terms of participant recruitment while not producing questionnaires that were 
over-long and would lose the participant’s interest. Each of the eight questions was asked 
for each of the material presented.  
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3.3 Results 
Each legend and the control material received 20 ratings on each scale (see 
Appendix C for the mean ratings for each legend).  
Familiarity 
 Participants were asked to identify their level of familiarity with the legend, from 
three options “Yes, I have heard it before,” “I have heard a similar story” and “No, I am 
not at all familiar.” 72 of the participants had either heard a legend before or heard a 
similar story (20% of the legends were rated as heard before or heard similar). Chi-square 
tests on each legend revealed that significantly more legends were rated as unfamiliar (χ21 
= 5 to 16.20, ps < .05). The exceptions being four legends where there was no significant 
difference between the frequency of familiar and unfamiliar ratings. These three legends 
were “Caller” (9/20 unfamiliar, χ21 = .20, p >.05), “Fish” (12/20 unfamiliar, χ
2
1 = .80, p 
>.05), “Spiders” (14/20 unfamiliar, χ21 = .20, p >.05) and “Clown” (11/20 unfamiliar, χ
2
1 = 
.20, p >.05). 52 (49%) of the participants were either familiar or had heard similar for at 
least one of the legends they received.  
Content Bias Ratings 
Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA tests were conducted to examine the variation in 
scores between legends. Significant variation between legends was found in emotional 
content (χ2 17 = 43.37, p < .001), plausibility (χ
2 
17 = 32.31, p < .05), survival information 
(χ2 17 = 101.76, p < .0001), social information (χ
2 
17 = 186.77, p < .0001) and gender 
stereotyped behaviour (χ2 17 = 126.47, p < .0001). Campbell and Skillings (1985) stepwise 
step-down multiple comparisons (overall error rate controlled at p = .05) were used to 
group the legends into homogenous subsets (see Appendix D for tables showing 
homogenous subsets for each scale).  
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There were three subsets with similar emotion scores, with fifteen legends in the 
highest scoring subset. The legend with the highest mean emotion score was Tumour with 
a mean of 6.50 and the lowest was the control material with a mean score of 4.70. There 
were two subsets with similar plausibility scores, with fourteen legends in the highest 
scoring subset. As the scale used in the plausibility rating ran from 1 being ‘likely to be 
true’ to 7 being ‘very unlikely to have taken place’, a high score here reflects being rated as 
less plausible. The legend with highest mean plausibility score (the least plausible) was 
Skin with a mean score of 5.60 and the lowest (most plausible) was Dinner with a mean 
score of 3.50. There were five subsets with similar survival information scores, with ten 
legends in the highest scoring subset. The legend with the highest mean survival score was 
Killer, with a mean score of 5.05 and the lowest was Dinner, with a mean score of 1.80. 
There were six subsets with similar social information scores, with six legends in the 
highest scoring subset. The legend with the highest mean social information score was 
Cybersex, with a mean score of 5.85 and the lowest was the control material, with a mean 
score of 1.40. There were ten subsets with similar gender stereotype scores, with six 
legends in the highest scoring subset. The legend with highest mean gender stereotype 
score was Choke with a mean score of 5.30 and the lowest was the control material, with a 
mean score of 1.45.  
Significant correlations were found between social information score and emotion 
score (r358 = .17, p < .01) and between social information score and gender stereotype 
score (r358 = .48, p < .01). No other ratings were significantly correlated (ps > .05).  
‘Pass on’ Ratings 
 ‘Pass on as true’ ratings were found to be significantly correlated with scores for 
emotion (r358 = .12, p < .05), plausibility (r358 = -.21, p < .01) and survival information (r358 
= .21, p < .01). ‘Pass on as interesting’ ratings were found to be significantly correlated 
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with scores for emotion (r358 = .18, p < .01), survival information (r358 = .27, p < .01) and 
social information (r358 = .19, p < .01). ‘Pass on as funny’ ratings were found to be 
significantly correlated with scores for plausibility (r358 = -.14, p < .01), survival 
information (r358 = -.25, p < .01), social information (r358 = .33, p < .01) and stereotype 
consistent behaviour (r358 = .37, p < .01).  
Participant Effects 
 Gender differences in each of the scales for each legend were tested for using 
Mann-Whitney U tests but no significant differences were found (Us = 17.5 – 72, ps > 
.05). For most of the legends there were no significant age effects on each scale (rs = -.42 
to .42, p > .05). Significant age effects were found in the stereotype score of the Tumour 
legend (r = .44, p < .05), and the social information scores of the Skin legend (r = -.46, p < 
.05) and the control material (r = .56, p < .05).  
3.4 Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to provide information and ratings for urban legends 
which could then be used to inform the selection of these legends for future experiments. 
Each urban legend received twenty ratings on a number of scales related to content which 
has been demonstrated to influence transmission. These ratings can then be used to select 
which of the urban legends are suitable to be used as material to examine content biases 
and can also inform interpretation of the results of these experiments.  
 Previous research has found that bias exploiting content can increase a participants 
willingness to pass information on (the ‘choose-to-transmit’ phase of transmission). As 
part of this study participants were asked to give each legend a score based on their 
willingness to pass the story on as interesting, true and funny. These ‘pass on’ ratings were 
found to correlate with some of the content bias-related scores. Legends which scored high 
Chapter 3 – Experimental Material 
 
84 
 
for emotion were more likely to be passed on as true or interesting. The range of emotions 
evoked by the legends is likely to have prevented this score from correlating with ‘pass on 
as funny’. This finding supports Heath et al. (2001) and Eriksson and Coultas (2014) who 
found that urban legends which evoked high emotion levels had an advantage at the 
‘choose-to-transmit’ phase of transmission. Legends which were rated as more plausible 
were more likely to be passed on as true or funny; this supports Heath et al. (2001) who 
found plausibility to be a significant predictor of participants’ willingness to pass a story 
on. The finding that social information and stereotype consistency were correlated with the 
pass on as funny scores is consistent with the association between both of these biases and 
the emotion of amusement found by Stubbersfield, Tehrani and Flynn (under review a, 
presented in Chapter 2).  
 Familiarity with the legends was thought to be potentially influential in how 
participants recall the legends in a linear transmission chain. As such, one of the questions 
asked if participants were familiar with the legends. The majority (80%) of urban legends 
had not been seen before by participants, with only a small number (6.9%) having been 
heard before. For most of the legends significantly more participants were unfamiliar with 
the legends than familiar. For the legends which were most familiar to participants, the 
difference was not significant. No legend was found to be significantly more familiar than 
unfamiliar, suggesting that the legends were suitable to be used as experimental material.  
 In order for the legends to be used as material for experiments examining content 
biases it is necessary that they significantly vary in content related to these biases. This was 
found to be the case. Of the potential content biases suggested by previous research (see 
Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008), there was evidence for all such biases across the legends with 
significantly high ratings in emotional content, survival information, social information 
and stereotyped behaviour. Significant correlations were found between social information 
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and emotional content and between social information and gender stereotyped behaviour 
content, suggesting that these biases may often be found together in urban legends. This is 
supported by an analysis of the biases present in urban legends (Stubbersfield et al., under 
review a, presented in Chapter 2). Equally, gender stereotyped behaviour is unlikely to 
appear without social information as it will often require some form of human interaction. 
Of particular relevance to one of the studies presented here in Chapter 5, urban legends can 
be seen to feature content which would exploit a bias for social information and content 
which would exploit a bias for survival information. The results also provide information 
which can then be controlled for in future studies, such as the degree to which they contain 
gender stereotyped behaviour. These results further support the argument that urban 
legends provide a fruitful avenue for research into the effects of content biases on the 
cultural transmission and evolution of narratives as they are shown to exploit these biases. 
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This chapter presents a study examining emotional content bias in the cumulative recall of 
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¹Centre for the Coevolution of Biology and Culture, Department of Anthropology, Durham 
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Abstract 
This study used urban legends to examine the effects of a cognitive bias for content 
which evokes higher levels of emotion on cumulative recall. As with previous research into 
content biases, a linear transmission chain design was used. One-hundred and twenty 
participants, aged 16-52, were asked to read and then recall urban legends that provoked 
both high levels and low levels of emotion and were both positively and negatively 
valenced. The product of this recall was presented to the next participant in a chain of three 
generations. A significant effect of emotion level on transmission fidelity was found with 
high emotion legends being recalled with significantly greater accuracy than low emotion 
legends. The emotional valence of a legend was found not to have any effect on cumulative 
recall; thus emotional biases in recall go beyond disgust and can incorporate other 
emotions such as amusement, interest and surprise. This study is the first to examine an 
emotion bias in cultural transmission as a general phenomenon without focusing on the 
emotion of disgust.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 – Emotional Content Bias 
 
91 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Recently researchers have convincingly argued that the ability to acquire and 
transmit knowledge through social learning has been a powerful selective force in the 
evolution of human cognition (Hermann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 
2007; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Reciprocally, it has been 
suggested that the ways in which information is processed and stored in the brain have a 
strong influence over the selection and modification of cultural traits that get passed on 
from person to person (Claidière & Sperber, 2007; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008; Sperber, 
1996). The positive influence of emotional arousal on the encoding and retrieval of 
memories in individual memory tests is well established (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006) but how 
this mnemonic advantage may translate to a content bias for emotional content in cultural 
transmission has received relatively little attention.  
 With regards to the effects of emotion on cultural transmission, previous research 
has focused on its influence on people’s willingness to pass a story on (in Eriksson and 
Coultas’ [2014] three phases of transmission, the stage defined by an individual’s 
willingness to pass cultural information on is the ‘choose-to-transmit’ phase. The other two 
phases are ‘choose-to-receive’, based on an individual’s willingness to receive cultural 
information and ‘encode-and-retrieve’, based on an individual’s ability to encode the 
information to memory and later retrieve it). Heath, Bell and Sternberg (2001) propose that 
cultural items such as narratives undergo ‘emotional selection’, whereby concepts that 
trigger a stronger emotional response are positively selected for. To test this hypothesis 
they conducted two studies using urban legends, focusing on the emotion of disgust. In 
their first study Heath et al. (2001) asked participants to read urban legends and to rate 
them for emotional, informational and story characteristics such as plot, characters, morals, 
practical information and plausibility, as well as their willingness to pass the story along to 
others. It was found that, while informational characteristics such as plausibility, were 
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important in the likelihood of passing on a legend, legends were also more likely to be 
passed on if they elicited a greater level of disgust. In a second study, when the number 
and level of disgust evoking motifs in a legend were manipulated, participants preferred, 
and were more likely to pass on, legends which produced the highest level of disgust 
despite the fact that these stories were also less plausible and featured higher mean levels 
of other negative emotions such as anger and sadness. Heath et al. (2001) also found that 
urban legends which featured a greater number of disgust evoking motifs were more 
widely distributed on urban legend websites. They argue that urban legends are transmitted 
and retained in the social environment due to a positive selection for narratives that evoke 
stronger levels of emotion in general.  
 Another study by Peters, Kashima and Clark (2009) examined the effect of 
emotionality on the dissemination of social information. Participants were asked to read 
anecdotes then complete a questionnaire on how likely they would be to tell this anecdote 
to an unspecified audience, an audience of friends or an audience of strangers. They found 
that anecdotes which evoked medium to high levels of emotion were more likely to be 
passed on than anecdotes which evoked lower levels of emotion. Participants were also 
significantly more willing to pass on anecdotes which evoked interest, disgust and 
happiness than sadness, fear and contempt to all three types of audience.  
Other research suggests that it is the features of emotions rather than individual 
emotions themselves which enhances transmission. Berger and Milkman (2010) conducted 
an empirical analysis of 6,956 articles published over three months on the New York Times 
website. When controlling for external drivers of attention (position on the website etc.) 
and the emotions of surprise and interest, they found that articles which aroused emotions 
characterised by high arousal, such as anger, anxiety and awe were more likely to be 
forwarded via email than articles which evoked emotions characterised by low arousal, 
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such as sadness. A survey of New York Times readers about their most recently shared 
article supported this finding (Berger & Milkman, 2010). No relation was found between 
disgust and how likely an article was to be shared but they suggest that this result is likely 
to be due to few of the news articles eliciting this emotion. Berger (2011) argues that this 
increased transmission is driven by the mobilising effect of an excitatory state and found a 
similar effect even when the arousal was incidental to the material being shared. Other 
studies have similarly found that increased emotional arousal increases the amount of 
sharing of information by participants (Christophe & Rimé, 1997; Luminet, Bouts, Delie & 
Manstead, 2000) but have not looked at the specific emotions involved.  
Cultural transmission, however, does not just rely on people’s willingness to pass a 
story on; in oral transmission at least, they must also encode and recall it. The cumulative 
effects of recall will have a particular influence over cultural transmission as only those 
elements which are preserved will be passed on to the next generation. Eriksson and 
Coultas (2014) examined the role of cumulative recall in transmission by expanding on 
Heath at al. (2001). They introduced the concept of three distinct phases of cultural 
transmission: ‘choose-to-receive’, ‘encode-and-retrieve’ and ‘choose-to-transmit’. In a 
number of experiments using urban legends, they demonstrated that content evoking a high 
degree of disgust had a transmission advantage over content evoking a lower degree of 
disgust in all three phases. However, when looking at individual differences in willingness 
to pass along stories they found that positively valenced emotions (amusement, surprise) 
received higher ratings than negatively valenced emotions (anger, sadness, fear, disgust), 
suggesting that other emotions, particularly positively valenced ones, may be selected for 
to an even greater degree than disgust, at least in the ‘choose-to-transmit’ phase. While this 
study did demonstrate an advantage in cumulative recall for content which evoked higher 
levels of emotion (in their ‘encode-and-retrieve’ phase), like Heath et al (2001) it focused 
on the emotion of disgust.  
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The Present Research 
As in Heath et al. (2001) and Eriksson and Coultas (2014), real urban legends were 
used as a means to investigate emotional content biases. The study focused on urban 
legends because they represent culturally successful narratives from the real world, which 
are also practical for use in experiments because they are relatively short and self-
contained. Successful legends often share a number of features, such as a suspenseful or 
humorous narrative, which contains surprising information or a twist, a warning or moral 
message that is either explicit or implied, and they are often attributed to a “friend of a 
friend” (Brunvand, 2000; Fox Tree & Weldon, 2007). 
 In contrast to the studies by Heath et al. (2001) and Eriksson and Coultas (2014), 
emotional content bias is investigated as a general phenomenon, rather than focusing on 
the single emotion of disgust, and the effects of emotion level on cumulative recall (the 
‘encode-and-retrieve’ phase of transmission) are examined rather than either just the 
‘choose-to-transmit’ phase or all three phases of transmission. Cumulative recall was 
chosen for examination as this can produce different results from individual recall, for 
example studies examining stereotype consistency bias have found that stereotype 
inconsistent (SI) information is recalled better than stereotype consistency (SC) bias at the 
individual level (Dijksterhuisand & van Knippenberg, 1995; Macrae, Hewstone, & 
Griffiths, 1993) but in cumulative recall stereotype consistent information is recalled better 
(Allport & Postman, 1947; Bangerter, 2000). Kashima (2000) found that, when 
remembering plot-relevant details, participants in earlier positions in a transmission chain 
recalled SI information better than SC information, however, SC information was retained 
better than SI information towards the end of the chain.  
A transmission chain design is used, in which some form of information is passed 
from one participant to another in a linear ‘chain’ (as per the children’s game ‘Chinese 
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Whispers’/’Broken Telephone’). Transmission chain experiments are uniquely effective in 
uncovering content biases in transmission (Mesoudi et al, 2006) and have been used 
successfully to investigate cognitive content biases, such as minimally counter-intuitive 
(MCI) bias (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001), a hierarchical bias (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2004), a 
stereotype consistency bias (Kashima, 2000) and a social information bias (Mesoudi, 
Whiten & Dunbar, 2006). In order to select appropriate material, seventeen urban legends 
were selected from the Urban Legends Reference Pages (www.snopes.com). The extent to 
which the legends evoked emotion was then rated by participants on a 7-point scale (see 
Chapter 3). Four legends were selected, two which scored high for evoking emotion and 
two which scored low. These legends evoked a range of emotions including disgust and 
amusement. This experiment aimed to test the hypothesis that emotional content bias is a 
general phenomenon and that legends that evoke higher levels of emotion will be recalled 
with higher fidelity along a transmission chain than legends that evoke lower levels of 
emotion, regardless of the emotion evoked. Individual recall-based experiments have 
shown a recall advantage for content which evokes high emotion across both positive and 
negative valences (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006) while transmission-based experiments have 
found differences between positive and negative valence in certain circumstances 
(Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Peters et al., 2009) so here the effect of valence of cumulative 
recall is also examined.  
4.2 Methods 
Participants 
One-hundred and twenty participants (94 females) took part in. Their ages ranged 
from 16 to 52 years with a mean age of 20.36 years (SD = 6.34). The majority (92%) were 
undergraduate students studying psychology, education or recruited through opportunity 
sampling. Others were prospective students and parents attending a Psychology 
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Department Open Day; all participants under the age of 18 took part with their parents’ 
consent.  
Design 
 A linear transmission chain design was used. Each individual legend was 
transmitted along ten chains of three participants or ‘generations’, totalling forty chains for 
all four legends. Three generations was judged to be an optimum chain length, capable of 
capturing long-term cumulative effects of cultural transmission but short enough to be 
practical in terms of participant recruitment and has been used successfully in previous 
research (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Nielsen, Cucchiaro & Mohamedally, 2012). The first 
participant in each chain received a selection of legends which were counterbalanced so no 
legend appeared in the same position more than another legend. The next participant was 
presented with the material that had been recalled by the previous participant and so on, 
along the chain.   
Material 
 Before conducting the transmission chain study it was necessary to select 
appropriate legends. From a selection of seventeen original urban legends edited to match 
for word count and number of central propositions (presented in Chapter 3), two high 
emotion legends and two low emotion legends were selected. These legends are presented 
below: 
1. Steroids in chicken cause ovarian cysts (low emotion) 
A woman underwent an operation to remove an ovarian cyst but just a few 
months later she relapsed and was rushed to her gynaecologist. The gynaecologist 
asked her if she often ate chicken wings, when she said yes he explained that, today, 
chickens are injected with steroids to accelerate growth. These steroids can have a 
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terrifying effect on the body and are most dangerous in the presence of female 
hormones. Exposure to these steroids can lead to women being more prone to the 
growth of cysts in her womb. 
2. Woman has revenge on boyfriend with rotten fish in car (low emotion) 
A woman caught her boyfriend with another woman and decided to get 
revenge. She cut open the passenger seat of his car and hid fish inside before neatly 
re-stitching along the seam. As the fish rotted his car was filled with a terrible 
smell that he couldn’t get rid of no matter what he did. He had no luck finding a 
new girlfriend because no woman would set foot in his car. He finally gave up and 
sold the car at a huge loss because of the horrible smell.  
3. Woman eats a tumour in a chicken burger (high emotion) 
A woman went into a takeaway and ordered a chicken burger but asked for it 
without mayonnaise. After leaving the restaurant she bit into the burger and 
discovered that there was mayonnaise in it after all, but she finished the burger 
anyway. Later that evening, she checked herself into the local hospital after falling 
violently ill with food poisoning. Her stomach was pumped and the doctors 
discovered that the chicken in her burger had contained a tumour and that the 
sauce wasn't mayonnaise, it was pus from the tumour.  
4. Man suffers from flatulence at dinner party hosted by his girlfriend’s parents 
(high emotion) 
A man was having dinner with his girlfriend’s parents when he was suddenly 
gripped by terrible flatulence. He excused himself from the table and went in 
search of a toilet, however, he couldn’t find one in time so instead he farted 
through an open window out of the parent’s earshot. Much relieved, he returned to 
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the table and continued the meal. Later, he asked his girlfriend how the night had 
gone, expecting a good response, however, she replied “it was going fine until you 
farted through the serving hatch!”  
Table 1 gives further detail about the legends used, such as their valence and the 
emotions they were said to evoke by participants. The legend selection was informed by 
questionnaire ratings from 106 participants on scales relevant to potential content biases 
such emotion, plausibility, survival information, social information and gender stereotyped 
behaviour. The ratings from this questionnaire allow for comparisons to be made between 
the legends in terms of content which may influence their recall and transmission. The high 
emotion legends were rated as evoking higher levels of emotion than the low emotion 
legends. Of the seventeen legends originally rated, Tumour-HN received the highest rating 
for emotion and Dinner-HP was ranked 4
th
, Cyst-LN was ranked 12
th
 and Fish-LP was 
ranked 16
th
. For full details about the questionnaire and its results, see Chapter 3. 
In order to ensure that level of emotion was driving any differences in transmission 
of the legends, efforts were made to select legends that did not significantly vary on 
measures of potentially confounding content biases such as survival information, social 
information and gender stereotyped behaviour. The selected legends were successfully 
matched across the measures in most cases but there were some potentially confounding 
differences in content. Fish-LP and Dinner-HP both differed from Cyst-LN and Tumour-
HN in survival information, social information and gender stereotypes but the effect of 
these differences were taken into account (see Appendix E for the mean differences 
between legends on these scores).  
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Table 1. The legends used in this study with their respective emotion levels, valence, two 
most frequently evoked emotions and code names. 
Legend Emotion Level 
(Mean Score) 
Valence  Emotions  Code Name 
1. Steroids in chicken 
cause ovarian cysts 
Low (5.5) Negative* Interest and 
Surprise 
Cyst-LN 
2. Woman has revenge 
on boyfriend with 
rotten fish in car. 
Low (5) Positive Amusement 
and Interest  
Fish-LP 
3. Woman eats a 
tumour in a chicken 
burger. 
High (6.5) Negative Disgust and 
Interest 
Tumour-HN 
4. Man farts in front of 
girlfriend’s parents at 
a dinner party. 
High (5.8) Positive Amusement 
and 
Surprise 
Dinner-HP 
 * Although interest and surprise were the most frequently evoked emotions by this legend these 
can be positive or negative, it also evoked fear, concern and sadness and as such was designated 
negatively valenced.  
Procedure 
Participants were asked to take part in a study regarding the cultural transmission of 
urban legends. Participants were individually presented with the experimental materials on 
a computer. They were asked to read the material and then, on a new page, type what they 
remembered of this material. No distracter task was performed and no time limit for recall 
was set. At no point during the procedure were participants told that the material had come 
from a previous participant or that their recall would be presented to another participant.  
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Coding 
Following previous studies which used a linear transmission chain design 
(Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 2000; Mesoudi, et al., 2006; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2004), a 
propositional analysis (Kintsch, 1974) was performed on each participant’s recall. This 
involves dividing the text into separate propositions. Only propositions central to the 
narrative were coded so as to avoid legends with more background details appearing to 
have poorer recall, as previous research has demonstrated that information relevant to the 
plot of a narrative is better recalled than background details (Kashima, 1997). This 
propositional analysis was used to calculate the percentage of original central propositions 
correctly recalled. Percentages were used instead of total number as the original texts 
varied between five and six central propositions. No significant difference in the 
percentage of central propositions recalled was found between legends with five central 
propositions and legends with six.  
To assess coder reliability, an independent coder blind to the study hypothesis 
coded two chains of each legend (20% of all material). There was a significant correlation 
between the coding of the independent coder and the original coder (r24 = .88, p < .001).  
4.3 Results 
A mixed 3x4 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with generation as a 
within subjects variable and legend as a between groups variable. There was a significant 
main effect of generation on the percentage of central propositions recalled (F2, 72 = 38.23, 
p < .001). Planned contrasts revealed that recall quantity was significantly higher in 
generation 1 than generation 2 (F1, 36 = 28.62, p < .001) and higher in generation 2 than 
generation 3 (F1, 36 = 11.38, p < .005). 
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There was also a significant main effect of legend on the percentage of propositions 
recalled (F3, 36 = 22.87, p < .001). A Games-Howell post hoc test revealed that Tumour-HN 
and Dinner-HP both had significantly higher recall than Fish-LP and Cyst-LN (ps ≤ .001). 
No other significant results were found. Figure 1 shows the pattern of recall for each 
legend along the chains for each generation 
 
Figure 1. Mean percentage of original central propositions recalled by each generation for 
each legend used in this study. Letter codes are used to indicate emotion level and valence 
(corresponding with codes used in the chapter), with H indicating 'high emotion', L 
indicating 'low emotion', P indicating positive valence and N indicating negative valence. 
Error bars show standard error. 
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A second mixed 3x2 ANOVA was conducted with generation as a within subjects 
variable and degree of emotion evoked (high vs. low) as a between groups variable. This 
revealed a significant main effect of generation as before (F2, 76 = 33.17, p < .001). 
Legends which evoked a higher degree of emotion showed a higher level of recall than 
legends which evoked a lower degree of emotion (F1, 38 = 56.97, p < .001). A third mixed 
3x2 ANOVA was conducted with generation as a within subjects variable and emotional 
valence (positive vs. negative) as a between groups variable but no significant main effect 
of emotional valence was found (F1, 38 = 1.12, p > .05).  
As some of the legends were not matched across potentially confounding content 
biases it is important to test for any effects this content may have had on recall. No 
significant correlations were found between the percentage of central propositions recalled 
and the social information score (M = 3.84, SD = 1.67) or the stereotype score (M = 3.73, 
SD = 1.15), both tests p > .05. However, a significant negative correlation was found 
between the percentage of central propositions recalled and the survival information score 
(r = -.35, n = 120, p < .01). In order to test how much effect the survival information score 
had on the percentage of central propositions recalled, a multiple regression was run to 
predict percentage of central propositions recalled from emotion level and survival 
information score. The regression model significantly predicted recall (F2, 117 = 68.87, p < 
.01, R
2
 = .54, adjusted R
2
 = .53). Emotion level received the strongest weight in the model, 
explaining 41.6% of the unique variance compared to the survival information score which 
only predicted 2.79% of the unique variance. No significant age or gender effects were 
found.  
4.4 Discussion 
 The results of this study show that the urban legends which evoked higher levels of 
emotion in general were recalled with greater accuracy across a linear transmission chain 
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than urban legends which evoked lower levels of emotion. This is consistent with previous 
research, which has demonstrated a cognitive bias for content which evokes higher levels 
of emotion (Berger & Milkman, 2010; Christophe & Rimé, 1997; Luminet, Bouts, Delie & 
Manstead, 2000). Importantly, however the emotional valence of an urban legend, positive 
or negative, was found to have no significant effect on cumulative recall. This is consistent 
with individual recall experiments where emotional arousal was found to enhance 
encoding and retrieval across both positive and negative valence (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006). 
Previous studies have found that participants were more willing to pass on stories which 
were positively valenced than negatively valenced, with the possible exception of when it 
is negatively valenced due to disgusting content (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Peters et al., 
2009). The transmission chain design presented here revealed that positive valence lends 
no advantage in the encode-and-retrieve phase of transmission, perhaps explaining why 
negatively valenced legends are so pervasive in the cultural environment. Future research 
should examine the differing levels of arousal of specific emotions in cultural transmission. 
If negatively valenced content is more likely to arouse strong emotions it could have an 
advantage at the encode-and-retrieve phase of transmission. Future research should also 
focus on the effects of positive or negative valence in the chose-to-receive phase and focus 
on examining the consumption of negatively valenced material.  
 Much of the existing research into emotional content bias has focused on disgust 
(e.g. Eriksson & Coutlas, 2014; Heath et al., 2001; Nichols, 2002). For example, Nichols 
(2002) found that 16
th
 century etiquette norms which prohibited disgust evoking actions 
were more likely to survive in the social environment than other etiquette norms. Similarly, 
Heath et al. (2001) found that participants preferred, and were more likely to pass on, 
legends which produced the highest level of disgust even though these stories were also 
less plausible and featured higher mean levels of other negative emotions such as anger 
and sadness. Heath et al. (2001) also found that urban legends which featured a greater 
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number of disgust evoking motifs were more widely distributed on urban legend websites. 
Disgust does make an interesting case study when examining the role of emotional content 
in the cultural transmission of narrative, largely because of the question: why would people 
choose to receive or transmit content which is negatively valenced? However, disgust is 
somewhat uniquely affective as an emotion. It arouses powerful behavioural responses and 
impacts on human society through our individual moral choices and public policy on issues 
such as health, justice, social exclusion and warfare (Curtis, 2011). This may make the 
findings of Nichols (2002) and Heath et al. (2001) more difficult to generalise to an overall 
bias for emotional content rather than a specific effect of disgust evoking content as it 
would be reasonable to expect disgust to be uniquely effective in cultural transmission 
compared to other emotions. 
 In this study, the emotion of disgust was shown to confer no particular advantage in 
transmission compared to other emotions at the encode-and-retrieve phase. The legend 
which featured disgusting content, Tumour-HN, was recalled with equal fidelity to an 
amusing legend, Dinner-HP, suggesting that the transmission fidelity was driven by the 
degree of emotion felt rather than the specific emotion evoked. This also suggests that 
disgust is not special in terms of cultural transmission and supports Heath at al.’s (2001) 
argument that emotional selection is a general bias. The emotions of interest and surprise 
were evoked by all the legends used in this study and in previous research they have been 
shown to grant a transmission advantage and increase the communicability of anecdotes 
(Peters et al., 2009). Both surprise and interest are unique in that they are fairly neutral in 
terms of valence but may add more to the effect of a narrative in terms of activation of the 
autonomic nervous system, a more surprising story would be more arousing and likely to 
be more memorable or transmissible (Berger, 2011; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006). The results of 
this study show no particular advantage to surprise or interest as the results were driven 
more by the degree of emotion evoked rather than specific emotions. Future research could 
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examine how different emotions combine: do neutrally valenced emotions like surprise 
bolster other emotions and increase their effectiveness? 
Following previous research into emotional bias in cultural transmission (Eriksson 
& Coultas, 2014; Heath et al, 2001) but unlike previous research examining other biases in 
cultural transmission that has used original material (i.e. Mesoudi et al., 2006) this study 
used real urban legends. There are a number of benefits to using ‘real world’ material in 
such an experiment but this can come at the cost of full control over the features of the 
material. In this experiment efforts were made to control for any confounding variables in 
terms of content. As mentioned in the results section, survival information was found to be 
negatively correlated with recall. This contradicts previous research which has found an 
advantage for survival related information in recall (e.g. Nairne 2010; Nairne & 
Pandeirada, 2008). It is unclear why that would be the case here; one possible explanation 
is that recall of survival information in a narrative context does not operate in the same 
manner as word list-based recall. Future research should examine the effects of survival 
information on cumulative recall. The results of the regression show that the degree to 
which the legends were rated as containing survival information explained far less of the 
variance in the percentage of propositions recalled than the emotion level, suggesting that 
it is correct to attribute the variation in recall to the different levels of emotion.  
 The results suggest that in general terms, material which evokes greater levels of 
emotion will be more successful in cultural transmission due to an advantage in cumulative 
recall. It is expected that, for an urban legend to be successful over other urban legends in 
the social environment it must evoke a greater degree of emotion. This is supported by a 
content analysis of 256 urban legends, which found emotional content bias to be one of the 
most frequently coded biases, being found in the majority of legends, with all of the 
emotions coded being characterised by high arousal (Stubbersfield, Tehrani & Flynn, 
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under review a, presented in Chapter 2). Emotional content is clearly a highly effective 
bias in the cultural transmission of urban legends.  
 While the aim of this study was to examine emotional content bias as a general 
phenomenon without focusing on a specific emotion, the range of emotions evoked by the 
urban legends used was still fairly narrow. The emotions are all characterised by high 
arousal for example. This is in part due to the use of urban legends as material as these 
narratives will tend to evoke more arousing emotions than some other narratives. 
Nevertheless, these results further support the argument that, urban legends provide a 
fruitful avenue for research into the effects of content biases on the cultural transmission 
and the evolution of narratives. Emotional content bias is clearly effective in transmission 
and research should look beyond the emotion of disgust to take into account other 
emotions and consider if the efficacy of the bias varies between emotions, the study 
presented here represents a significant step in that direction.  
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transmission of urban legends. 
 
This chapter presents a study examining social information and survival information bias 
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Abstract 
This study uses urban legends to examine the effects of the social information bias 
and survival information bias on cultural transmission across three phases of transmission: 
the choose-to-receive phase, the encode-and-retrieve phase and the choose-to-transmit 
phase. In line with previous research into content biases, a linear transmission chain design 
with 60 participants aged 16-52, was used to examine the encode-and-retrieve phase, while 
participants were asked to rank their interest in reading a story behind a headline and 
passing a story on for the other two phases. Urban legends which contained social 
information (Social Type), legends which contained survival information (Survival Type) 
and legends which contained both forms of information (Combined Type) were all recalled 
with significantly greater accuracy than control material but Social and Combined Type 
legends were recalled with significantly greater accuracy than Survival Type legends. In 
another study with 30 participants aged 18-22, no significant differences were found 
between legend types in either the choose-to-receive phase or the choose-to-transmit phase. 
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5.1 Introduction 
A growing body of research suggests that when information is transmitted from one 
person to another, it is subjected to cognitive selection pressures that alter its content and 
structure to make it maximally transmittable (Bartlett, 1932; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; 
Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008; Mesoudi, Whiten & Dunbar, 2006; Sperber, 1996). The extent 
to which information is transmittable is affected by three factors: its salience (i.e. its ability 
to attract attention), the accuracy with which it is recalled, and the motivation of adopters 
to pass it on to others. While the second factor has been studied quite extensively (Bartlett 
1932, Mesoudi & Whiten 2008), the first and third have received comparatively little 
attention (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014). Here, I investigate the impact of cognitive biases in 
all three phases of cultural transmission, specifically focusing on the roles of social 
information bias, (Mesoudi et al., 2006), and survival information bias (Nairne & 
Pandeirada, 2008; Nairne, Thompson & Pandeirada, 2007) in the spread of urban legends. 
Survival Information Bias 
Nairne and colleagues argue that, as human memory is an evolved trait that must 
have been shaped by selection pressures to achieve specific fitness-related goals, memory 
should display functional specialisation (Nairne, 2010; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008; Nairne, 
Thompson & Pandeirada, 2007). They argue that human memory is unlikely to have 
evolved to be domain general, as some information such as the locations of food sources or 
predators would be more beneficial to remember than random events (Nairne & 
Pandeirada, 2008). Human memory, therefore, has evolved to be ‘tuned’ towards encoding 
and recalling fitness related information better than other forms of information (Nairne & 
Pandeirada, 2008).  
To test this hypothesis Nairne et al. (2007) had participants imagine themselves 
stranded in a foreign grassland scenario and then rate the relevance of words to finding 
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food, water and protection from predators, they refer to this as ‘survival processing’. Later, 
surprise free-recall tests revealed an advantage for survival processing. Nairne, Pandeirada 
and Thompson (2008) also found a similar result, words processed within a survival 
context (e.g. relating to food and predators) were more likely to be recalled than those 
same words processed in a non-survival context. Similarly, in Nairne and Pandeirada 
(2008), participants were asked to make either survival relevant decisions or pleasantness 
ratings about words in the same categorised list. They found that survival processing 
produced the best recall in both within- and between-subject designs, despite previous 
findings suggesting that the pleasantness rating of words in a categorised list is considered 
one of the best methods for enhancing free-recall (Packman & Battig, 1978). Kang, 
McDermott and Cohen (2008) found that survival processing produced better recall than a 
control scenario chosen to match the novelty and potential excitement of the survival 
scenario.  
A number of studies, using a variety of experimental designs and materials, have 
demonstrated the strong mnemonic advantage that survival processing grants participants 
compared to other forms of processing and show this effect to be robust in both within- and 
between-participants designs (Nairne, et al., 2007; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008, 2010; 
Kang, et al., 2008; Otgaar, Smeets, & van Bergen, 2010; Weinstein, Bugg, & Roediger, 
2008). The recall advantage for ecological survival information found in these studies 
suggests a potential bias for ecological information relevant to survival in human cultural 
transmission. Just as they have been used in assessing social information biases, 
transmission chain experiments can be used to empirically test if the bias for survival 
information in recall goes beyond the individual and would operate on cultural 
transmission.  
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Social Information Bias 
The Machiavellian Intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988, Whiten 1999) or Social 
Brain (Dunbar, 1998, 2003) hypothesis suggests that primates evolved greater intelligence 
in order to deal with complex social interactions, rather than to deal with non-social 
challenges in their ecological environment. These hypotheses oppose an ecological 
hypothesis of primate intelligence evolution (Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1980) by 
emphasising the importance of social interaction. Further, Dunbar’s Social Gossip Theory 
(1993) of human language evolution argues that language evolved as a means to maintain 
social cohesion in the complex social groups which are characteristic of modern humans. 
Together, the Machiavellian Intelligence, Social Brain and Social Gossip Theory suggest 
that greater intelligence and language were necessary for tracking social relationships and 
interactions in complex social groups, and therefore evolved in response to natural 
selection.  
Based on these evolutionary theories, Mesoudi et al. (2006) argue that if human 
cognition evolved to deal with social relationships and interaction, then humans should 
preferentially attend to, recall and transmit social information over equivalent non-social 
information. They empirically tested for this by comparing the transmission of social and 
equivalent non-social information along linear transmission chains. The transmission chain 
method, in which some form of information is passed from one participant to another along 
a ‘chain’ of individuals, was first developed by Bartlett (1932) and has been used 
successfully to reveal cumulative and systematic biases in recall that influence cultural 
transmission and evolution (Mesoudi et al., 2006; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008). Mesoudi et 
al. (2006) defind social as information which concerned the interactions and relationships 
between a number of third parties, while non-social information was defined as a single 
individual’s interactions with the physical environment, or solely concerning the physical 
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environment. For the purposes of the study social information was divided into two 
categories: gossip, which involved intense and salient social interactions or relationships, 
for example an illicit sexual affair, and social non-gossip, which involved ‘everyday’ 
interactions and relationships, for example someone receiving directions.  
Mesoudi et al. (2006) found that social information was transmitted with greater 
accuracy and in greater quantity than equivalent non-social information. Perhaps 
unexpectedly, social non-gossip was transmitted just as well as gossip, suggesting that the 
intensity of the social relationships described in the information has no effect on the 
fidelity of transmission; instead what is important is that the information detailed some 
form of third party interaction. The results were consistent with predictions based on the 
Machiavellian Intelligence or Social Brain hypotheses and suggest that humans are 
cognitively biased towards social information. Mesoudi et al. (2006) argued that this bias 
for social information explains the nature of some popular media, such as gossip 
magazines, reality television and tabloid newspapers.  
An advantage for social information in transmission was also found by McGuigan 
and Cubillo (2013). They used an open diffusion paradigm to explore the transmission of 
social and non-social information within two groups of children aged ten to eleven years. 
Two children in each group were told one piece of social information and one piece of 
general knowledge and this information was allowed to naturally diffuse within the group. 
They found that social information was transmitted more frequently within the group than 
non-social information. This is supported by the findings of Reysen, Talbert, Dominko, 
Jones and Kelley (2011) who conducted three experiments exploring the influence of 
collaboration on memory for social information and found that both individuals and 
collaborative groups recalled more social information than non-social information. 
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Despite it not being a focus of their research, Owens, Bower and Black (1979) also 
found a bias for social information in recall. In their study, participants were asked to read 
and recall five episodes describing a female student completing everyday events. The 
experimental group were given a social motive for the student, that she was pregnant by 
her professor, which connected the five episodes into a narrative. The control group were 
not provided with this motive, leaving the episodes as independent events. The 
experimental group recalled significantly more of the five episodes than the control group, 
suggesting that the social nature of the material given to the experimental group exploited a 
bias for social information in encoding and recall.  
Mar and Oatley (2008) argue that the function of fictional narratives is not merely 
to entertain but that fiction offers a simulation of social relationships and interactions that 
can facilitate the communication and understanding of social information. Given this 
argument, even overtly fictional narratives that feature social interaction should exploit the 
social bias suggested by Mesoudi et al. (2006) and feature an advantage in transmission 
and recall. 
Social and Survival Biases in Urban Legends 
Evidence of social and survival biases can be found in the kinds of stories 
propagated by the tabloid press and gossip magazines, and in narratives transmitted from 
person-to-person – most notably in so-called “urban legends”. Urban legends, also referred 
to as ‘modern legends’ (Mullen, 1972), ‘urban belief tales’ (Fine, 1979) and ‘contemporary 
legends’ (Simpson, 1981) are generally defined as apocryphal stories which are told as true 
(Brunvand, 2000; Heath, Bell & Sternberg, 2001, Tangherlini, 1990), involve an urban or 
suburban contemporary setting (Brunvand, 2000), and feature a single event, usually an 
individual experience, as the core of the narrative (Tangherlini, 1990). Successful legends 
often share a number of features, such as a suspenseful or humorous narrative (Brunvand, 
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2000), which contains surprising information or a twist ending (Fox Tree & Weldon, 
2007), a warning or moral message that is either explicit or implied, and they are often 
attributed to a “friend of a friend” (Brunvand, 2000). While they have been traditionally 
transmitted orally, urban legends are now spread through a combination of oral 
transmission, electronic communication and publication in mass media (Brunvand, 2000). 
Traditional, longer forms of oral narrative such as epic ballads or counting-out rhymes 
often feature mnemonic advantages such as repetition or poetics that enhance recall and 
lead to less variation between generations (Rubin, 1995). Urban legends, however, rarely 
feature these elements, meaning they are more subject to the effects of recall. The analysis 
of urban legends can offer a unique means of studying the concerns of modern populations 
(Brunvand, 2000) and therefore provide an opportunity to study content biases such as 
social or survival bias. 
 A wide range of social information can be found in urban legends. These legends 
are frequently built around intense social interaction that could easily be defined as gossip, 
such as the accidental cybersex between a father and daughter, or actual accidental incest 
in some instances (Brunvand, 1999). Urban legends can also be attached to real people in a 
manner that clearly acts as gossip, for instance, the legend of a film star having to have a 
gerbil (or hamster) removed from their rectum (Brunvand, 1986) has been said of several 
real life film stars over the past thirty years. In these instances the social information 
contained in the legend would appear to be the sole reason for the legend’s success in 
transmission. Many urban legends also clearly feature ecological survival information. 
Food contamination is a common feature, whether it is deliberate, such as in the ‘Razor 
blade in the apple’ legend (Best & Horiuchi, 1985), or accidental, such as in the ‘Kentucky 
fried rat’ legend (Fine, 1980). These food contamination legends are often localised (Fine, 
1980) and as such provide survival information directly relevant to the receivers’ 
environments. Violence at the hands of other humans is also a common feature and often 
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the perpetrators of this violence are from minorities within a society (Ellis, 1983; Victor, 
1990), once again providing information directly relevant to the receivers’ environments. 
Unlike the oral narratives of forager populations (discussed by Sugiyama, 2001), these 
stories are apocryphal and do not contain information that could be used for survival in a 
modern environment, however, they could still be exploiting a cognitive susceptibility for 
survival-relevant ecological information. Urban legends frequently exploit more than one 
content bias and they often feature both social and survival relevant information 
(Stubbersfield, Tehrani & Flynn, under review a, presented in Chapter 2). An example of 
this being the common ‘gang initiation’ legends, where the social context of a violent 
action is explained, giving the receiver information relevant to their survival within a social 
context. As yet no studies have examined how different biases interact when combined 
within a narrative and urban legends offer an excellent means to investigate this.  
The Present Research  
The studies presented in this chapter use real urban legends, which have been or are 
actively transmitted between people, as a means to investigate social bias and survival bias. 
In the first study a linear transmission chain design is used to examine the effects of social 
information, survival information and combining both types of information on the cultural 
transmission of an urban legend narrative. These experiments aimed to test the hypothesis 
that legends containing content relevant to survival and social information biases are 
transmitted with higher fidelity than control material lacking such content. It was further 
hypothesised that legends containing both types of content should have an even greater 
advantage in transmission. The second study goes beyond the ‘encode-and-retrieve’ phase 
of transmission tested in the transmission chain to examine the effects of this content on 
two other phases of transmission: ‘choose-to-receive’ and ‘choose-to-transmit’. 
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5.2 Study 1 
5.2.1 Methods 
This study uses the ratings from Chapter 3 to select survival type, social type and 
combined type legends to be passed along a linear transmission chain. Previous research 
has successfully used this design to demonstrate a social information bias (Mesoudi, et al., 
2006), while individual memory experiments have demonstrated an advantage for survival 
information in recall (Nairne et al., 2007; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008). This study makes a 
direct comparison between both proposed biases and also examines the effects of 
combining both biases in a single narrative. The primary focus of this study is the potential 
effects of these biases on cumulative recall in a micro-culture in the absence of 
communicative intent, as communicative intent has been shown to affect the emergence of 
biases in transmission (Lyons & Kashima, 2006) 
Participants 
Sixty participants (48 females) took part in Study 1. Their ages ranged from 16 to 
52 years with a mean age of 22.52 years (SD = 8.72). The majority (57%) were 
undergraduate students studying psychology, and others were prospective students and 
parents attending a Psychology Department Open Day; all participants under the age of 18 
took part with their parents’ consent.  
Design 
 A linear transmission chain design was used, in which the first participant in each 
of the twenty chains received three legends, one of each type (social, survival and 
combined, based on the results of Study 1) and the control material. A within-groups 
design was used so that each participant would contribute to the cumulative recall of each 
type of legend. The order in which each chain was presented with these was 
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counterbalanced so no legend type or the control material appeared in the same position 
more than any other. The next participant was presented with the material that had been 
recalled by the previous participant. Each of the twenty chains comprised of three 
participants or ‘generations’. A chain of three generations was judged to be an optimum 
length, capable of capturing long-term cumulative effects of cultural transmission but short 
enough to be practical in terms of participant recruitment. This length of chain has been 
used successfully in previous research (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Nielsen, Cucchiaro & 
Mohamedally, 2012). Each individual legend and the control material was passed along ten 
chains.  
Material 
From the seventeen original legends rated in Chapter 3, two social type legends, 
two survival type legends and two combined type legends were selected (see Table 1 for an 
overview and Appendix A for the full text of the urban legends used) these legends were 
matched for plausibility, emotional content and gender stereotyped behaviour where 
possible (see Appendix F for the mean differences between the legends). In Chapter 3 the 
legends were grouped into homogenous subsets using stepwise step-down multiple 
comparisons (see Chapter 3 for the full details and Appendix D for tables showing 
homogenous subsets for each scale). The two social type legends appear in the highest 
social score subset and the lowest survival score subset. The two survival type legends 
appear in the highest survival score subset and the second lowest social score subset. One 
combined type legend (Combined-Gang) appears in both the highest social score and 
highest survival score subsets, the other combined type legend (Combined-Killer) appears 
in the highest survival score subset and the third highest social score subset. No legend 
other than Combined-Gang appeared in the highest subsets for both social and survival 
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scores so Combined-Killer represents the best choice for combining social and survival 
scores.  
The strong correlation between social information and gender stereotypical content 
found in Chapter 3 means that one potentially conflicting bias was gender stereotype 
consistency. Social-Birthday scored significantly higher in gender stereotype than 
Survival-Cyst and Combined-Gang (ps < .05). Combined-Killer also scored significantly 
higher than Survival-Cyst (p < .05) and the control material was rated significantly lower 
in gender stereotype than all legends accept for Survival-Cyst (ps < .05). As such legends 
were categorised as either stereotype low (control material, Survival-Cyst), stereotype 
medium (Social-Cybersex, Combined-Gang, Combined-Killer, Survival-Spiders) or 
stereotype high (Social-Birthday) according to their position in the homogenous subsets 
and relationship to each other in terms of gender stereotype score. 
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Table 1. Legends used in Study 1 with their legend types and the codes used to refer to 
them in the chapter (see Appendix A for full text) 
Legend Legend Type Code used in chapter         Mean Score (SD) 
       Social  Survival 
Steroids in chicken 
cause ovarian cysts. 
Survival Survival-Cyst 2.50(1.76) 4.90(2.00) 
Woman killed by 
spiders in her hair. 
Survival Survival-Spiders 2.50(1.61) 4.05(1.93) 
Naked boss caught by 
surprise birthday party.  
Social Social-Birthday 5.45(1.32) 1.85(.99) 
Father and daughter 
accidental cybersex. 
Social Social-Cybersex 5.85(1.04) 2.55(1.70) 
Little boy attacked as 
part of a gang 
initiation. 
Combined Combined-Gang 4.90(1.21) 4.25(1.70) 
Serial killer using 
recorded baby crying 
to trap women. 
Combined Combined-Killer 3.45(1.70) 5.05(1.96) 
 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to take part in a study regarding the cultural transmission of 
urban legends. Participants were individually presented with the experimental materials on 
a computer. They were asked to read the material (legend or control), then on a new page 
they had to type what they remembered of this material; they then repeated this for all 
material presented to them. No distracter task was performed and no time limit for recall 
was set. As previous research has demonstrated that communicative intent can alter the 
content of material transmitted in a diffusion chain, including altering the degree to which 
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content biases are represented (Lyons and Kashima, 2006), participants were not told that 
the material had come from a previous participant or that their recall would be presented to 
another participant. This was done with the intention of focusing on the effects of 
cumulative recall rather than communicative choice (which would be examined in Study 2 
of this chapter).  
Coding 
Following previous studies which used a linear transmission chain design 
(Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 2000; Mesoudi, et al., 2006; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2004), a 
propositional analysis (Kintsch, 1974) was performed on each participant’s recall. In 
propositional analysis the text is divided into separate propositions, defined as a predicate 
(a verb, adjective, or other relational term) with a series of ordered arguments (the 
complementary noun/s). As previous research has demonstrated that information relevant 
to the plot of a narrative is better recalled than background details (Kashima, 1997) only 
propositions central to the narrative (central propositions) were coded so as to avoid 
legends with more background details appearing to have poorer recall (see Appendix A for 
the full text of the legends used). This propositional analysis was used to calculate the 
percentage of original central propositions correctly recalled. Percentages were used 
instead of total number as the original texts varied between five and six central 
propositions. No significant difference in the percentage of central propositions recalled 
was found between legends with five central propositions and legends with six.  
To assess coder reliability, an independent coder blind to the study hypothesis 
coded two chains of each legend and the control material (20% of all material). There was 
a significant correlation between the coding of the independent coder and the original 
coder (r40 = .83, p < .01).  
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5.2.2 Results  
 A general linear mixed multilevel binomial regression model was used to analyse 
the data using the lme4 software package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2008) in R 
version 3.0.2 (R Core Team, 2013). The initial full model had legend type (social, survival, 
combined), stereotype level (high, medium, low), participant age, participant gender and 
generation as fixed effects without interaction, assuming a nested randomised structure of 
legend type within participant within generation and stereotype level within participant 
within generation. In this full model coefficients for age, gender and stereotype level were 
not significant. As such a second legend type based model was used with legend type and 
generation as fixed effects without interaction, assuming a nested randomised structure of 
legend type within participant within generation. This legend type based model showed a 
significantly better fit than a generation only model (X
2
4 = 45.5, p < .01) and a stereotype 
level based model (X
2
1 = 16.39, p < .01). The full model did not significantly improve the 
model fit over the legend type based model (X
2
7 = 4.89, p > .05). Table 2 shows a 
comparison between the models (see Appendix G for full comparisons between the 
models). See Table 3 for the results of the type based mode.  
Table 2. Model comparison with goodness-of-fit tests 
Model Df AIC BIC Log 
Likelihood 
Test X
2 
1. Full 16 201.34 254.89 -84.67   
2. Legend Type 9 192.22 222.35 -87.11 1 vs. 2 4.89 
3. Generation 
Only 
5 229.72 246.46 -109.86 3 vs. 2 45.5*** 
4. Stereotype 
Level 
8 206.61 233.39 -95.31 4 vs. 2 16.39*** 
Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 
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Table 3. Results of the best fitting model (legend type based). Results show comparisons to 
the baseline. In the case of the legend types the baseline is the control and in the case of 
the generations the baseline in generation 1. 
Predictor Coefficient SE Z 
(Intercept) 0.26 0.5 0.52 
Social 3.24 0.63 5.14*** 
Survival 1.69 0.52 3.23** 
Combined 3.24 0.63 5.14*** 
Generation 2 -1.18 0.54 -2.19* 
Generation 3 -2 0.53 -3.75*** 
Model Fit    
AIC 192.22   
BIC 222.35   
Log Likelihood -87.11   
Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 
 
In addition to the model, orthogonal planned contrasts were used to examine the 
differences between generations. Z-tests revealed that mean recall was significantly higher 
in generation 1 than generation 2 (z = 3.19, p < .005) and recall in generation 2 was 
significantly higher than generation 3 (z = 3.34, p < .001). Figures 1 and 2 show the pattern 
of recall for legend type along the chains for each generation.  
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Figure 1. Mean percentage of original central propositions recalled by each generation for 
each type of legend used in study 1. Error bars show standard errors. 
 
To examine the differences in recall between legend types multiple comparisons 
with a Tukey’s HSD correction were conducted using the multcomp software package for 
R (Horthorn, Bretz, & Westfall, 2008). Recall for social type and combined type legends 
was not significantly different (z = .00, p > 0.05) but recall for both of these legend types 
was significantly greater than recall for the survival type legends (zs = 2.91, both tests p < 
.05) and the control material (zs = 5.14, both tests p < .001). Recall of the survival type 
legends was also significantly higher than recall of the control material (z = 3.23, p < 0.01).  
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Figure 2. Mean number of central propositions recalled by each generation in Study 1 
(error bars show standard errors). 
5.2.3 Discussion  
The Cumulative Effects of Recall  
The aim of Study 1 was to examine the effects of different informational content on 
cumulative recall along a transmission chain. Previous research has suggested two 
potential content biases in cultural transmission: social information bias and survival 
information bias. This study compared the cumulative recall of urban legends featuring 
both types of content and a third legend type which combined both. The results show that 
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legends that contained information regarding the interaction between third parties (the 
social type legends and the combined type legends) were recalled with significantly greater 
fidelity than the control material and the legends that contained information relevant to 
survival (survival type legends). This finding is consistent with previous research (Mesoudi 
et al., 2006) which also found social information to feature an advantage in recall in 
comparison to equivalent non-social information through a transmission chain. This result 
provides further evidence for the concept of a content bias for social information in cultural 
transmission.  
Survival-type legends were not recalled with significantly greater accuracy than 
legends which featured social information but were recalled with greater accuracy than the 
control material. This suggests that survival information alone does confer a mnemonic 
advantage in cumulative recall but not as great an advantage as social information. This 
supports previous finding by Nairne and colleagues who found that survival processing 
conferred a mnemonic advantage in individual memory experiments, compared to other 
forms of mnemonic processing (Nairne, 2010; Nairne et al., 2007; Nairne & Pandeirada, 
2008). The results of Study 1 suggest that this mnemonic advantage granted by survival 
processing for an individual translates into a cumulative recall advantage for survival 
information across microcultures.  
An objection could be raised with regard to the distinction being made between 
social and survival information. Nairne (2010) argues that the ‘fitness-relevant’ 
information that should feature an advantage in recall includes both ecological survival 
information, such as the presence of predators, and social information, such as third party 
interactions; however, the results of Study 1 suggest that the distinction between social and 
survival information should be made. The results suggest that social information is 
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particularly salient compared to other forms of fitness-relevant information and as a result 
may be unique in the way humans preferentially attend, recall and transmit it. 
That the combined type legends were recalled with the same accuracy as the social 
type legends suggests that social information is key to the success of the cultural 
transmission of an urban legend narrative. There were no apparent recall benefits to 
combining two potential content biases. This could be a result of the nature of the bias it 
was combined with; survival information on its own did not grant as much of an advantage 
in recall across the chains as social information, so it may not confer a greater advantage in 
a narrative which also contains social information. Future studies could examine how 
different potential content biases interact and effect transmission when they are combined.  
That legends high in gender stereotype consistent behaviour also featured high 
levels of recall could be considered support for previous research which has suggested a 
content bias for gender stereotype consistent information in cultural transmission 
(Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 2000). However, Lyons and Kashima (2006) found that 
stereotype consistency bias only emerged in a transmission chain when there was 
communicative intent rather than just recall as in Study 1. As the legend type model was a 
significantly better fit for the data than a stereotype level model, it is likely that the 
observed pattern of recall is driven by the different types of information (survival, social, 
both combined) rather than the level of stereotype consistent behaviour. Gender stereotype 
consistent content was not the focus of the study so any evidence from the results can only 
be considered inconclusive with regards to true support for gender stereotype bias. It does 
suggest, however, that future studies examining gender stereotype or social information 
bias should consider if both biases are being exploited by the material at once and this is 
particularly pertinent if the material is ‘gossip’ involving sexual behaviour.  
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Transformations 
As demonstrated by Bartlett (1932), one advantage to using the transmission chain 
design is that the recall of participants can transform the original material in interesting 
ways that reflect cognitive biases. In Study 1 a number of transformations were observed. 
In the combined-gang legend, the last sentence – “Apparently, the poor boy had been 
attacked as part of a gang initiation” was frequently transformed. In the majority of chains, 
the word “apparently” was lost in the first or second generation. This is consistent with 
theories regarding the development of rumour; where ambiguous information is 
transformed to become fact (Shibutani, 1966). The ambiguous word “attacked” was also 
transformed in a number of cases to something more specific and emotive such as 
“stabbed” (chains 7 and 9) or “murdered” (chain 10). This could be explained by the 
content evolving through transmission to become increasingly emotive, and therefore 
further exploit the high emotion bias suggested by Heath, Bell and Sternberg (2001).  
Another interesting transformation was found in the social-birthday legend. In the 
first generation of one chain the sentence – “The boss of a small company took his 
attractive secretary out for a long lunch on his birthday [emphasis mine] ” was transformed 
into this sentence – “The boss of a small company took her attractive secretary out for 
lunch on his birthday [emphasis mine]”. This is essentially a gender-swap that changes the 
narrative from being gender stereotype consistent to being gender stereotype inconsistent. 
This change is inconsistent with research suggesting a bias for gender stereotype consistent 
narratives (e.g. Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 2000), however, by the second generation the 
gender of the boss character had returned to being male. This transformation is an example 
of a copying error being ‘corrected’ or conventionalised by a content bias. 
 The results of Study 1 provide further evidence for the presence of a social 
information bias in human cultural transmission at the level of recall. It suggests that this is 
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true of narratives where the social information is the primary narrative focus and of 
narratives that also contain survival information. Evidence was also found for a survival 
information bias in cultural transmission at the level of recall, although not to the same 
extent as social information. These findings provide support for the Machiavellian and 
Social Brain hypotheses of human intelligence evolution and to a lesser extent provide 
support for the concept that human memory evolved to preferentially recall fitness-related 
ecological information.  
5.3 Study 2 
While previous research into content biases in cultural transmission has largely 
relied on the transmission chain paradigm (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008), in true cultural 
transmission, selection is not limited by recall ability alone. While memory is important, as 
an oral narrative must be recalled to be retold, audience feedback and choice as well as the 
teller’s own preferences will affect the transmission of a narrative (Dégh & Vazsonyi, 
1975; Lyons & Kashima, 2006; Rubin, 1995; von Sydow, 1948/1965). The choice of the 
teller can be particularly pertinent as they will not always transmit everything they 
remember and may refrain from transmitting information if they doubt its truthfulness 
(Lyons & Kashima, 2003). Tellers are also likely to prefer to transmit information which 
will keep their audience entertained and/or intrigued (Kashima, Lyons & Clark, 2012). 
Eriksson and Coultas (2014) argue that research should distinguish between three distinct 
phases of cultural transmission: ‘choose-to-receive’, ‘encode-and-retrieve’ and ‘choose-to-
transmit’. In using the transmission chain paradigm previous content bias research has 
demonstrated biases in one phase, encode-and-retrieve, but not the other two. Previous 
research into emotional bias by Heath et al. (2001) demonstrated an advantage for 
disgusting material in a choose-to-transmit paradigm and Eriksson and Coultas (2014) 
expanded this to investigate emotional biases in the two other phases: encode-and-retrieve 
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and choose-to-receive. They found an advantage across all three phases of transmission for 
urban legends which evoked higher levels of disgust. Lyons and Kashima (2006) found 
that stereotype consistency bias only emerged in a transmission chain when there was 
communicative intent as opposed to just recall, suggesting that the choose-to-transmit 
phase plays an important part in how this stereotype consistency bias operates. This second 
study importantly extends previous work examining social information bias and survival 
information bias by looking beyond the encode-and-retrieve phase and by comparing how 
these biases operate across the choose-to-receive and choose-to-transmit phases. 
5.3.1 Methods 
Participants 
Thirty participants (24 females) took part. Their ages ranged from 18 to 22 years 
with a mean age of 19.43 years (SD = .97). These were all undergraduate students studying 
psychology.  
Material  
For the choose-to-receive phase, six ‘headlines’ were produced from the legends 
used in Study 1, describing the key elements of each legend (two each of survival type, 
social type and combined type; see Table 4 for the six headlines used). The material for the 
choose-to-transmit phase was the same six legends used in Study 1. 
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Table 4. The headlines used as experimental material in Study 2 with the legend code used 
to refer to them in the chapter (see Table 1). 
Headline Legend Code 
Steroids in chicken cause ovarian cysts. Survival-Cyst  
Woman killed by spiders in her hair. Survival-Spiders 
Man caught naked by surprise birthday party Social-Birthday 
Father and daughter have accidental cybersex Social-Cybersex 
Little boy attacked in gang initiation Combined-Gang 
Serial killer lures women with a recording of a crying baby Combined-Killer 
 
Procedure 
For the choose-to-receive phase participants were presented with a list of 
‘headlines’ and were asked to read them all (the order of headlines on the lists was 
counterbalanced). After reading the headlines they were asked to rank them in the order of 
their interest in reading the story from which the headline was derived. As assessment of 
this phase required participants to demonstrate which story they would be most likely to 
choose to read, a self-report paradigm was thought to be ecologically valid. While the 
participants could be influenced by experimenter effects, this could be the case in any 
paradigm examining this phase. In the choose-to-transmit phase participants were provided 
with all six legends (the order in which they received them was counterbalanced and was 
not the order selected in the choose-to-receive phase). They were asked to read the material 
and then asked to rank the legends in the order of their interest in passing that story on to 
another person. Self-report was used in this phase due to practical restrictions and to any 
potential audience effects that could influence the participants’ choice if they expected to 
actually pass the story on. Urban legends are rarely told to strangers so using a paradigm in 
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which participants actually passed the story on may not be ecologically valid. This design 
is consistent with previous research examining participants’ willingness to pass a story on 
such as Heath et al. (2001). 
5.3.2 Results  
 In both the choose-to-receive and choose-to-transmit phases a lower number 
indicates a higher rank i.e. the highest rank is one. 
Choose-to-receive Phase  
A Friedman test was used to assess variance in rank across individual’s ‘choice to 
receive’ for all the individual legends. Mean rank varied significantly across the six 
legends (χ25 = 34.23, p < .001). Post hoc analyses with Wilcoxon tests were conducted, 
with a Bonferroni-Holm correction applied, to examine the differences between legends. 
This analysis revealed that Combined-Killer (M = 2.5, SD = 1.55) ranked significantly 
higher than Combined-Gang (M = 3.63, SD = 1.59), Social-Birthday (M = 4.2, SD = 1.42), 
and Survival-Cyst (M = 4.83, SD = 1.39), zs = 370 – 424, ps < .05. Social-Cybersex (M = 
2.8, SD = 1.56) ranked significantly higher than Social-Birthday and Survival-Cyst, zs = 
389, 406.5, ps < .05, and Survival-Spiders (M = 3.03, SD = 1.63) ranked significantly 
higher than Survival-Cyst, z = 394.5, p <0.05; see Figure 3 (NB – Higher rank denotes 
more willingness to receive the story, 1 is the highest rank, 6 is the lowest rank).  
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Figure 3. The mean ranks given to each headline in the choose-to-receive phase of study 2 
(NB – Higher rank denotes more willingness to receive the story, 1 is the highest rank, 6 is 
the lowest rank). Error bars show standard errors. 
A Friedman test was used to assess variance in rank across individual’s ‘choice to 
receive’ for the legend types. Mean rank varied marginally signifycantly across legend 
type (χ22 = 5.67, p = .06). Post hoc analyses with Wilcoxon tests were conducted, with a 
Holm-Bonferroni correction applied, to examine the differences between legend types. The 
largest difference was found between combined type legends (M = 3.07, SD = 1.28) and 
survival type legends (M = 3.93, SD = .93) but this was not significant (z = 265, p = .069). 
All other comparisons were not significant (zs = 135, 198, ps > .05).   
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Choose-to-transmit Phase 
A Friedman test was used to assess variance in rank across individual’s ‘choice to 
transmit’ for the individual legends. Mean rank varied significantly across the six legends 
(χ25 = 15.57, p < .01). Post hoc analyses with Wilcoxon tests were conducted, with a 
Bonferroni-Holm correction applied, to examine the differences between legends. This 
analysis revealed Social-Cybersex (M = 2.93, SD = 1.70) ranked marginally significantly 
higher than Social-Birthday (M = 4.33, SD = 1.35), z = 371.5, p = .06. Comparisons 
between other legends were not significant (zs = 194.5 – 367, ps >.05). See Figure 4 (NB – 
Higher rank denotes more willingness to receive the story, 1 is the highest rank, 6 is the 
lowest rank).  
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Figure 4. The mean ranks given to each legend in the choose-to-transmit phase of study 2 
(NB – Higher rank denotes more willingness to receive the story, 1 is the highest rank, 6 is 
the lowest rank). Error bars show standard errors. 
A Friedman test was used to test for variance in rank across individual’s ‘choice to 
transmit’ for the legend types but no significant variation in mean rank was found (χ22 = 
5.41, p > .05).  
5.3.3 Discussion 
The aim of Study 2 was to examine how social information bias and survival 
information bias operate on two distinct phases of transmission, the choose-to-receive 
phase and the choose-to-transmit phase. Previous research has demonstrated these biases in 
the encode-and-retrieve phase, but has not investigated their effect outside of that single 
phase. The experiment also examined the effect of combining both social and survival 
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information on transmission across these phases. The results demonstrate no particular 
preference for either survival or social information at the choose-to-receive phase with 
both being equally preferred as legend types. Legends which combined both showed a 
slight advantage but this was not significant. Further research should investigate how 
different combinations of biases operate at this phase of transmission. In the choose-to-
transmit phase, no advantage for any legend type was found, suggesting that people are 
equally willing to pass on legends that contain social information, survival information and 
combine the two. A possible limitation of the approach used in this study is that the results 
were based on self-reported data. While self-report may be a plausible means to measure 
the choose-to-receive phase, it may be less appropriate in the choose-to-transmit phase as 
participants may not have an accurate perception of which stories they would actually 
transmit in a real life situation; however, it would be practically challenging to replicate the 
transmission of urban legends in an experimental setting while remaining ecologically 
valid.  
5.4 General Discussion 
The aim of these studies was to examine the effects of social information bias, 
survival information bias and combining both of these biases on the cultural transmission 
of urban legends across three distinct phases of transmission: the choose-to-receive phase, 
the encode-and-retrieve phase and the choose-to-transmit phase. Taken together the results 
for Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate the importance of examining transmission in all of these 
different phases when seeking to demonstrate a content bias in cultural transmission. 
Previous research by Eriksson and Coultas (2014) into emotional bias found a largely 
consistent transmission advantage for content that evoked high levels of disgust across all 
three phases of transmission while another study by Lyons and Kashima (2006) found that 
stereotype consistency bias only emerged when there was communicative intent rather than 
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emerging from a recall advantage. The results show that social information has an 
advantage over survival information in the encode-and-retrieve phase, the phase based on 
recall, but this was not consistent in the other phases. In both the choose-to-receive phase 
and the choose-to-transmit phase neither bias had an advantage over the other.  
The fact that social information was most advantageous in the encode-and-retrieve 
phase when there was no communicative intent suggests that this bias operates at the level 
of a recall advantage. This suggests that humans have a predisposition towards 
preferentially recalling narratives which contain social information over survival 
information. This result lends partial support to the Machiavellian Intelligence (Byrne & 
Whiten, 1988, Whiten 1999; Whiten & Byrne, 1997) or Social Brain (Dunbar, 1998, 2003) 
hypotheses that intelligence evolved in order to deal with complex social relationships. 
However, no evidence was found to support the prediction of these hypotheses that humans 
will also preferentially attend to or choose to transmit social information over survival 
information. In both these cases there was no apparent preference for social information 
over survival information. The choose-to-transmit phase is the phase most influenced by 
what the transmitter believes that their audience will respond to and the neutral finding 
here could be due to participants imagining passing on a story rather than actually doing 
so. Future experiments could examine audience effects on the choose-to-transmit phase of 
transmission and communicative intention.  
The legends combining both social information and survival information were as 
successful in recall as the social legends and had a recall advantage over legends 
containing survival information alone. This suggests that survival information needs to be 
combined with another bias to be as culturally successful as social information or possibly 
be exceptionally memorable in order to ‘survive’ the encode-and-retrieve phase. Given 
these results, in the general corpus of urban legends one could expect to see fewer urban 
Chapter 5 – Social Information and Survival Information Bias 
 
141 
 
legends that contain survival information than social information, or for the former to 
exploit additional biases. This is supported by a content analysis of 256 urban legends, 
which found a greater number of legends that contained social information than survival 
information and also found survival information to be commonly combined with other 
biases (Stubbersfield, Tehrani & Flynn, under review a, presented in Chapter 2). Previous 
research (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Heath et al., 2001) has suggested that urban legends 
exploit a bias for content that evokes high emotion, particularly disgust. This high emotion 
bias could explain the prevalence of survival type legends more accurately than survival 
information bias alone. However, as disgust is so associated with survival mechanisms 
(avoiding contaminated food, etc.), future research should examine if the high emotion bias 
is found for emotions other than disgust.  
 While Mesoudi et al. (2006) used original material created for the purpose of the 
experiment, Study 1 and 2 used real urban legends. Although they were altered in terms of 
word length for the purposes of the study multiple versions of any urban legend always 
exist with no ‘true’ version, so the material used in the present study is an accurate 
representation of narratives that are transmitted between people orally and through 
electronic communication. There are a number of benefits to using ‘real world’ material in 
such an experiment but this can come at the cost of full control over the features of the 
material. In this experiment efforts were made to control for any confounding variables in 
terms of content and differences in social and survival information provide the best 
account for the observed differences in recall. The fact that urban legends that contain 
some social information were found to have an advantage in the encode-and-retrieve phase 
of transmission in an experimental setting suggests that this is also the case for these 
legends in the ‘real world’ and provides an explanation for the large number of legends 
which feature some form of social information (Stubbersfield et al., under review a, 
presented in Chapter 2).  
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The studies presented here demonstrate that social information bias provides a 
transmission advantage over survival information in the encode-and-retrieve phase of 
transmission but has no strong advantage in either the choose-to-receive or choose-to-
transmit phases. Survival information was found to have an advantage over control 
material at the encode-and-retrieve phase, although this advantage was not as great as 
social information. To succeed in cultural transmission, survival information is likely to be 
combined with a more successful bias, such as social information, although other biases 
such as emotional bias are also likely candidates. Future research examining content biases 
in cultural transmission should consider how these biases operate across all three phases of 
transmission and not just focus on the encode-and-retrieve or choose-to-transmit phases. 
New experimental paradigms that go beyond the traditional linear transmission chain could 
be used and developed to allow for further investigation into the effects of content biases 
on the choose-to-receive and choose-to-transmit phases. By investigating these phases 
separately new information can be discovered with regard to how the biases operate and 
new predictions could be made in terms of how biased content is transmitted. 
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Chapter 6 
Justin Bieber and Unicorns: An Examination of Guided Variation and Content 
Biases in Narratives Using a Transmission Chain Without Recall 
 
This chapter presents a study which uses a transmission chain without recall to examine the 
process of guided variation in cultural transmission and how it may reflect the cognitive 
content biases observed in recall-based transmission. 
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Abstract 
 To date, most studies of cultural evolution have focused on processes of selection 
and inheritance, neglecting processes of mutation. Theorists have identified two potential 
forms of mutation in cultural evolution: ‘copying error’, where a learner makes 
unintentional, random modifications to a behaviour, due to distraction, accident or lack of 
skill, and ‘guided variation’ where a learner makes non-random modifications to the 
demonstrated behaviour based on individual experience. While copying error is directly 
analogous to random genetic mutation, guided variation is a specifically cultural process 
that does not have a close parallel in biological evolution. It has been suggested that the 
decision-making processes underlying guided variation may produce similar results to 
cultural transmission as both are likely to be influenced by cognitive biases. So far, this 
idea has only been explored in relation to context biases in cultural transmission (i.e. whom 
to copy) and has yet to be investigated in relation to content biases (i.e. what to copy). This 
study addresses the latter by using a unique linear transmission chain design, without any 
influence of recall, to examine this gap in the literature. Participants were given news 
stories and asked to alter these stories however they wished in order to make it more 
interesting, the product of their modification was then passed to the next participant and so 
on down the chain. The products of the chains were then compared with the original 
material so as to assess any underlying biases in the changed content. It was found that 
original material that already exploited content biases was not enhanced by guided 
variation, however, original material which scored low for biased content was enhanced in 
at least one known content bias.  
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6.1 Introduction 
In recent years, theories of cultural evolution (e.g. Mesoudi, 2011, Richerson & 
Boyd, 2005) have become increasingly popular in a number of disciplines, including 
psychology (e.g. Mesoudi, 2009), anthropology (e.g. Henrich & McElreath, 2003), 
archaeology (e.g. Shennan, 2002), sociology (e.g. Runciman, 2009) and linguistics (e.g. 
Gray, Drummond, & Greenhill, 2009). These theories propose that culture represents a 
second system of heritable variation that evolves through the same Darwinian processes as 
the genetic system, i.e. mutation, selection and inheritance. To date, most theoretical and 
empirical work in this field has focused on the latter two processes. For example, 
researchers have used a range of methods, from mathematical modelling (e.g. Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985) and controlled experiments (Wood et al., 2013) to ethnographic 
fieldwork (Henrich & Broesch, 2011), to investigate how one makes decisions about what 
to copy (‘content biases’) and who to copy (‘context biases’). Other researchers, 
meanwhile, have employed techniques of phylogenetic analysis to trace lineages of cultural 
descent and modification in various socially learned traditions (e.g. Currie, 2013; Lycett, 
2009; Lyman & O’Brien, 2003; Tehrani, 2013; Tehrani, Collard & Shennan, 2010), and 
establish long-term trends in cultural, economic and political systems (e.g. Jordan, Gray, 
Greenhill & Mace, 2009). However, comparatively little research has been carried out on 
how the variants of any given behaviour that one chooses to adopt and pass on were 
initially created. The present study aims to shed more light on this problem by examining 
processes of innovation in artificially generated narrative traditions. 
 Current theory (e.g. Mesoudi, 2011) suggests there are two main mechanisms of 
cultural mutation. The first of these is copying error, which is defined as the non-random, 
non-intentional modification of a demonstrated behaviour. Copying error can result when a 
learner is less adept than a model (for example, the father of the bride attempting to imitate 
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Michael Jackson’s ‘moonwalk’ at his daughter’s wedding party), due to an accidental 
mishap (a pianist accidentally hitting the wrong key during a performance), or as a 
consequence of the constraints of the human perceptual system (for example, believing two 
lines to be the same length when they are not). An excellent example of the latter is 
provided by Eerkens and Lipo’s (2005) case study of Paleo-Indian projectile points from 
Owens Valley, California between 1500 and 650 BCE. Eerkens and Lipo demonstrated 
that patterns of variance and cumulative change in point forms during this period is 
consistent with a model of pure copying error derived from research into shape perception, 
which shows that humans are unable to discriminate between line lengths that differ by less 
than 3% (known as the Weber Fraction), regardless of scale. The second mechanism for 
generating cultural variation is known as ‘guided variation’ (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), 
which involves the non-random modification of a demonstrated behaviour by the learner. 
For example, someone may be taught how to cook a particular dish, and decide to alter the 
recipe to make it tastier or healthier by adding or substituting ingredients. This newly 
invented recipe might then be copied by other members of the population, or not, 
depending on whether it is favoured by the cultural selective forces at work (i.e. content 
and context biases in transmission). This non-random modification can occur in both 
unintentional and intentional forms and also occur through learning processes such as trial-
and-error (Mesoudi, 2013). 
 Whereas copying error is directly analogous to random mutation in genetics, guided 
variation is a specifically cultural process that does not have a close parallel in biological 
evolution. Goal-directed guided variation allows individuals to take short-cuts to solving 
adaptive problems that would take several generations to solve under pure natural 
selection. As Richerson and Boyd stated, guided variation is “like an imaginary genetic 
system in which mutations tend to be fitness-enhancing, rather than random” (2005:116). 
They further suggest that the decision-making processes underlying guided variation may 
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often produce similar results to biased cultural transmission because both are likely to be 
based on the same psychological mechanisms (ibid). The same point has been made more 
forcefully by Claidière, Scott-Phillips and Sperber (2014) who argue that it is impossible to 
decouple mutational and selective forces in cultural evolution (see also Sperber, 1996). 
 To my knowledge, only one study has directly tested whether traditions that evolve 
through guided variation exhibit the same dynamics as traditions that evolve through 
biased cultural transmission. Mesoudi (2008), inspired by Bettinger and Eerkens’ (1999) 
classic archaeological analysis of variation in arrow-head designs in prehistoric Nevada 
and California, used an artificial hunting experiment to compare the evolution of virtual 
arrow-head designs under guided variation (in this case intentional modification informed 
by individual trial-and-error learning) versus a transmission bias for copying successful 
individuals. Mesoudi found that in simple (unimodal) fitness landscape, participants using 
guided variation converged on the same optimal design as those who were able to copy the 
most successful hunters. In a multi-modal landscape, on the other hand, the latter 
consistently outperformed the former. Consequently, Mesoudi’s experiments suggest that 
guided variation can produce similar outcomes to biased cultural transmission, but only 
under specific circumstances (i.e. when there is a single best variant of a particular 
behaviour). However, it is important to emphasise that the study focused specifically on 
context-based (i.e. copy-who) transmission biases. To date, no similar studies have 
examined whether guided variation exhibits the same dynamics as content-based (i.e. copy 
what) transmission biases. Here, I present a study that was designed to address this gap.  
The Present Research 
Our study focuses on several content biases that have been identified in previous 
research: an ecological survival information bias (Nairne 2010), a social information bias 
(Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006); an emotional bias (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001), a 
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minimally counter-intuitive (MCI) bias (Boyer & Ramble, 2001), and a stereotype 
consistency bias (Kashima, 2000). Ecological survival information bias suggests that, as 
human memory has evolved to be ‘tuned’ towards encoding and recalling ecological 
information related to survival and fitness better than other forms of information, humans 
will be biased towards ecological information relevant to survival (Nairne & Pandeirada, 
2008). While social information bias suggests that, as humans evolved greater intelligence 
in order to deal with complex social interactions they will be biased towards information 
related to social interaction (Mesoudi et al., 2006). Content which evokes a greater 
emotional response has been shown to grant a mnemonic advantage in individual recall 
tests (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006) and content eliciting a greater level of disgust has been 
shown to have an advantage in cultural transmission (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Heath et 
al., 2001); such emotional content bias suggests that humans are biased in transmission 
towards content that evokes a greater emotional response. MCI bias suggests that humans 
are biased towards content which meets a cognitively optimal balance between a small 
number of counter-intuitive concepts which breach category level expectations (of folk 
physics, folk biology etc.) and a majority of intuitive concepts (Boyer, 1994). Stereotype 
consistency bias suggests that humans are biased towards content which is consistent with 
these cultural stereotypes (Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 2000). 
To investigate these issues more systematically, this study uses a novel 
experimental paradigm in which participants in a linear transmission chain receive 
information and then were given the opportunity to alter it however they wished without 
having to recall it. The next participant in the chain then received the material produced by 
the previous participant and was asked to alter it, replicating the ‘creative transmission’ 
seen in electronic communication in a micro-culture. The nature of this paradigm means 
that the guided variation studied here is explicitly goal-directed and intentional and as such 
is not representative of all forms of guided variation, some of which may feature 
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unintentional but non-random modification. In this sense, the guided variation studied here 
is similar to the version presented by Claidière, Scott-Phillips and Sperber (2014), who 
describe it as a constructive mental process which imaginatively anticipates the effects of a 
modification. The study addressed two key questions: 
1. Will the product of guided variation reflect the content biases demonstrated in 
recall-based experiments such as transmission chains and memory tests? 
2. Will the choices made by participants when altering the material reflect the 
choices made by participants in ‘choose-to-transmit’-based experiments? 
6.2 Methods 
This study involved three distinct phases using different participants in each stage. 
In Stage 1, participants rated four news stories for various criteria related to their content. 
Stage 2 took the form of a linear transmission chain where participants were allowed to 
alter the original material however they wished without having to recall it. In Stage 3 
participants rated the material that was produced by the transmission chains using the same 
questionnaire as Stage 1. For the results the data from the Stage 1 and Stage 3 
questionnaires are compared. The methodological details of each stage are provided below, 
before the results are presented. 
6.2.1 Stage 1 – Initial ratings of News Stories 
Participants 
 Eleven participants (10 female) participated. Their ages ranged from 18 to 25 years 
with a mean age of 20 years (SD = 2.05). All participants were students at Durham 
University.  
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Materials 
 Four news stories were collected from the BBC News website 
(www.bbc.co.uk/news/); two were thought to exploit content biases to a greater degree 
than the other two providing two groups of stories low-exploit and high-exploit. One story 
(low-trees) describes a plan to plant thousands of trees on a Cumbrian fell to boost 
numbers of black grouse. Another (low-bridge) describes delays on the Kessock Bridge at 
Inverness due to two lorries carrying abnormal loads. Another (high-pea) describes an 
incident in Massachusetts where a man was found to have a pea plant growing in his lung. 
The fourth story (high-tiger) describes an incident where a US police sniper sedated a tiger 
found in a Harlem apartment. These stories were presented as narratives without headlines 
and were referred to as stories rather than news articles (see Appendix H for the full news 
stories). Questionnaires were created which contained five questions for each story asking 
about emotional content, plausibility, relevance, survival information, social information 
and gender stereotypes. The questions were: 
1. What emotion or emotions did you feel while reading this story? (e.g. interest, 
joy, anger, surprise, sadness, contempt, fear, disgust) 
2. Please rate to what extent you felt up to three emotions out of 7  
3. Please rate to what extent you believe this story to be plausible out of 7 (1= very 
unlikely to have taken place, 7= likely to be true)  
4. Please rate how relevant you feel this story is to you and your life out of 7  
For question five participants were asked to rate ‘to what extent the story contains’ 
‘information relevant to health and survival’, ‘information concerning social interaction or 
relationships’ and ‘behaviour stereotypical for either gender’. Questions one, two, four and 
five used a seven-point Likert scale from ‘1 = very little’ to ‘7 = very much’. For question 
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three the Likert ran from ‘1 = very unlikely to have taken place’ to ‘7 = likely to be true’ 
(see Appendix I for full questions). These questions were used to collect data on potential 
content biases that the stories may exploit (see Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008). The order of 
stories presented was counterbalanced to avoid order effects.  
Procedure 
 Participants were asked to take part in a study regarding the cultural transmission of 
narratives. Each participant was presented with a series of news stories and then had to fill 
out a questionnaire for each of the four stories. The same set of five questions was asked 
for each of the stories presented. The questions were related to emotional content, 
plausibility, relevance, survival information, social information and gender stereotypes. 
Questions 2-5 involved participants rating the content of the story on a seven point Likert 
scale (see Appendix I). 
6.2.2 Stage 2 – Adaption of the News Stories 
Participants 
 Thirty participants (21 female) participated. Their ages ranged from 19 to 40 with a 
mean age of 21.67 years (SD = 4.2). All participants were students at Durham University. 
Design 
A linear transmission chain design was used, in which the first participant in each 
of the ten chains received the four news stories. Unlike traditional transmission chains, 
however, participants were not required to recall the material; instead they were asked to 
alter the stories. The next participant was presented with the material that had been 
produced by the previous participant. Each of the ten chains comprised of three 
participants or ‘generations’. Three generations was judged to be an optimum chain length, 
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capable of capturing long-term cumulative effects of ‘guided variation’ but short enough to 
be practical in terms of participant recruitment. Three generations have been used 
successfully in diffusion chains in previous research (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Nielsen, 
Cucchiaro & Mohamedally, 2012). Each individual story was passed along ten chains.  
Materials 
 The material presented to the first generation in each chain was the same four news 
stories that were used in Stage 1. Again, these were presented as narratives without 
headlines (See Appendix H).  
Procedure 
 Participants were asked to take part in a study regarding the cultural transmission of 
narratives. Participants were individually presented with the experimental materials on a 
computer. The participants were given the following written instructions:  
‘Please edit the story to make it as interesting as possible, so that another person 
would be likely to tell it to a friend. You have complete freedom to alter the story 
however you wish but please change at least two aspects of the story.’ 
 Participants were asked to change at least two aspects of the story to ensure that some 
changes were made. This was repeated for each story presented to them.  
6.2.3 Stage 3 – Final ratings of the stories 
Participants 
 One-hundred participants (81 female) participated. Their ages ranged from 17 to 39 
with a mean age of 20.48 years (SD = 3.89). The majority (87%) of participants were 
students at Durham University, others were recruited through opportunity sampling.  
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Materials 
The material used in this stage was the material produced by the final generation of 
each chain in Stage 2. Participants rated these using the same questionnaire as Stage 1 (see 
Appendix I) 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to take part in a study regarding the cultural transmission of 
narratives. Each participant was presented with an online questionnaire and answered 
questions on each of the four stories they were presented with. The same set of five 
questions was repeated for each of the stories presented. Each version of each story (ten 
chains for each story led to ten versions of each story, totalling 40 final stories) was rated 
by ten participants (each participant rating four stories).  
6.3 Results 
Before Transmission 
 Each news story was rated by eleven participants before being transmitted along the 
transmission chains. Table 1 presents the mean rating scores for each of the questions in 
the questionnaire.  
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Table 1. Mean and standard deviation rating scores for each news story before 
transmission. 
Story   Mean (SD)    
 Emotional Plausibility Relevance Survival Social Stereotype 
Trees 3.73(1.35) 6(1.1) 2.82(1.25) 2.73(1.62) 1.82(1.08) 1.36(.67) 
Bridge 3.36(1.57) 4.91(1.87) 1.91(1.45) 1.91(1.22) 2.36(1.03) 1.91(.83) 
Pea 5.55(.82) 2.82(2.04) 2.36(1.63) 4.55(1.29) 2.91(1.14) 1.91(.7) 
Tiger 5.36(.67) 3.82(1.6) 1.64(.92) 3.55(1.44) 2.45(1.57) 3.09(1.38) 
NB - Rating scale ran 1-7. For plausibility low scores represent less plausible. 
Variation between the news stories was examined using Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
ANOVAs. Significant variation was found between the news stories in emotional content 
(χ23 = 20.76, p < .001), plausibility (χ
2
3 = 15.02, p < .005), survival information (χ
2
3 = 
15.12, p < .005) and gender stereotype consistent behaviour (χ23 = 11.67, p < .01). There 
was no significant variation found in relevance (χ23 = 5.98, p > .05) or social information 
(χ23 = 4.63, p > .05). Pairwise comparisons using Dunn’s (1964) procedure were used to 
examine the differences between individual stories. It was found that low-trees and low-
bridge stories scored significantly lower than high-pea and high-tiger in emotional content 
(ps < .05). Low-trees scored significantly higher than high-pea in plausibility (p < .005). 
Low--bridge scored significantly lower than high-pea in survival information (p < .005). 
High-tiger scored significantly higher in gender stereotyped behaviour than low-trees (p < 
.005). No other significant differences between news stories were found. See Table 2 for 
the mean differences between all stories on each scale. 
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Table 2. Significant mean differences between each story before transmission (at p<.05) 
  Mean Difference  
Story Low Bridge High Pea High Tiger 
Low Trees  Em: -1.82 
Pl: 3.18 
Em: -1.64 
St: -1.73 
Low Bridge  Em: -2.18 
Su: -2.64 
Em: -2.00 
Su: -1.64 
High Pea    
Key: 
Em – Emotional content Su – Survival information      
Pl – Plausibility   St – Stereotype consistency  
 
After Transmission 
 After being transmitted along the chains, each version of each story was rated by 
ten participants. Table 2 presents the mean rating scores for each of the questions in the 
questionnaire.  
Table 3. Mean and standard deviation rating scores for each story after transmission. 
Story   Mean (SD)    
 Emotional Plausibility Relevance Survival Social Stereotype 
Trees 4.18(1.38) 2.77(1.85) 2.18(1.24) 3.09(1.81) 2.51(1.45) 2.09(1.56) 
Bridge 4.21(1.59) 2.89(1.83) 1.91(1.18) 2.45(1.48) 3.56(1.63) 2.39(1.59) 
Pea 4.76(1.6) 1.94(1.48) 1.54(.99) 3.59(2.04) 2.66(1.7) 2.14(1.54) 
Tiger 4.54(1.45) 2.20(1.57) 1.48(.77) 2.82(1.7) 2.77(1.52) 2.78(1.73) 
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 Variation between the news stories was examined using Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
ANOVAs. Significant variation was found between the transmitted stories in emotional 
content (χ23 = 10.10, p < .05), plausibility (χ
2
3 = 22.59, p < .001), relevance (χ
2
3 = 28.47, p 
< .001), survival information (χ23 = 17.46, p < .005), social information (χ
2
3 = 25.25, p < 
.001) and gender stereotyped behaviour (χ23 = 13.74, p < .005). Dunn’s (1964) procedure 
for pairwise comparisons was used to compare individual stories. High-pea scored 
significantly higher than low-trees in emotional content (p < .05). Low-bridge scored 
significantly higher than high-pea and high-tiger in plausibility (ps < .05) and high-pea also 
scored significantly lower than high-trees in the same score (p < .005). Low-trees scored 
significantly higher than high-pea and high-tiger in relevance (ps < .001). High-pea scored 
significantly higher than low-bridge in survival information (p < .005). Low-bridge scored 
significantly higher than all other stories in social information (ps < .01). High-tiger scored 
significantly higher than low-trees and high-pea in gender stereotyped behaviour (ps < 
.05). No other significant differences were found. See Table 4 for the mean differences 
between all stories on each scale. 
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Table 4. Significant mean differences between each story after transmission (at p<.05) 
  Mean Difference  
Story Low Bridge High Pea High Tiger 
Low Trees Su: .64 
So: -1.05 
Em: -.58 
Pl: .83 
Re: .64 
Re: .70 
St: -.69 
Low Bridge  Pl: .95 
Su: -1.14 
So: .90 
Pl: .69 
So: .79 
High Pea   St: -.64 
Key: 
Em – Emotional content Re - Relevence   So – Social Information 
Pl – Plausibility   Su – Survival information   St – Stereotype consistency  
 
Before and after transmission comparison 
 Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to examine the differences between before 
and after transmission for each news story (and the material developed from that story by 
the chains) in each rating scale.  
Low-Trees 
 The plausibility score was found to be significantly lower after transmission (U = 
105, p < .001). No other significant differences were found (Us = 690-380, ps > .05).  
 
 
Chapter 6 – Guided Variation and Content Biases 
 
164 
 
Low-Bridge  
 The plausibility score was found to be significantly lower after transmission (U = 
235, p < .005) and the social information score was found to be significantly higher (U = 
782.5, p < .05). No other significant differences were found (Us = 713-584.5, ps > .05).  
High-Pea 
 No significant differences were found (Us = 384.5-502.5, ps > .05), although the 
relevance score was marginally significantly different after transmission (U = 384.5, p = 
.51).  
High-Tiger 
The emotional content score was found to be significantly lower after transmission 
(U = 354, p < .05) as was the plausibility score (U = 245.5, p < .005). No other significant 
differences were found (Us = 621.5-394.5, ps > .05).  
Qualitative Analyses 
 During coding it was observed that certain additions and changes frequently 
occurred and were common across the stories. As such a qualitative analysis was 
conducted using NVivo 10 (QSR International, 2012) to assess the frequency of these 
common alterations. The common changes or additions considered were: 
 The addition of MCI concepts, here defined as concepts which breach category 
level expectations (of folk physics, folk biology etc.). 
 The addition of content intended to be found amusing by the reader. 
 Exaggeration of elements in the story, either simply the physical dimensions of an 
element (e.g. the size of the pea in high-pea) or an exaggeration of the story’s 
events (e.g. the landslide in low-trees being deadly). 
Chapter 6 – Guided Variation and Content Biases 
 
165 
 
 The addition of references to popular culture such as celebrities.  
 A change to the location of the story’s setting.  
The results of this frequency based analysis can be seen in Table 5. 
Table 5. Results of the qualitative analysis. The table shows the percentage frequency of 
common additions or changes made to the stories.  
Addition / 
Change 
Frequency in each story (% of stories) Frequency in 
all stories (%) Low-Trees Low-Bridge High-Pea High-Tiger 
MCI content 50 40 80 40 52.5 
Amusing content 60 60 50 60 57.5 
Exaggeration 40 50 60 60 52.5 
‘Pop culture’  20 40 20 40 30 
Location change 20 10 0 10 10 
 
6.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the effects of intentional guided variation on 
the evolution of narratives, in this case news stories. In particular the aim of the study was 
to test if the product of transmission based solely on individual modification rather than 
recall would reflect the content biases that have been suggested by previous research. To 
do this two key questions were addressed: 
1. Will the product of guided variation reflect the content biases demonstrated in 
recall-based experiments such as transmission chains and memory tests? 
2. Will the choices made by participants when altering the material reflect the 
choices made by participants in ‘choose-to-transmit’-based experiments? 
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Previous research using recall-based experiments such as transmission chains and 
memory tests has given support to a number of content biases in cultural transmission. 
These recall-based studies have suggested a survival information bias (Nairne, 2010; 
Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008; Nairne, Thompson & Pandeirada, 2007), a social information 
bias (McGuigan & Cubillo, 2013; Mesoudi et al, 2006; Owens, Bower & Black, 1979; 
Reysen, Talbert, Dominko, Jones & Kelley, 2011), a bias for stereotype consistency 
(Allport & Postman, 1947; Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 2000), and MCI bias (Barrett, 
Burdett, & Porter, 2009; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Norenzayan, 
Atran, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2006; Upal, 2011; Upal, Gonce, Tweney, & Slone, 2007). 
Emotional content bias has been demonstrated in studies based on recall and also the 
‘choose-to-transmit’ phases of transmission (Berger & Milkman, 2010; Erikkson & 
Coultas, 2014; Heath, Bell & Sternberg, 2001; Peters, Kashima and Clark, 2009). While 
stereotype consistency bias has been demonstrated in recall-based experiments, Lyons and 
Kashima (2006) found that stereotype consistency bias only emerged in a linear 
transmission chain where there was communicative intent but did not emerge in a recall-
based chain. Here, it was tested whether participants would enhance the degree to which 
material contained emotionally-arousing information, stereotypically-consistent 
information, social information, survival information and MCI concepts. 
In order to examine these issues, an original experimental paradigm was used. For 
this study participants in a linear transmission chain were given material (original material 
being an article from the BBC News website) and were asked to alter this material 
however they wished, in contrast to having to recall it as in traditional transmission chain 
experiments. Separate groups of participants were used to rate the original material and the 
material produced by the chains, which allowed comparison of changes in content biases in 
the initial and resulting material. The results show that there was significant variation in 
scores between the stories both before and after transmission. Before transmission the 
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stories could be separated into two groups: those which were rated as more plausible but 
less emotive (low-trees and low-bridge) and those which were rated as less plausible but 
more emotive (high-pea and high-tiger). The high-exploit stories also scored higher for 
survival information, social information and stereotyped content, although the distinction 
between the two groups was less distinct for these measures. This is largely consistent with 
expectations of how the news stories would exploit content biases before transmission and 
allows for a comparison between the two groups with regards to how they are altered 
through guided variation in transmission. After the material had been transmitted along the 
chains and altered by participants, the differences in their scores was less marked, that is, 
there was less to distinguish the two groups. The low-exploit stories became less plausible 
and in one case (low-bridge) scores significantly increased in social information. The 
scores for the high-exploit stories were largely consistent between before and after 
transmission in versions, the only significant change being that high-tiger’s emotion score 
reduced. The only story not to reduce in plausibility was high-pea, although that story had 
the lowest plausibility score before transmission and it did reduce, just not to a significant 
degree.  
With regards to whether ‘the product of guided variation reflects the content biases 
demonstrated in recall-based experiments such as transmission chains and memory tests’, 
the results suggest, where biased content did increase, this was consistent with the findings 
of recall-based experiments and is therefore comparable to unintentional changes in 
transmission. The biases that increased, social information and stereotyped content, have 
both been demonstrated in recall-based experiments. The fact that this was not consistent 
across all stories suggests that while certain biases may provide a recall advantage, both 
individually and cumulatively, these biases are not deliberately added or enhanced when 
recall is not necessary for transmission and may be uniquely unintentional changes made in 
recall-based transmission. The finding that stereotype consistent content increased in one 
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story is consistent with Lyons and Kashima (2006) who found that this bias emerged when 
there was communicative intent.  
With regards to whether ‘the choices made by participants when altering the 
material reflect the choices made by participants in ‘choose-to-transmit’-based 
experiments’, the results were not consistent with these studies. While ‘choose-to-transmit’ 
studies have found that more emotive content is more likely to be chosen to be transmitted 
over less emotive content, the degree to which the stories in this study evoked emotion did 
not alter. The guided variation transmission process did not increase the degree of emotion 
evoked to a significant degree and in fact one story (high-tiger) which scored higher for 
emotion before transmission actually reduced in emotion score.  
A more detailed qualitative analysis can provide some insight into how the stories 
were altered and how this may have affected the individual biases scores. Frequently 
changes were made with the apparent intention of making the story more amusing, in some 
cases using deliberate punch lines, (for example, having a clown being taken into 
“CUSTARDy”). This is consistent with an analysis of content biases in urban legends 
which found amusement to be the most frequently evoked emotion (Stubbersfield, Tehrani 
& Flynn, under review a, presented in Chapter 2). These attempts at making the stories 
funny, however, did not translate to increased emotion scores, suggesting that they were 
unsuccessful. Another common alteration was to exaggerate elements of the story. This 
could be either a simple increase of the physical dimensions of a story element (for 
example, the growth mentioned in high-pea is ½ an inch in the original material but 
became as large as three miles in one version of the story), or an exaggeration of the events 
described, (for example, the landslides in low-trees becoming deadly). Again, however, 
these exaggerations did not appear to increase the degree to which the stories evoked 
emotion and are likely to have contributed to the reduction in plausibility scores. 
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Exaggeration of narrative elements has been observed in a recall-based transmission chain 
study, with elements becoming more explicitly violent (Stubbersfield, Tehrani & Flynn, 
under review c, presented in Chapter 5). This suggests that the intentional exaggeration 
found in guided variation is comparable to unintentional changes made in recall-based 
transmission.  
Another common alteration that may have reduced plausibility scores was the 
inclusion of MCI elements (here defined as content which breaches category level 
expectations, such as acting against folk physics or folk biology, e.g. supernatural 
elements), which were found in close to half of the material produced by the chains. The 
MCI elements ranged from mythical creatures, such as unicorns, to more sci-fi like 
elements, such as space-craft or superheroes. Although this is likely to have reduced the 
plausibility scores, the inclusion MCI elements could enhance the transmission success of 
the stories. The introduction of MCI elements (where there were none before) has not been 
observed in recall-based transmission studies suggesting that it is a uniquely intentional 
change. The fact that MCI elements are preserved in recall-based transmission, however, 
suggests that this intentional inclusion of MCI elements reflects cognitive biases. Other, 
less frequently observed changes reflect tropes commonly seen in urban legends. These 
include references to popular culture (multiple references were made to the internet 
‘meme’, the ‘Harlem Shake’), references to celebrities such as actor Charlie Sheen and 
location changes. The introduction of celebrities appears to reflect social information bias. 
By introducing real people likely to be known to the reader, the author of these changes 
increases the social relevance of the information provided in the narrative, thereby 
exploiting social information bias.  
One of the more unexpected results of the study was that there was not a general 
increase in the biased content across all the stories. Instead it was found that only one 
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exploit-low story showed an increase in biased content and that this was not across all 
biases. This story only increased in social information but in a number of examples both 
low-exploit and high-exploit stories had MCI elements added to them. One might expect 
guided variation to work in a similar manner to traditional recall-based transmission and 
enhance how transmissible the material is by increasing all biases. However, an analysis of 
urban legends found that even in narratives which have been transmitted multiple times in 
an online environment the majority only exploited between one and three content biases 
(Stubbersfield et al, under review a, presented in Chapter 2) so this low degree of change 
reflects what is observed in ‘real world’ material. This suggests that there may be an 
optimum number of biases for a narrative to be maximally transmissible and the findings 
of this study are consistent with this. Future research should examine the effect of multiple 
biases by examining which combination of biases make a narrative more memorable and 
more transmittable, and whether a large number of biases actually make material less 
transmissible.  
The finding that the exploit-high group did not increase in any biases (although 
MCI content was added to a number of versions) could be explained in a number of ways. 
First, the participants may not be very skilled in creatively making stories that already 
exploited biases even more entertaining. Altering a narrative that may already be 
successful in transmission so that it is even more appealing to an audience could be a 
challenge and in a real environment only the most successful versions would be selected 
for transmission by readers. A second explanation draws on a methodological issue. The 
use of a Likert scale to assess the content means that material which already scored high on 
this scale had less opportunity to increase after transmission.  
Cognitive content biases in guided variation have particular relevance to electronic 
communication, where recall is not necessary to transmit information. Despite having the 
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ability to accurately replicate the received information by forwarding it as they received it, 
people often alter the information before transmitting it themselves. This phenomenon is 
particularly common in the transmission of urban legends where people may alter the 
location of a story to make it appear more relevant to those they are transmitting it to, or 
alter a risqué story into something much more explicit, or include references to a popular 
celebrity (Brunvand, 2000). An example of this is the ‘Written by a Cop’ document which 
has been transmitted through electronic media such as email and Facebook. This document 
began in 2001 as a list of twelve crime safety tips apparently based on a seminar given by 
personal safety expert Pat Malone. Since then, despite the ease by which it could be simply 
replicated through copying and pasting, or forwarding, it has changed significantly. A 
number of the items on the list have been removed and new ones have been added, with 
one new item being a version of a widely circulated urban legend. As such it has gone from 
being a list of genuine advice to a list containing both true and false information which is 
incorrectly attributed to a police officer (see www.snopes.com/crime/prevent/ninetips.asp 
for more details of this document).   
This study is the first to examine how transmission without recall, allowing 
participants to deliberately alter the material however the wish, may reflect cognitive 
content biases found in recall-based transmission. As such it is also the first study to 
explicitly examine content biases in guided variation. Previous research by Mesoudi (2008) 
compared arrow-head designs produced through context bias and through guided variation 
and found that under certain circumstances guided variation can produce similar outcomes 
to cultural transmission. This study found that guided variation is effective in increasing 
the degree to which material exploits content biases to some extent but only when the 
original material does not exploit biases to a great extent. Only the suggested content 
biases of social information and MCI were found to be increased. No other content biases 
were increased. Unlike recall-based experiments where aspects of material either are 
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retained or degrade, here new material was introduced increasing the number of biases that 
material may exploit. Material which already exploits biases to a greater degree was found 
not to be enhanced by guided variation. The results of this study suggest the importance of 
both deliberate changes and selection in the evolution of a culturally successful narrative as 
intentional guided variation alone appears not to enhance narratives to any great degree in 
terms of their exploitation of content biases. 
Future research should examine the effects of motivation on this process as perhaps 
one of the most interesting aspects of the alterations made to electronic material when it is 
transmitted is why some would change it at all, rather than simply forwarding it or 
choosing not to transmit it. With specific audiences or motivations in mind the creative 
changes made by participants could be very different to those made in this study. Another 
potential avenue for future research would be to examine the interaction between the 
choose-to-receive phase of transmission and guided variation in transmission so as to 
investigate the roles of both selective and mutational processes in cultural evolution.   
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Chapter 7 
Expect the Unexpected? Testing for Minimally-Counterintuitive (MCI) Bias in the 
Transmission of Urban Legends. A Computational Phylogenetic Approach. 
 
This chapter expands on the previous studies which have used participant-based 
experiments by using a computational phylogenetic analysis of MCI concepts in the urban 
legend ‘Bloody Mary’. Phylogenies function as naturally occurring transmission chains 
and allow the researcher to examine the fidelity in transmission of elements within a story 
across a greater number of generations. MCI bias was chosen because, although MCI 
content appears less frequently in urban legends than other biases, it is found in some 
particularly successful legends such as ‘Bloody Mary’ and the ‘Vanishing Hitchhiker’. A 
version of this chapter has been published as Stubbersfield, J
 1, 2
., & Tehrani, J
1
. (2013). 
Expect the Unexpected? Testing for Minimally Counterintuitive (MCI) Bias in the 
Transmission of Contemporary Legends a Computational Phylogenetic Approach. Social 
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Abstract 
In this study computational methods are used in analysing cultural transmission to 
examine the role of cognitive selection pressures on the evolution of narratives, the first 
use of computational phylogenetic analysis in the study of urban legends. It has been 
suggested that a number of biases in transmission may alter the content and structure of 
narrative so as to maximise how transmittable it is. One bias that has attracted much 
attention is Boyer’s (1994) Minimally-Counterintuitive (MCI) bias, which suggests that a 
cognitively optimal number of counterintuitive concepts increase the salience and, 
therefore, the transmission of a narrative. Previous research has used traditional folklore 
and religious texts to examine this bias and a cognitively optimum number of 1-2 or 2-3 
counterintuitive concepts has been suggested. The present research uses the legend of 
‘Bloody Mary’, an urban legend with MCI elements in a computational phylogenetic 
analysis to examine the influence of MCI on cultural transmission and evolution. 
Counterintuitive and intuitive concepts were found to be equally stable in transmission, 
suggesting that MCI bias may function on the narrative as a whole, rather than individual 
concepts within it.  
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7.1 Introduction 
Previous research on urban legends has largely been focused on psychoanalytic 
interpretations of these legends (e.g. Dundes, 1998; Tucker, 2005) and while examples 
exist (see Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Heath et al., 2001), relatively little research has 
utilised these legends as a means to study cultural transmission and evolution. The current 
study represents the first use of computational phylogenetic analysis in the study of urban 
legends, and, more generally, demonstrates the important role that computer based 
techniques can play in the study of cultural transmission and evolution. In this study, it is 
demonstrated that applications developed to support phylogenetic analysis (in this case 
PAUP, Swofford, 2003) can be applied to the investigation of how narratives are 
transmitted and reproduced and potentially to a wide range of cultural forms.  
In recent years the study of cultural transmission – i.e. the preservation and 
modification of socially learned information – has been greatly enhanced by the 
application of computational quantitative methods, such as mathematical modelling, 
simulations, and phylogenetic software (see Mesoudi, 2011). The introduction of these 
techniques has allowed the investigation into the dynamics of cultural evolution to develop 
from a largely theoretical/philosophical exercise to a fully-fledged empirical research field. 
In this paper computational phylogenetic methods are adopted to investigate the potential 
role played by psychological biases on evolution of narratives. It has been proposed that 
when stories are repeatedly re-told from one person to another they are subjected to 
cognitive selective pressures which may alter the content and structure so as to make them 
maximally transmittable (Barrett & Nyhof, 2001). Rather than a process of high fidelity 
replication, human cultural transmission displays biases and distortions which reflect these 
cognitive selection pressures. Biases and distortions in recall were first identified by 
Bartlett (1932) and since then studies have identified a number of potential biases in 
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transmission. One such bias was suggested by Boyer’s (1994) theory of the transmission of 
counterintuitive ideas, also termed minimally counterintuitive (MCI) bias. 
MCI Bias 
Boyer (1994) argues that for any category, people hold a host of intuitive 
assumptions about its member’s properties. These intuitive assumptions are generally 
described as ‘folk biology’, ‘folk physics’ and ‘folk psychology’. These intuitive 
assumptions do not involve conscious inspection and are assumed to be cross-cultural 
(Barrett, 2008). Concepts which violate these category-level expectations are considered to 
be counterintuitive and feature inherent transmission advantages that can increase the 
salience of a narrative (Boyer, 1994). Boyer, however, also argues that this effect is not 
linear and that a balance must be met between satisfying intuitive expectations and 
violating enough of them to be cognitively optimal. If a narrative features too many 
counterintuitive concepts it can render it incomprehensible and unmemorable (Boyer & 
Ramble, 2001). Stories which are considered MCI will balance a minority of 
counterintuitive concepts with a majority of everyday, intuitive events. Several studies 
have supported the idea that MCI narratives are cognitively optimal, granting them an 
advantage in recall and transmission (e.g. Barrett et al., 2009; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; 
Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Norenzayan, Atran, Faulkner & Schaller, 2006; Upal, 2011; Upal, 
Gonce, Tweney, & Slone, 2007). This content bias has been explained in evolutionary 
terms by Upal et al. (2007), who argues that memory should evolve to preferentially 
remember and recall events or objects which violate expectations about the future but can 
be justified once they have been observed. By contrast, Barrett (2000) suggests that MCI 
concepts hold a transmission advantage because they can be understood and represented 
without the allocation of too many cognitive resources but are also challenging enough to 
require increased attention in order to be assimilated into conceptual schemes.  
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Barrett and Nyhof (2001) used a transmission chain methodology to examine 
whether MCI narratives have a cognitive advantage. They used traditional Native 
American folktales (as Bartlett, 1932, had used) and two original stories created for their 
study, one being a sci-fi style story describing an inter-galactic diplomat’s visit to an alien 
museum and the other being a story describing a brother and sister’s journey back home 
from school. The two original stories were manipulated to vary in the number of 
counterintuitive and intuitive concepts they described. Barret and Nyhof (2001) found that, 
after three generations of transmission, counterintuitive and intuitive but bizarre items were 
recalled in greater proportions than intuitive items. This recall of counterintuitive items 
was found both immediately and after a three month delay. Barrett and Nyhof (2001) also 
replicated these findings using oral transmission in a group serving as a mock community. 
The fact that recall of counterintuitive items was upheld after a three month gap is 
important, as an idea that is immediately memorable but becomes significantly less 
memorable with time could not be as culturally successful as those ideas that retain 
memorability.  
Norenzayan et al. (2006) conducted two studies using experimental methodologies 
other than transmission chains. The first study used lists featuring intuitive and 
counterintuitive ideas and, while the intuitive ideas were better recalled in the short-term 
(similarly to the results of Bartlett, 1932) MCI lists had a recall advantage over time. For 
their second study Norenzayan et al. (2006) used the folktales collected by the Brothers 
Grimm and had the rated for MCI concepts, memorability and other psychological 
variables. Norenzayan et al. (2006) found that MCI tales were more likely to be culturally 
successful (determined by number of hits using a Google web search) and were perceived 
to be more memorable and more psychologically appealing in terms of understandability 
and ease of transmission. Norenzayan et al. (2006) suggest that the cognitively optimum 
level is around two to three counterintuitive objects in a narrative. Norenzayan et al. (2006) 
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concluded that MCI narratives are culturally successful due to a stronger cognitive 
advantage in recall compared to other narrative templates.  
Barrett (2008) acknowledges some of the issues relating to the empirical study of 
MCI bias; identifying a difficulty in ascertaining what are and are not counterintuitive 
concepts in a technical sense and an inability in quantifying just how counterintuitive a 
concept is. In an attempt to clarify MCI theory and aid the future empirical study of MCI 
concepts, Barrett (2008) presented a formal system of coding and quantifying the 
‘counterintuitiveness’ of a concept termed the counterintuitiveness coding and quantifying 
scheme (CI-Scheme). The CI-Scheme uses six steps which include identifying basic level 
membership and ontological category/categories of a concept and coding for breaches and 
transfers of expectation sets. Using this scheme a concept can be given a 
‘counterintuitiveness score’. Barret (2008) suggests that MCI concepts are those which 
score one for counterintuitiveness and that the cognitive optimum would be a score of one 
or two, concepts which score three or higher would too counterintuitive to have a 
transmission advantage and would be discarded for simpler concepts. Barrett et al. (2009) 
used the CI-Scheme in a study which analysed a cross-cultural selection of seventy-three 
folktales. Independent coders applied the CI-Scheme to these folktales and it was found 
that the number of counterintuitive objects ranged from zero to eleven; however, the 
majority (79.2%) only contained one or two objects. Most of the counterintuitive objects 
(99%) had a score of one or two, none had a score higher than three. Barrett et al. (2009) 
uses these findings to argue that the cognitive optimum for the number of counterintuitive 
concepts in folktales is one or two and that these objects will only violate one or two 
ontological categories.  
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MCI in Urban Legends 
Previous research into MCI bias has used traditional folklore or religious texts as a 
means to study its effect on transmission and memorability, however, examples of MCI 
can also be found in an area of folklore which is less ‘canonised’; the urban legend. Urban 
legends are generally defined as apocryphal stories which are told as true (Brunvand, 2000; 
Heath, Bell & Sternberg, 2001; Tangherlini, 1990), involve an urban or suburban setting 
(Brunvand, 2000), and feature a single event, usually an individual experience, as the core 
of the narrative (Tangherlini, 1990). Other common features are a suspenseful or humorous 
tone, surprising information, a twist ending, implicit or explicit moral messages and 
attribution to a “friend of a friend” (Brunvand, 2000; Fox Tree & Weldon, 2007). Urban 
legends have traditionally been transmitted orally but are now commonly transmitted 
through electronic media (Brunvand, 2000). The analysis of urban legends can offer a 
unique means of studying the concerns of modern populations (Brunvand, 2000) and 
therefore can be a fruitful area to study content biases such as MCI bias.  
One example of an urban legend which includes MCI concepts is the legend of 
‘Bloody Mary’. A wide number of variations of this legend exist but generally the story 
involves a young girl (the character is female in almost all examples) repeating a certain 
phrase a specific number of times before a mirror. As a result of the ritual, a frightening, 
supernatural figure appears and often inflicts violence upon the summoner. Below is a 
typical example: 
“A long time ago there was a woman named Mary. She was very beautiful and very 
vain. She had a horrible accident though and her face became so horribly scratched 
that she bled to death. Her spirit didn't die, she still comes; if you stand in front of a 
mirror in the dark and say her name three times her face appears. If you do'nt [sic] 
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turn on the light and run away as fast as you can she'll scratch your face off, or 
some say, drag you into the mirror with her!”  
(Collected from http://www.oocities.org/tragicpixie/FLbloodymary.html). 
The name and nature of the supernatural figure can vary but most frequently it is a 
ghost named Mary, with Bloody Mary being the most common variation. Other variations 
include Mary Worth, Mary Whales, Black Agnes, the White Lady, the Bell Witch (a 
regional variation specific to Tennessee, USA) and Svarte Madame. Most commonly the 
summoning phrase is simply the figure’s name, and typically it is repeated three times. The 
figure is sometimes given a back-story, such as being the ghost of a woman executed for 
witchcraft or a beautiful woman disfigured. If present, the back-story often links to the 
summoning phrase, for example, the summoning phrase “Bloody Mary, I killed your baby” 
is often linked to the back-story of Bloody Mary being the ghost of a mother whose 
children were murdered. The result of the summoning also varies; sometimes the 
summoner is killed or injured by the supernatural figure, while in other examples a means 
of escape or protection is present, such as turning on a light or a protective ring of salt.  
The Bloody Mary legend is popular and widespread, with similar variations being 
found in Britain, the USA, Canada, Sweden, Holland, France, Australia, Japan and 
Thailand (Armitage, 2006). It has also found its way into popular culture, being the focus 
of horror films such as Urban Legends: Bloody Mary (Merrell, Phillips, & Messer, 2005), 
Bloody Mary (Miller & Tyler, 2006), Dead Mary (Cameron, Dueck, Glazer, Harrison & 
Howsam, 2007), The Legend of Bloody Mary (Ahrens et al., 2008) and was an influence on 
the film Candyman (Barker & Golin, 1992).  
Previous research has suggested that the Bloody Mary legend evolved from much 
older mirror divination rituals (Armitage, 2006; Klintberg, 1988). In notes on his 1786 
poem Halloween, Robert Burns (2009) describes a mirror ritual that a woman can use to 
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see the face of her future husband. This was a popular piece of European folklore from the 
late 18
th
 to 20
th
 century (Hutton, 2001), with Halloween greetings cards being produced 
with pictures of the ritual. The results of the ritual could, however, be horrific. It was said 
that if the woman was destined to die unmarried she would see the face of the Grim Reaper 
reflected in the mirror (Ellis, 2004). The 19
th
 century ballad Svetlana by Vasili Zhukovskii, 
an example of ‘folklore’ romanticism (Ryan & Wigzell, 1992) also features the accidental 
summoning of a horrific supernatural figure; Svetlana is persuaded by her female 
companions to enact a mirror ritual to see her lover, however, a demon appears in his 
place. It was also said during the 19
th
 century that if you stare into a mirror for too long the 
devil would appear (Jones & Kropf, 1883). These examples of traditional folklore are 
likely to be the ancestors of the modern Bloody Mary legend. It was not until the 1970s, 
however, that examples of Bloody Mary legends were first published in print. The first 
examples of ‘Mary Worth’ legends were published in an anthology of American children’s 
folklore (Knapp & Knapp, 1976) and the first academic writing on the subject was by 
Longlois (1978). As with any oral tradition, Bloody Mary legends may have existed for 
many years before they were first published, however, it is argued that the modern Bloody 
Mary legend originated in the USA (Klintberg, 1988).  
Computational Phylogenetic Analysis 
The current research uses computational phylogenetic analysis techniques to 
analyse variations of the Bloody Mary legend. Phylogenetic analysis employs an explicit 
evolutionary model whereby new entities arise by descent with modification from existing 
ones. In this context, phylogenetic analysis provides a useful means for estimating 
relationships of common ancestry among story variants, and examining which traits tend to 
be preserved and which ones modified. This allows us to explore the influence of MCI 
elements on the cultural evolution and transmission of a narrative and will particularly 
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focus on whether the inclusion of an MCI element makes the narrative as a whole more 
stable, or whether the individual elements vary in stability, with the most stable being those 
which are MCI. Based on the work of Barrett and Nyhof (2001) and Norenzayan et al. 
(2006), one would expect the MCI concepts to display greater stability in transmission than 
the intuitive concepts of the narrative. 
The software used for this analysis was Phylogenetic Analysis Using Parsimony 
(PAUP) (Swofford 2003), a widely used software package for the inference of 
evolutionary trees that supports a wide range of approaches to phylogenetic analysis and 
features relatively friendly input for data and output of results. It is proprietary software, 
but an open source package PHYLIP (PHYLogeny Inference Package, Felsenstein, 1989) 
is also in common use.  
7.2 Methods and Materials 
Legend variations were gathered from internet websites (see Appendix J for a full 
list of sources) using the search key words bloody mary. For the purposes of this study, any 
urban legend which features the purposeful summoning of a supernatural, malevolent 
figure through a ritual involving a mirror is considered a Bloody Mary legend variation and 
was included in the dataset. Fragmentary legends were excluded. 45 Bloody Mary legend 
variations were collected and a total of 36 characters were derived from the sample. These 
characters included features of the supernatural figure such as appearance, elements of the 
ritual such as summoning phrase and number of repetitions and other key elements of the 
narrative (Appendix J for full list of characters). Character states were coded as present or 
absent.  
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Table 1. Representative characters and coding (see Appendix K for full list) 
Character Trait  Coded As 
1 Mary  0 = Absent; 1 = Bloody Mary; 2 = Mary 
Worth 
2 Satan/Devil 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
3 Bathroom 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
4 Name summons 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
5 Belief summons 0 = Absent; 1 = ‘I believe in’; 2 = I don’t 
believe in’ 
6 ‘Come to/get me’ summons 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
7 Baby summons 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
8 Number of phrase repetitions 0 = Absent; 1 = Three; 2 = Seven; 3 = 
Thirteen; 4 = Twenty; 5 = Unspecified; 6 = 
Five; 7 = Six; 8 = Fifty; 9 = Ten 
9 Beautiful woman disfigured 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
10 Mother of murdered children 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
 
In order to examine the hypothesis that MCI concepts within a narrative feature a 
mnemonic advantage, characters were coded as either counterintuitive or intuitive. 
Characters were coded as counterintuitive if they breach the folk expectations of the 
ontological categories suggested by Boyer (1994). Characters were only coded as 
counterintuitive if the ‘counterintuitiveness’ was a property of that individual character in 
itself; characters which brought about counterintuitive events in the context of the narrative 
but did not breach folk expectations themselves, such as the ritual summoning phrase, were 
therefore considered intuitive (see Barrett 2008). For example, the ritual taking place in a 
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bathroom (character 3) would not be coded as counterintuitive, as its presence in the 
narrative does not breach the folk expectations of any ontological categories, however, the 
supernatural figure appearing through a mirror or out of a bath or sink (character 16) would 
be coded as counterintuitive, as it breaches the expectations of ‘folk physics’.   
The character data were analysed using cladistic phylogenetic reconstruction. 
Cladistic analysis reconstructs relationships by minimising the number of evolutionary 
changes required to explain the distribution of character states among a group of taxa. This 
involves distinguishing characters that are evolutionarily novel (also termed apomorphic or 
derived), from those that were present in the last common ancestor of all the taxa under 
study, which are labelled ancestral or plesiomorphic. The presence of a derived trait in two 
or more taxa provides evidence that they are descended from a common ancestor of more 
recent origin than the ancestors they share with the other taxa under analysis. There are 
several methods to identify which traits are derived and which are ancestral, the most 
popular of which is outgroup analysis. An outgroup is defined as a taxon that shares a 
common ancestor with the taxa under analysis (the ingroup), but is of more distant origin 
than the ancestor the analyzed taxa share with each other. Since the outgroup does not 
share an exclusive common ancestor with any individual member of the ingroup, it follows 
that when a character occurs in two states among the study group, but only one of the states 
is found in the outgroup taxon, the former is considered the derived state and the latter the 
ancestral state. For the purposes of these analyses, the variant which most resembles 
traditional mirror ritual folklore (T42) was used as an outgroup. 
Although the principles of cladistics are relatively simple, actually identifying the 
shortest, or most parsimonious tree (MPT) is usually impossible without the aid of 
computers as the number of possible trees for any given dataset increases exponentially 
with the number of taxa. For three taxa (A, B, C), one only needs to compare the number 
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of steps for three possible trees (AB-C; AC-B; CB-A). But for four taxa one must consider 
fifteen trees, for seven taxa ten thousand trees, and for ten taxa one would have to evaluate 
more than 34 million trees. Therefore, most cladistic analyses require specialised software 
programs that use algorithms to search for the most parsimonious trees. In this study, the 
heuristic branch-swapping search function in the program PAUP 4.0 (Swofford 2003) was 
used. 
Once phylogenetic relationships among the variants were estimated, the fidelity of 
transmission from ancestral to descendent taxa was estimated using a statistic known as the 
Retention Index (RI). The RI is a measure of the number of homoplastic changes a 
cladogram requires that are independent of its length (Farris, 1989b; 1989b). The RI of a 
single character is calculated by subtracting the number of character state changes required 
by the focal cladogram (s) from the maximum possible amount of change required by a 
cladogram in which all the taxa are equally closely related (g). This figure is then divided 
by the result of subtracting the minimum amount of change required by any conceivable 
tree (m) from g. The RI of two or more characters is computed as (G - S)/(G - M), where 
G, S and M are the sums of the g, s and m values for the individual characters. A maximum 
RI of 1 indicates perfect fidelity of character transmission, while the lower the fidelity the 
closer the RI reaches 0. The RI was used to estimate both the overall fidelity of 
transmission of characters, and to compare counter-intuitive and intuitive characters. 
7.3 Results 
The number of counterintuitive characters found in the legend variations ranged 
from 1 to 4 (M = 2.356, sd = .88) and the number of intuitive characters found in the 
legend variations ranged from 1 to 10 (M = 5.756, sd = 2.18). 91.12% of legend variations 
featured between one and three counterintuitive concepts. 
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The cladistic analysis in PAUP returned 47 most parsimonious trees (MPTs) (i.e. 
there were 47 trees that required an equal number of evolutionary changes). The character 
RIs of two consensus trees were used for analysis. One tree represented relationships that 
occur in the majority of the MPTs, referred to as the Majority Rules Tree (Figure 1), and 
another tree represented relationships that occur in all of the MPTs, referred to as the Strict 
Tree (Figure 2).
 
 
Figure 1. Majority rules consensus of the most parsimonious trees returned by the 
cladistics analysis. 
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Figure 2. Strict consensus of the most parsimonious trees returned by the cladistics 
analysis. 
The RI of all the characters on the two consensus trees was 0.53. As the data were 
not normally distributed, a Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to compare the individual 
RIs of counterintuitive and intuitive characters (see Table 2 for the mean RIs of 
counterintuitive and intuitive characters and Appendix L for the RIs of each individual 
character). No significant difference was found in either the Majority Tree (U = 85, z = -
1.62, p > .05) or the Strict Tree (U = 80, z = -1.82, p > .05). The frequency of appearance 
in the variations of counterintuitive and intuitive characters was also compared using a 
Mann-Whitney U test but no significant difference in frequency of appearance was found 
(U = 105, z = -0.89, p > .05).  
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Table 2. The mean RIs for counterintuitive and intuitive characters in the Majority Rules 
and Strict Tree (see Appendix L for the RIs of each individual character).  
 Mean RI (SD) 
 Majority Tree Strict Tree 
Intuitive Characters (N = 10) .48 (.34) .42 (.33) 
Counterintuitive Characters (N = 26) .27 (.35) .21 (.33) 
 
7.4 Discussion and Conclusions 
The RIs of all the characters on the two consensus trees are considered low by the 
standards of other real and simulated cultural datasets (Collard, Shennan, & Tehrani, 2006; 
Nunn, Arnold, Matthews, & Borgerhoff Mulder, 2010). This indicates that the Bloody 
Mary story is transmitted with generally poor fidelity from ancestral to descendent version. 
One explanation for this finding concerns the nature of the legend itself and how it has 
traditionally been transmitted. For at least thirty years, Bloody Mary legend variations have 
been more often transmitted orally in a group setting rather than between individuals 
(Dundes, 1998) suggesting that the most likely form of transmission is non-linear. Rather 
than one individual passing on their version of the legend to another individual, a group of 
people may bring together different versions and elements of all of them may be combined 
and transmitted. At present there has been little research into the effects of group 
transmission on the cultural evolution of a narrative, the most commonly used 
experimental paradigm has been the linear transmission chain, where an individual 
transmits a single narrative to another individual (Eriksson & Coultas, 2012). Barrett and 
Nyhof (2001) and Marques, Páez, Valencia and Vincze (2006) both used experimental 
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designs in which multiple cultural parents were used but no analysis was conducted to 
compare this with a traditional linear design. Eriksson and Coultas (2012) did examine the 
influence of a two cultural parent design, where each participant receives transmission 
from two separate sources, and found that recall was greater in the two cultural parent 
chains than single or double transmission chains. Items which were present in both 
versions of the story were most stable in transmission and items which were unique to the 
first story heard had a recall advantage over items which were unique to the second story. 
How group transmission, where versions are not presented simply one after the other and 
where items may directly compete with each other, as they may between Bloody Mary 
legend variations, effects the transmission and evolution of a narrative has not yet been 
explored but it could explain the weak phylogenetic signal found in these trees.  
As the Bloody Mary variations were collected from the internet rather than oral 
sources, it is possible that this effected their transmission. Unlike oral transmission the 
electronic transmission of a narrative allows people to copy exactly what has been sent to 
them, without the limitations of recall. As a means to check if the Bloody Mary legend 
variations used in analysis appeared to be copied from one another, the variations were 
entered into Turnitin a computer programme designed to compare academic essays and 
check for plagiarism. None were found share more than 10% similarity except for two 
pairs which shared around 50%, however, these pairs appeared to just be close variations 
rather than the result of direct copying. As a result it was deemed that these variations were 
likely to have been largely derived from orally transmitted versions rather than solely 
electronically transmitted versions.  
Norenzayan et al. (2006) and Barrett (2008) both suggest a fixed cognitive 
optimum number of counterintuitive concepts to be found in a story. The range of 
counterintuitive characters present in the Bloody Mary legends was found to be one to 
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four, with an average of 2.36. This average falls within the cognitive optimum of two to 
three counterintuitive concepts as suggested by Norenzayan et al. (2006) and comes close 
to the one to two cognitive optimum suggested by Barrett (2008); the majority of stories 
(91.12%) featured one to three counterintuitive concepts with very few featuring four; 
none featured more than this. The research conducted by Norenzayan et al. (2006) and 
Barrett (2008) used traditional folktales, such as those collected by the Grimm Brothers, to 
derive their cognitive optimum and suggest that it would be true of all stories. The results 
of the current research suggest this may be the case, as a similar number of counterintuitive 
concepts were found in variations of an urban legend. It also suggests that urban legends 
and traditional folktales may feature structural similarities in terms of MCI content. 
The finding that there was no difference in the RIs or appearance frequency of 
counterintuitive and intuitive characters, however, suggests that the counterintuitive 
characters were as stable in transmission as the intuitive characters and, therefore, may not 
be inherently more memorable as individual concepts. Should counterintuitive concepts 
feature an inherent mnemonic advantage, one would expect them to be more stable in 
transmission and the RI of counterintuitive characters would be significantly higher than 
intuitive characters. As this was not the case it suggests that the transmission advantage of 
MCI bias works as a function of the narrative as a whole rather than the individual 
concepts within it. Although it could be argued that the weak phylogenetic signal in both 
sets of characters means that we should not read too much into these findings, it is worth 
recalling that a comparison of the raw frequencies of counterintuitive and intuitive 
characters also found no significant difference. Again, this contradicts the prediction that 
counterintuitive traits are more likely to be copied than intuitive ones. 
These findings are supported by Upal et al. (2007; 2011) who refers to the 
hypothesis that the presence of a specific number of MCI concepts increases the 
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memorability of a narrative as the Fixed MCI-narrative template (FMNT) hypothesis and 
conducted a series of studies intended to critically examine this. Upal (2011) found that the 
inclusion of counterintuitive concepts only increases the memorability of a narrative if the 
concepts make the story more coherent. He suggests that the global cohesion of the 
narrative is a key mediating factor in its memorability and calls into question the idea that 
there is a specific cognitive optimum for all narratives. Upal also argues that memorabilty 
is not a property of a concept but it is a property of the concept, its context, and the 
background knowledge of the comprehendor, therefore the memorability of a concept will 
vary depending upon its context and this context should not be ignored when examining 
transmission (Upal, 2011). The importance of the context in which counterintuitive 
concepts are presented is also supported by Atran and Norenzayan (2004) who found that 
recall for counterintuitive concepts only increased when they were surrounded by intuitive 
concepts, suggesting that the counterintuitive concepts were not inherently more 
memorable, they only became more memorable when placed in a context of intuitive 
concepts. The interaction between counterintuitive and intuitive concepts within a narrative 
and their joint influence on its cultural transmission is an area that is yet to be fully 
explored.  
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that urban legends provide rich data for 
studying processes in cultural transmission. Previous research analysing urban legends has 
primarily been focused on psychoanalytic interpretation of the legends (e.g. Dundes, 1998, 
Tucker, 2005) and while examples exist (see Heath et al. 2001; Eriksson & Coultas, 2014), 
relatively little research has utilised these legends to investigate how narratives and other 
cultural forms might be influenced by cognitive biases such as MCI bias. The phylogenetic 
analyses of Bloody Mary presented here represent significant steps in that direction and, it 
is hoped, further underline the important role that computer based techniques can play in 
the study of cultural transmission and evolution. 
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Chapter 8 
General Discussion 
8.1 Aims and Findings 
 The key aim of this thesis was to examine the role of content biases in the cultural 
transmission and evolution of information. As in several previous studies examining 
content biases (e.g. Bangerter, 2000; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001; Mesoudi, Whiten & Dunbar, 
2006) a narrative form was used, in this case urban legends. This research sheds new light 
on how content biases operate and how they may influence the cultural evolution of a 
narrative. It also bridges some gaps in the current literature. Previous research has focused 
on examining a single bias and has mostly used recall-based paradigms; in contrast, some 
of the studies here examine how biases can be combined in a single narrative and how this 
affects their transmission. Also, it was considered that a narrative may exploit biases 
beyond the target bias of research, hence all of the material used in participant experiments 
was rated for characteristics thought to influence transmission, such as plausibility and 
biased content. Non-recall based paradigms were used, including both a computational 
approach and a unique non-recall based transmission chain paradigm. Another aim was 
that this research would contribute to the body of literature examining the cultural success 
of urban legends by using theories from cultural evolution, rather than theories taken from 
the traditions of psychoanalysis, sociology and social-anthropology. 
Chapter 2 presented analyses of 254 randomly selected urban legends taken from 
the internet. The study found that over 90% of the legends exploited at least one of the 
known content biases. Emotional content bias and social information bias were found to be 
the most frequently exploited biases, being coded as present in 78% and 77% of the 
legends respectively. Based on the range of the number of biases exploited by the legends 
it was suggested that a 2-3 biases within a narrative may be cognitively optimal in cultural 
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transmission. Chapter 3 presented a study in which legends were rated by participants on 
scales relevant to content biases. This was done with the intention of providing information 
that could be used to select legends for the transmission chain experiments presented in the 
thesis. Chapter 4 presented a linear transmission chain study examining emotional content 
bias which found that a higher level of emotion granted an advantage in cumulative recall 
along the chains. This was true regardless of the emotion evoked demonstrating this bias 
operates on content which evokes emotions other than disgust, with amusement, interest 
and surprise also granting an advantage. The emotional valence of content had no effect. 
Chapter 5 presented a study in which the transmission of urban legends containing social 
information, survival information and combining both were compared at three stages of 
transmission: choose-to-receive, encode-and-retrieve (using a linear transmission chain 
design) and choose-to-transmit. It was found that legends containing social information 
had an advantage over legends containing survival information at the encode-and-retrieve 
phase of transmission but there was no significant difference between them at the other two 
stages. Combining both types of information had no apparent effect, with the combined 
legends operating in the same manner as social information legends. Chapter 6 presented 
a study which examined intentional guided variation and how it may reflect the cognitive 
content biases seen in recall-based transmission. Previous research has found that the 
product of guided variation can resemble the product of context biased transmission in 
certain circumstances. This study found that the product of guided variation can enhance 
the degree to which material exploits content biases to some extent but only when the 
original material did not already exploit biases to a great extent. Chapter 7 extended on 
the previous micro-culture style experiments to a phylogenetic analysis of the urban legend 
‘Bloody Mary’. This allowed the examination of the fidelity in transmission of MCI 
elements across many generations. It found that intuitive and counterintuitive concepts 
were equally stable in transmission and suggested that it is the narrative as a whole which 
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gains a transmission advantage with MCI content rather than the individual concepts 
within it.  
8.2 Overview and Implications 
Taken together the results of these studies have a number of implications for 
understanding how cognitive content biases operate in cultural transmission and provide a 
greater understanding of the cultural success of urban legends. The importance of social 
information in cultural transmission was suggested by a number of studies. Social 
information was (i) shown to have an advantage over survival information in Chapter 5, 
(ii) one of two biases enhanced by guided variation in Chapter 6 and (iii) the one of the two 
most frequently present biases in Chapter 2. Together, these results suggest that social 
information bias is highly effective in cultural transmission and is likely to grant a greater 
advantage in transmission than other suggested content biases (with the exception perhaps 
of emotional content bias). In order to be culturally successful, urban legends are likely to 
exploit this bias by featuring social interaction at the core of the narrative. Other biases, 
which may be less effective in enhancing the transmission of a narrative, are likely to 
‘piggy-back’ on social information, as in the combined social-survival legends used in 
Chapter 5 or those described in Chapter 2. It is probable that this result is not unique to 
urban legends and would also be true of other narratives. The success of social information 
in cultural transmission (especially over survival information at the level of recall) 
provides excellent support for the Machiavellian Intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988, 
Whiten 1999) or Social Brain (Dunbar, 1998, 2003) hypotheses of human intelligence 
evolution and that social information is an evolved heuristic in social learning.   
Another bias that emerged as a candidate for being particularly effective in cultural 
transmission was emotional content bias. This bias was the most frequently present in the 
urban legends analysed in Chapter 2 and was shown to grant an advantage in cumulative 
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recall in Chapter 4, regardless of the specific emotion evoked or its emotional valence. 
Given the well-established role of emotion in memory in individual recall tests (LaBar & 
Cabeza, 2006) this finding is not surprising; however, it has not been clearly demonstrated 
with regards to cultural transmission (outside of disgust) prior to the studies presented here. 
It is also worth investigating as studies have shown that cumulative recall tests may not 
necessarily replicate individual recall tests; for example, studies into stereotype 
consistency bias have found that stereotype inconsistent information is recalled better than 
stereotype consistency bias at the individual level (Dijksterhuisand & van Knippenberg, 
1995; Kashima, 2000; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993) but in cumulative recall, 
stereotype consistent information is recalled better (Allport & Postman, 1947; Bangerter, 
2000; Kashima, 2000). The finding that valence had no effect on the cumulative recall of 
legends explains the prevalence of legends which evoke negative emotions such as disgust. 
Despite this finding, however, the positively valenced emotion of amusement was the most 
frequently evoked emotion in the urban legends analysed in Chapter 2. This is perhaps 
counter to the typical image of urban legends, which are often portrayed as evoking disgust 
or fear and suggests that urban legends exploit a wide range of emotions including 
amusement, surprise and interest. Previous research has not examined what other types of 
biased content may be linked to particular emotions and a key finding of Chapter 2 was the 
frequent combination of social information and content evoking amusement in urban 
legends. The findings suggest that a narrative describing social interaction which evokes 
amusement is likely to be particularly salient in cultural transmission; this is true of urban 
legends and is likely to be true of other forms of narrative.  
Survival information bias has been previously suggested by results demonstrating 
that survival processing grants a mnemonic advantage in individual recall experiments 
compared to other forms of processing. The studies presented here represent the first time 
survival information bias has been demonstrated in cultural transmission based 
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experiments. It was shown to have a transmission advantage over control material in the 
study presented in Chapter 5, although not to the same extent as social information at the 
encode-and-retrieve phase. Survival information was also the third most frequently present 
bias in Chapter 2, although it was far behind social information and emotional content. The 
prevalence of survival information in urban legends could be explained by these legends 
exploiting other biases to gain an advantage in transmission that survival information alone 
would not grant. This finding in particular could have ‘real world’ applications. It would be 
worth examining how information is transmitted in public health campaigns, if it is 
presented as survival information alone, its success may be enhanced by adding some form 
of social information or social context to the survival information.   
An interesting contradiction when comparing the results is with regards to MCI 
bias. In the analyses of urban legends presented in Chapter 2, MCI was shown to be the 
least frequently present bias, being present in only 6% of the legends analysed. In Chapter 
6, however, close to half of the material was modified by participants through intentional 
guided variation to include MCI concepts. As the legends analysed in Chapter 2 were 
collected from the internet, their evolution is likely to have been influenced by both guided 
variation and copying error, so one might expect a higher number of legends containing 
MCI elements than were found, based on the results of Chapter 6. A possible explanation 
for the relative scarcity of MCI urban legends is the potential reduction in plausibility or 
coherence that adding MCI elements could bring, as suggested in Chapter 6. As urban 
legends are told as true, implausible legends once generated may not be selected for by 
audiences or tellers and therefore will either be altered to become more successful or stop 
being transmitted. Heath, Bell and Sternberg (2001) found that plausibility increased 
participants’ willingness to pass an urban legend on, although this was less important than 
emotional content, so it is feasible that as plausibility reduces urban legends are transmitted 
less. However, when considering MCI in urban legends, it is worth noting that one of the 
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most culturally successful urban legends, ‘Bloody Mary’ (used in analysis for Chapter 7), 
contains MCI elements, it is also one of the few urban legends suggested to have ancestors 
originating before WWII. It may be the case that, while MCI urban legends are less 
frequent, those that survive transmission are highly successful in the cultural landscape. It 
is also worth considering that MCI elements are much more common in traditional 
folklore, which is also much older, suggesting that folktales which contain MCI elements, 
if successful, can retain their cultural success for hundreds or even thousands of years. It 
may be the case that urban legends which exploit MCI, such as Bloody Mary, will survive 
in culture for much longer than those which exploit other biases. The questions raised here 
with regards to MCI and urban legends suggest that examining MCI bias in a 
contemporary non-religious context would be an interesting area for future research. 
Taken in the broader context of content biases in cultural transmission these results 
have a number of implications. From a theoretical standpoint the results demonstrate that 
content biases may not each operate in the same way and may differ in the degree of 
transmission advantage that they grant material. This, in turn, may suggest that different 
biases are operating differently at a cognitive level. They also demonstrate that cognitive 
biases may be reflected in guided variation but not necessarily in the same manner as in 
transmission which involves recall. It may be possible that guided variation in general is 
actually less successful at producing narratives which successfully exploit content biases 
than recall-based transmission. There also may be a strong influence of individual 
differences in producing successful narratives through guided variation, as some 
individuals may be more creative or more ‘in tune’ with what will be culturally successful 
in transmission. Another interesting implication is that there may be a cognitive optimum 
for the number of content biases that material exploits. Previous research has suggested 
that there may be a cognitive optimum for counterintuitive elements in a narrative but no 
research has examined the potential for a cognitive optimum for content biases in general. 
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This cognitive optimum may operate in a similar manner to MCI, in that simply adding 
more biased content will reduce the coherence of the narrative and make it less memorable 
or appealing.  
In practical terms these studies have a number of implications for future research 
examining content biases in cultural transmission. First, they demonstrate the efficacy of 
using ‘real world’ material in experiments. However, this does present its own challenges 
in terms of controlling for confounding variables, in that the urban legends used are 
different stories and can vary in a number of ways that could impact on the results of the 
experiment. Here, emphasis was placed on how the urban legends varied in ways that one 
would expect to impact on their recall, based on previous research. As such, efforts were 
made to gather data about the content of the urban legends that could predict recall, largely 
the extent to which each legend exploited known content biases. With this done, when the 
legends were selected an informed choice could be made and so when examining the 
results, informed interpretations of the data could be made with potentially confounding 
content controlled for. It is worth noting that even original material created for an 
experiment may exploit content biases outside of that bias of interest and that this should 
be considered when examining content biases in cultural transmission experiments. 
Thorough assessment of the biases exploited by material of any kind allows the 
experimenter to control for confounding biases and provide a rigorous explanation of the 
results. Despite the practical challenges presented by using real world material, using urban 
legends provided an ecologically valid model of transmission as participants were 
transmitting the same kind of material in an experimental setting that is actively 
transmitted between people in the real world and may better reflect this transmission.  
Second, urban legends were shown to be particularly useful as they exploit all 
biases that have been demonstrated by previous studies. This also means they can be useful 
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in examining how biases can be combined into a single narrative. Third, the studies 
presented here also demonstrate the efficacy of using methods drawn from cultural 
evolution to examine folklore (urban legends can be considered a contemporary form of 
folklore). Traditionally the study of folklore has been dominated by psychoanalytic 
interpretation and theories drawn from socio-cultural anthropology or sociology, the 
studies presented here are among other more recent studies (such as Tehrani, 2013) that 
have used modern techniques influenced by cultural evolution theory to provide further 
insight into the cultural success of folklore. Fourth, the results of Chapter 5 demonstrate 
the importance of considering different phases of transmission. In that chapter, social 
information was shown to have an advantage over survival information, but only at the 
encode-and-retrieve phase of transmission, not in either the choose-to-receive or choose-
to-transmit phases. Future research should consider all three phases when demonstrating a 
content bias in transmission as doing so can provide greater insight into how the bias 
operates. It may just operate as a recall effect for example, or only be present when there is 
communicative intent, as was found for stereotype consistency bias by Lyons and Kashima 
(2006). By doing this it may be possible to classify content biases into two categories – 
recall-based and audience-based, although some biases could be considered both 
(emotional bias for example has been demonstrated across all three phases of transmission 
by Eriksson and Coultas, 2014).  
8.3 Avenues for Future Research 
The studies presented in this thesis suggest a number of avenues for future research. 
Guided variation and how it may resemble content biased transmission offers a number of 
interesting avenues for research, especially given that guided variation is unique to cultural 
evolution. Future research could examine the differences and similarities between content 
produced by recall-based transmission chains and material produced by guided variation 
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chains. This would provide an excellent insight into how guided variation operates with 
regards to content biases. Guided variation is particularly pertinent when considering the 
electronic transmission of narratives as recall is not required for transmission and yet 
transformation of material does occur. Examining the manner in which information is 
deliberately changed in electronic communication and the motivation behind these changes 
would be an interesting avenue for future research. This may be something that could not 
be done experimentally but could be done in conjunction with experiments examining 
guided variation in transmission.  
Emotional content bias is also an area where further research would be highly 
beneficial. Despite being well established in relation to memory (Labar & Cabeza, 2006), 
except for a few cases (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Heath et al., 2001), emotional content 
bias in cultural transmission has not been thoroughly researched, especially given the wide 
range of emotions that could be evoked by material and the level of influence it has on 
transmission. One potential method would be to use more experimental means of testing 
for the degree of emotion evoked, such as galvanic skin response, rather than self-report 
measures. These methods have been used to great success in individual recall experiments 
but have not been used in transmission based experiments.  
The results of the studies presented here could provide assumptions for the 
computer modelling of cultural transmission with different assumptions for different 
phases of transmission. Rather than a single probability of information being transmitted, 
there could be distinct probabilities for receiving information, retaining information and 
transmitting information. The results of this modelling could be compared to the analysis 
of urban legends presented in Chapter 2 and could be used to examine, for instance, the 
relative prevalence of social and survival information in urban legends. The suggestion that 
there may be a cognitive optimum for the number of biases in a narrative also presents an 
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interesting area for future research. This could be approached in a similar manner to those 
studies which have examined a cognitive optimum for the number of MCI elements within 
a narrative by manipulating how many biases the experimental material exploits. The 
differences between recall-based and non-recall-based transmission could also be 
compared with regards to this cognitive optimum as it may be that without recall cognitive 
limits may not be relevant.  
The interaction between content and context biases would be another interesting 
avenue for further research as no material is transmitted in a vacuum, the influence of 
context biases on how biased content is transmitted would be fascinating to examine. 
Model based biases, such as prestige bias, may have an effect on the transmission of an 
urban legend, in that learners may be more credulous of information provided by a high 
status individual. The degree to which a model influences transmission may depend on the 
content of the information being transmitted, for instance a doctor may by more influential 
in transmitting health-related survival information compared to other types of content. The 
relative effectiveness in transmission of content biases and context biases could be 
investigated by having material which exploits content biases to a greater and lesser degree 
transmitted along a transmission chain featuring high and low prestige individuals. The 
interaction between content and context biases could also be examined through network 
analysis by examining how the relative prestige of different nodes effects the transmission 
of different types of content through the network.  
Cross-cultural studies could also provide interesting insights into how content 
biases operate, especially comparisons between social and survival bias. For example, 
survival information may be more salient in cultures where people’s survival is less secure. 
Ethnographies of traditional folklore of foraging peoples have found that they contain both 
ecological formation relevant to survival, such as foraging and hunting information, and 
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information relevant to social interaction, such as kinship, deception and interpersonal 
conflict (Sugiyama, 2001) but it would be interesting to examine these biases 
experimentally with participants whose survival is less secure than western students. 
Cross-cultural studies could also be used to examine cultural differences across the three 
phases of transmission and how this impacts on what kind of information is successful in 
different cultural environments. Culture may have a large impact on the choose-to-receive 
and choose-to-transmit phases of transmission as, even if material has an advantage at the 
encode-and-retrieve phase, if it is not culturally acceptable to transmit these stories they 
will not be successful across all three phases. Sexually explicit material for example may 
exploit emotional bias or social information bias and be well recalled but in a number of 
cultures its transmission would be restricted and may not be visibly culturally successful.  
8.4 Conclusions  
In conclusion the studies presented in this thesis demonstrate that content biases are 
an effective force in the cultural transmission of information. Humans exhibit cognitive 
biases towards preferentially receiving, recalling and transmitting certain types of 
information over others, however, these biases may not operate in exactly the same manner 
as each other. Some biases, such as social information bias and emotional content bias, 
were shown to be particularly salient. Also, content biases are unlikely to appear alone in 
naturally occurring material and are more likely to be found in combination with other 
biases. There may be a cognitive optimum for the number of biases that can be combined 
in a successful narrative. The studies also suggest that the cultural success of urban legends 
can be adequately explained by humans’ susceptibility to content biases and that the 
psychology of individuals should be considered when explaining the success of cultural 
artefacts. Urban legends have been shown to exploit known biases, often multiple ones, 
and as such are evidence of the selective pressures that these cognitive biases create.  
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Appendices 
 
A. Complete text of the legends used and the control material 
1. Tumour (used in Chapter 4) 
A woman went into a takeaway and ordered a chicken burger but asked for it without 
mayonnaise. After leaving the restaurant she bit into the burger and discovered that there 
was mayonnaise in it after all, but she finished the burger anyway. Later that evening, she 
checked herself into the local hospital after falling violently ill with food poisoning. Her 
stomach was pumped and the doctors discovered that the chicken in her burger had 
contained a tumour and that the sauce wasn't mayonnaise, it was pus from the tumour.  
2. Noodles 
A UK student who couldn’t cook resorted to eating instant noodles every day. When he 
developed terrible stomach aches he went to the doctor who found a layer of wax lining the 
wall of his stomach. The doctor told him that instant noodles are coated in edible wax to 
prevent them from sticking together
 
during cooking but that your body needs two days to 
clear the wax or it can build up and cause problems. The student had to have an operation 
to remove the wax from his stomach.  
3. Cyst (used in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) 
A woman underwent an operation to remove an ovarian cyst but just a few months later 
she relapsed and was rushed to her gynaecologist. The gynaecologist asked her if she often 
ate chicken wings, when she said yes he explained that, today, chickens are injected with 
steroids to accelerate growth. These steroids can have a terrifying effect on the body and 
are most dangerous in the presence of female hormones. Exposure to these steroids can 
lead to women being more prone to the growth of cysts in her womb.   
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4. Cybersex (used in Chapter 5) 
A student broke up with her boyfriend after they started university. Feeling lonely, she 
started to use internet dating and met a new guy online who she began to share flirtatious 
messages with before eventually winding up having fully fledged cybersex. After months 
of an online relationship they eventually decided to meet and arranged to spend the 
weekend together. She waited for him in the hotel room and when her dream man came in 
through the door, she was horrified to discover it had been her dad all along! 
5. Dinner (used in Chapter 4) 
A man was having dinner with his girlfriend’s parents when he was suddenly gripped by 
terrible flatulence. He excused himself from the table and went in search of a toilet, 
however, he couldn’t find one in time so instead he farted through an open window out of 
the parent’s earshot. Much relieved, he returned to the table and continued the meal. Later, 
he asked his girlfriend how the night had gone, expecting a good response, however, she 
replied “it was going fine until you farted through the serving hatch!”  
6. Birthday (used in Chapter 5) 
The boss of a small company took his attractive secretary out for a long lunch on his 
birthday and they enjoyed some drinks together. Afterwards, the secretary invited the boss 
up to her apartment for a few more drinks and which he readily agreed to. At her apartment 
she left the room to ‘slip into something more comfortable’. When she returned a few 
minutes later with a birthday cake, surrounded by the man’s friends, family, and his wife, 
they found the surprised man waiting in nothing but his socks! 
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7. Gang (used in Chapter 5) 
A little boy was out shopping with his mum and needed the toilet, so she let him use the 
gents’ toilet on his own rather than going into the ladies’ with her. When he didn’t come 
back, his mum began to get worried and asked a passing policeman to check in the toilet 
for her son. The policeman found the little boy almost immediately, lying in a pool of 
blood in one of the cubicles. Apparently, the poor boy had been attacked as part of a gang 
initiation.   
8. Caller 
A babysitter was watching TV after putting the kids to bed when the phone rang. She 
picked up the phone and a man shouted “check the children!” After another call from the 
same caller, she rang the operator and asked them to trace the location of the next call. 
When the caller rang again the girl kept him talking. After she put the phone down the 
operator rang back saying “get out of the house! He’s on the upstairs extension!” When the 
police arrived they found the children murdered and the killer gone! 
9. Hitcher 
A woman was driving home one night and saw an old lady hitch-hiking, feeling sorry for 
her, she picked the old lady up. While driving along the woman noticed that the old lady 
had unusually hairy, manly arms and began to feel anxious. She pretended that there was 
something wrong with her brake lights and asked the “old lady” to check them but as soon 
as the old lady was out of the car the woman drove off. Later she checked inside the “old 
lady’s” bag and found a blood-stained knife! 
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10. Powder 
A girl was having dinner with her boyfriend’s rich parents and needed to use the toilet. Not 
wanting to be indiscreet she asked for the ‘powder room.’ Inside she found only a vanity 
table and sink. Not wanting to embarrass herself by asking for the toilet she tried to use the 
sink but slipped and fell, hitting her head on the towel rack and knocking herself 
unconscious. On hearing a loud thump from above the family rushed upstairs to find the 
sink broken and girl passed out with her pants down. 
11. Fish (used in Chapter 4) 
A woman caught her boyfriend with another woman and decided to get revenge. She cut 
open the passenger seat of his car and hid fish inside before neatly restitching along the 
seam. As the fish rotted his car was filled with a terrible smell that he couldn’t get rid of no 
matter what he did. He had no luck finding a new girlfriend because no woman would set 
foot in his car. He finally gave up and sold the car at a huge loss because of the horrible 
smell.  
12. Choke 
A woman kept on returning a new car to the dealer, complaining that the engine was 
overheating and was high on fuel consumption. The mechanics could not find anything 
wrong with the car but the woman still insisted there was a problem. The dealer asked the 
woman to drive the car for him. The woman got the car keys out of her handbag, pulled the 
choke lever out to its full position, hung her handbag on the choke lever, started the car and 
proceeded to drive it with the choke pulled. 
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13. Skin 
A young woman saw a blind man picking his way through a crowd. They talked and 
afterwards the man asked her to deliver a letter to the address on the envelope. She agreed 
but while leaving she turned around and saw the man hurrying through the crowd without 
his glasses or white cane. Suspicious, she went to the police, who raided the address on the 
envelope, where they found heaps of human flesh for sale. And what was in the envelope? 
“This is the last one I am sending you today.” 
14. Spiders (used in Chapter 5) 
When beehive hair styles were in fashion it was almost a competition to see which girl 
could get her hair the highest. There was one girl who got her hair so high, and put so 
much hair spray on it, that she never took it down, combed it or washed it. One day she 
suddenly fell ill and died. They found out that a deadly spider had nested in her hair and 
laid eggs. When the eggs hatched the baby spiders bit into her scalp and poisoned her.  
15. Snake 
A mother took her son to a fast food restaurant and let him play in the ball pit after their 
meal. The boy played for a while and then began to whimper that he was hurt. She took 
him home and an hour later the boy died. She went back to the restaurant to try and find 
out what could have happened and the employees discovered that there were venomous 
snakes living in the ball pit area. The snakes crawled in there because it is dark and warm.  
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16. Killer (used in Chapter 5) 
One night a woman heard a baby crying outside her door. She rang the police because it 
was late and she thought it was weird. The police told her “whatever you do, do NOT open 
the door.” The woman said that she was worried that the baby would crawl into the street 
and get run over but the police then told her that a serial killer has a baby’s cry recorded 
and has been using it to coax women out of their homes so he can kill them.  
17. Clown 
A teenager was babysitting for a family. After putting the children to bed she rang the 
parents to ask if she could watch satellite TV upstairs in their bedroom. “Well of course 
she could” they replied. The babysitter made another request; could she put a sheet or 
blanket over the clown statue that was in the bedroom? It was making her nervous. “Take 
the children, go to the neighbours and call the police!” said the parent “We don’t own a 
clown statue!” The statue was a serial killer in disguise! 
18. Control (used in Chapter 5) 
Cheddar Gorge is a rock formation formed by melt water floods at the end of the last Ice 
Age. The limestone rock was blocked with ice which prevented water from flowing 
through it, so melting water was forced to flow over the surface, carving out the gorge. 
During warmer periods the ice melted and water flowed underground through the 
limestone, creating the caves and leaving the gorge dry. Today much of the gorge has no 
river until an underground river emerges in the lower part from a cave. 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
222 
 
B. Questionnaire used in Chapter 3 
 
1. Are you familiar with this story? (please tick as appropriate) 
a. Yes, I have heard it before  □ 
b. I have heard a similar story  □ 
c. No, I am not at all familiar  □ 
 
If you answered a. or b., please complete question 2. If you answered c., please 
continue to question 3. 
 
2. a. What relationship did you have with the person telling you the story? (Please 
circle as appropriate) 
Parent / Other relative / Partner / Friend / Stranger / Not Sure 
b. Was this person older or younger than you? (Please circle as appropriate) 
 Older / Younger / Same Age / Don’t Know 
c. What gender was the person telling you the story? (Please circle as appropriate) 
 Male / Female / Don’t Know 
d. What medium did the teller use to tell you the story? (Please circle as 
appropriate) 
 Orally / Email / Other internet / Text message / Other Media / Not Sure 
 
3. What emotion or emotions did you feel while reading this story? (e.g. interest, joy, 
anger, surprise, sadness, contempt, fear, disgust) 
 
............................................................................................................................. 
4. Please rate to what extent you felt each emotion  (1= very little, 7 = very much) 
Emotion 1. :                                   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Emotion 2. :                                   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Emotion 3. :                                   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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5. Please rate to what extent you believe this story to be plausible (1= likely to be 
true, 7= very unlikely to have taken place) 
 
                                                     1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  
 
6. Please rate to what extent the story contains (1 = very little, 7 = a lot) 
 
a. Information relevant to health and survival      
            
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b.  Information concerning social interaction or relationships   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b. Behaviour stereotypical for either gender     
                            
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. Please rate how likely you would be to pass this story on as: (1 = not likely, 7 = 
very likely): 
 
A true story                                       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
An interesting story                         1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A funny story                                    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. Please complete these details: 
a. Your age                                                                                                                  
...... 
b. Your gender                                                                                    Male / Female 
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C. Table showing Legends’ mean scores. 
 
Legend Percentage 
Unfamiliar 
  Mean Rating  (SD)  
  Emotional Plausibility   Survival Social Gender Stereotype 
1. Tumour 80% 6.50 (.89) 5.00 (1.95)   4.05 (2.11) 1.90 (1.17) 2.25 (1.65) 
2. Noodles 95% 5.30 (1.38) 3.80 (2.12)   4.15 (1.60) 1.70 (.98) 2.45 (1.79) 
3. Cyst 95% 5.50 (1.19) 4.25 (1.86)   4.90 (2.00) 2.50 (1.76) 3.00 (1.38) 
4. Cybersex 90% 6.00 (1.12) 3.75 (1.94)   2.55 (1.70) 5.85 (1.04) 3.75 (1.71) 
5. Dinner 75% 5.80 (1.44) 3.50 (2.09)   1.80 (1.24) 5.20 (1.32) 4.55 (1.57) 
6. Birthday 75% 5.55 (1.05) 4.40 (1.98)   1.85 (.99) 5.45 (.95) 4.90 (1.41) 
7. Gang 85% 5.90 (1.17) 4.85 (1.39)   4.25 (1.70) 4.90 (1.21) 3.25 (1.74) 
8. Caller 45% 5.75 (1.37) 3.85 (1.95)   3.95 (1.88) 3.35 (1.66) 3.10 (1.86) 
9. Hitcher 85% 5.05 (1.50) 4.60 (1.27)   4.10 (1.74) 3.90 (1.77) 3.30 (1.95) 
10. Powder 95% 5.50 (1.32) 4.75 (1.25)   2.10 (1.21) 5.15 (1.53) 3.95 (1.73) 
11. Fish 60% 5.00 (1.45) 4.10 (1.62)   2.30 (1.34) 5.75 (1.12) 5.10 (1.17) 
12. Choke 100% 4.80 (1.32) 4.35 (1.81)   1.90 (.97) 3.20 (1.47) 5.30 (1.84) 
13. Skin 85% 5.60 (1.39) 5.60 (1.31)   2.80 (1.88) 3.50 (1.32) 2.25 (1.59) 
14. Spiders 70% 5.35 (1.35) 3.95 (2.14)   4.05 (1.93) 2.50 (1.61) 4.10 (1.52) 
15. Snake 100% 5.65 (1.09) 5.20 (1.80)   4.20 (2.02) 2.25 (.97) 1.9 (.85) 
16. Killer 75% 5.50 (.95) 4.15 (1.63)   5.05 (1.96) 3.45 (1.70) 4.65 (1.63) 
17. Clown 55% 5.75 (1.21) 5.15 (2.08)   3.40 (2.16) 3.25 (1.86) 2.50 (1.50) 
18. Control 75% 4.70 (1.17) 3.75 (2.50)   2.50 (1.70) 1.40 (.82) 1.45 (1.15) 
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D. Tables showing homogenous subsets and means.  
NB – Homogenous subsets were determined by the Campbell and Skillings (1985) 
stepwise step-down multiple comparison procedure. A non-parametric test based on mean 
rank (as determined by a Kruskal-Wallis test), as such, position in the subsets is based on 
mean rank rather than mean score, mean scores are presented for illustrative purposes.  
Emotion score homogenous subsets and means.  
Legend Homogenous Subsets (p = 
.05) with mean scores 
      1 2 3 
18. Control 4.70     
12. Choke 4.80 4.80   
11. Fish 5.00 5.00   
9. Hitcher 5.05 5.05 5.05 
2. Noodles 5.30 5.30 5.30 
14. Spiders 5.35 5.35 5.35 
16. Killer 5.50 5.50 5.50 
6. Birthday 5.55 5.55 5.55 
3. Cyst 5.50 5.50 5.50 
10. Powder 5.50 5.50 5.50 
15. Snake 5.65 5.65 5.65 
13. Skin 5.60 5.60 5.60 
17. Clown 5.75 5.75 5.75 
8. Caller 5.75 5.75 5.75 
5. Dinner 5.80 5.80 5.80 
7. Gang   5.90 5.90 
4. Cybersex   6.00 6.00 
1. Tumour     6.50 
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Plausibility score homogenous subsets and means. 
Legend  Homogenous 
Subsets (p = .05) 
with mean scores 
1 2 
5. Dinner 3.5   
4. Cybersex 3.75   
2. Noodles 3.80   
8. Caller 3.85   
18. Control 3.75 3.75 
14. Spiders 3.95 3.95 
11. Fish 4.10 4.10 
16. Killer 4.15 4.15 
3. Cyst 4.25 4.25 
12. Choke 4.35 4.35 
6. Birthday 4.40 4.40 
9. Hitcher 4.60 4.60 
10. Powder 4.75 4.75 
7. Gang 4.85 4.85 
1. Tumour 5.00 5.00 
17. Clown 5.15 5.15 
15. Snake 5.20 5.20 
13. Skin   5.60 
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Survival information score homogenous subsets and means. 
Legend Code Homogenous Subsets (p = .05) with mean 
scores 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Dinner 1.80         
6. Birthday 1.85         
12. Choke 1.90         
10. Powder 2.10         
11. Fish 2.30 2.30       
18. Control 2.50 2.50       
4. Cybersex 2.55 2.55 2.55     
13. Skin 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80   
17. Clown 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 
8. Caller   3.95 3.95 3.95 3.95 
1. Tumour     4.05 4.05 4.05 
14. Spiders      4.05 4.05 
9. Hitcher       4.10 4.10 
15. Snake       4.20 4.20 
2. Noodles       4.15 4.15 
7. Gang       4.25 4.25 
3. Cyst       4.90 4.90 
16. Killer         5.05 
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Social information score homogenous subsets and means. 
Legend Code  Homogenous Subsets (p = .05) with mean scores 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
18. Control 1.40           
2. Noodles 1.70  1.70         
1. Tumour 1.90 1.90         
15. Snake  2.25 2.25 2.25       
3. Cyst  2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50     
14. Spiders  2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50     
17. Clown   3.25 3.25 3.25     
12. Choke     3.20 3.20     
8. Caller     3.35 3.35     
13. Skin       3.50     
16. Killer       3.45     
9. Hitcher       3.90 3.90   
7. Gang         4.90 4.90 
10. Powder         5.15 5.15 
5. Dinner         5.20 5.20 
6. Birthday           5.45 
11. Fish           5.75 
4. Cybersex           5.85 
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Gender stereotype behaviour score homogenous subsets and means. 
Legend Homogenous Subsets (p = .05) with mean scores 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
18. Control 1.45                   
15. Snake 1.90 1.90                 
1. Tumour 2.25 2.25                 
13. Skin 2.25 2.25 2.25               
2. Noodles 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.45             
17. Clown 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50           
3. Cyst   3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00           
8. Caller   3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10         
7. Gang   3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25       
9. Hitcher   3.30 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.30       
4. Cybersex     3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75     
10. Powder       3.95 3.95 3.95 3.95 3.95 3.95   
14. Spiders         4.10 4.10 4.10 4.10 4.10 4.10 
5. Dinner           4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 
16. Killer             4.65 4.65 4.65 4.65 
6. Birthday               4.90 4.90 4.90 
11. Fish                 5.10 5.10 
12. Choke                   5.30 
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E. Table showing the mean differences between the legends used in Chapter 4 
(column – row). 
 Cyst-LN (2) Dinner-HP (3) Fish-LP (4)  
Tumour-HN 
(1) 
E 1.00 
P .75 
G -.75 
S -.60 
V -.85 
E .70 
P 1.50  
G -2.30* 
S -3.30* 
V 2.25* 
E 1.50*  
P .90 
G -2.85* 
S -3.85* 
V 1.75* 
2  E -.30 
P .75 
G -1.55* 
S -2.70* 
V 3.10* 
E .50 
P .15 
G -2.10* 
S -3.25* 
V 2.60* 
3   E .80 
P -.60 
G -.55 
S -.55 
V -.50 
* Indicates legends are found is different subsets (p ≤ .05) 
Key:  
E = Emotion score   S = Social information score 
P = Plausibility score   V = Survival information score 
G = Gender stereotype score 
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F. Table showing the mean differences between the legends used in Chapter 5 
(column – row). 
 Cybersex 
Social 
Birthday 
Social 
Gang 
Combined 
Spiders  
Survival 
Killer  
Combined 
Control    
Cyst 
Survival 
E -.50 
P .50 
G -.75 
S -3.35* 
V 2.35* 
E -.05 
P -.15 
G -1.90* 
S -2.95* 
V 3.05* 
E -.40 
P -.60 
G -.25 
S -2.40* 
V .65 
E .15 
P .3 
G -1.10 
S .00 
V .85 
E .00 
P .10 
G -1.65* 
S -.95 
V -.15 
E .80 
P .50 
G 1.55* 
S 1.1 
V 2.40* 
Key: E = Emotion 
P = Plausibility  
G = Gender stereotype 
Cybersex 
Social  
 E .45 
P -.65 
G -1.15 
S .40 
V .70 
E .10 
P -1.1 
G .50 
S .95 
V -1.70* 
E .65 
P -.20 
G -.35 
S 3.35* 
V -1.50* 
E .50 
P -.40 
G -.90 
S 2.40* 
V -2.50* 
E 1.30* 
P.00 
G 2.30* 
S 4.45* 
V .05 
 S = Social info 
V = Survival info 
Birthday 
Social 
  E -.35 
P -.45 
G 1.65* 
S .55 
V -2.40* 
E .20 
P .45 
G .80 
S 2.95* 
V -2.20* 
E -.05 
P .25 
G .25 
S 2.00* 
V -3.20* 
E .85 
P .65 
G 3.45* 
S 4.05* 
V -.65 
  
Gang  
Combined 
   E .55 
P .90 
G -.85 
S 2.40* 
V .20 
E .40 
P .70 
G -1.40 
S 1.45* 
V -.80 
E 1.20* 
P 1.10 
G 1.80* 
S 3.50* 
V 1.75* 
  
Spiders  
Survival 
    E -.15 
P -.20 
G -.55 
S -.95 
V -1.00 
E .65 
P .20 
G 2.65* 
S 1.1 
V 1.55* 
  
Killer  
Combined 
     E .80 
P .40 
G 3.20* 
S 2.05* 
V 2.55* 
  
* Indicates legends are found is different subsets (p ≤ .05) 
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G. Table showing the results of each model with predictor coefficients from Chapter 
5. 
Model AIC Predictor Coefficient SE z 
Full 201.34 (Intercept) 2.55 1.63 1.56 
  Age -0.04 0.03 -1.46 
  Gender=Male -0.53 0.56 -0.95 
  Stereotype=Low -1.46 1.29 -1.14 
  Stereotype=Medium -1.29 1.02 -1.27 
  Type=Social 2.94 1.05 2.81** 
  Type=Survival 1.97 0.69 2.84** 
  Type=Combined 3.51 0.99 3.55*** 
  Generation=2 -1.35 0.61 -2.21* 
  Generation=3 -2.22 0.63 -3.53*** 
Generation Only 229.72 (Intercept) 2.05 0.38 5.45*** 
  Generation=2 -0.91 0.47 -1.95 
  Generation=3 -1.52 0.45 -3.38*** 
Type Based 192.22 (Intercept) 0.26 0.5 0.52 
  Type=Social 3.24 0.63 5.14*** 
  Type=Survival 1.69 0.52 3.23** 
  Type=Combined 3.24 0.63 5.14*** 
  Generation=2 -1.18 0.54 -2.19* 
  Generation=3 -2 0.53 -3.75*** 
Stereotype Based 206.11 (Intercept) 3.93 0.86 4.57*** 
  Stereotype=Low -2.92 0.81 -3.61*** 
  Stereotype=Medium -1.13 0.79 -1.42 
  Generation=2 -1.07 0.52 -2.05* 
  Generation=3 -1.83 0.51 -3.57*** 
Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 
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H. News stories used as original material in Chapter 6 
1. Low-Trees (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cumbria-20928042) 
Thousands of trees will be planted on a Cumbrian fell in a scheme to boost numbers of an 
endangered bird. 
Farmer Paul Stobbart will receive £130,000 from the Forestry Commission for the scheme 
to help black grouse. 
It will involve planting 16,000 trees such as oak, birch and rowan in a 25-hectare wood. 
Another aim of the scheme will be to tackle landslides, with the new trees helping to bind 
the soil together to prevent erosion. 
The Forestry Commission said 80% of the black grouse population was concentrated in the 
North Pennines Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. 
It said the population in the area was about 1,000 adult males, which showed a recovery 
after numbers fell following recent hard winters. 
Forestry Commission woodland officer Jim O'Neill said: "The North Pennines has very 
low levels of native woodland cover, so a scheme of this size makes a real impact." 
Mr Stobbart said: "It's good to boost wildlife like black grouse, but planting is also a sound 
option for the land in economic as well as environmental terms.  
"Long-term I also hope trees will provide hillside shelter for livestock." 
 
2. Low-Bridge (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-21524978) 
Drivers of two lorries carrying abnormal loads have been accused of causing delays on the 
Kessock Bridge at Inverness. 
The crossing is being upgraded and measures have been put in place to help HGVs to 
negotiate the road works. 
Other motorists complained to the police after the two lorries crossed the bridge at about 
09:00. 
Police said the drivers had failed to stop at a designated lay-by before being escorted 
across the bridge. 
Northern Constabulary said a report would be made to the procurator fiscal about the 
incident. 
Lorries carrying a load with a width of 2.9m (9.6ft) or more must stop before crossing and 
request an escort. 
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Designated abnormal load lay-bys on the approach to the Kessock Bridge are near the 
Munlochy junction, at Drumossie Brae, Morayhill, and Woody's car park in Inverness. 
Road works will be on the bridge until June. 
 
3. High-Pea (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-10945050) 
Can the humble pea grow anywhere?  
A Massachusetts man who was rushed to hospital with a collapsed lung came home with 
an unusual diagnosis: a pea plant was growing in his lung. 
Ron Sveden had been battling emphysema for months when his condition deteriorated. 
He was steeling himself for a cancer diagnosis when X-rays revealed the growth in his 
lung. 
Doctors believe that Mr Sveden ate the pea at some point, but it "went down the wrong 
way" and sprouted. 
"One of the first meals I had in the hospital after the surgery had peas for the vegetable. I 
laughed to myself and ate them," Mr Sveden told a local Boston TV reporter.  
Mr Sveden said the plant was about half an inch (1.25cm) in size.  
"Whether this would have gone full-term and I'd be working for the Jolly Green Giant, I 
don't know. I think the thing that finally dawned on me is that it wasn't the cancer," Mr 
Sveden said. 
He is currently recovering at home with his wife Nancy, who joked that God must have a 
sense of humour.  
 
4. High-Tiger (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3166010.stm) 
 
A US police sniper has accomplished a daring operation in an urban housing complex - 
sedating and removing a 350-pound (160 kg) Bengal tiger from a New York flat.  
Police were alerted to go to the flat - in a 21-storey block in the Harlem area after the 
animal's owner, Antoine Yates, checked into hospital with bites he said were caused by a 
pit bull.  
When they arrived at the scene, they found a three-to-five-foot-long (1-1.5m) caiman 
alligator as well.  
The animals have been temporarily taken to an animal care centre.  
Mr Yates was meanwhile arrested in Philadelphia and police said he would be charged 
with "reckless endangerment".  
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Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly said two callers had directed them to the exact 
address - and they had confirmed the existence of the orange-and-white tiger after cutting a 
hole through the door.  
After evacuating the building, they trained a camera to observe the movement of the 
animal through a window and policeman Martin Duffy abseiled to the fifth floor with a 
tranquiliser gun.  
"I saw him eye to eye, to say the least," Mr Duffy was quoted as saying by the Associated 
Press news agency. "He charged twice and I shot him."  
Police then went into the five-bedroom flat and tied the sedated tiger to a stretcher before 
carrying it away.  
It was then they came across the caiman - and carried it away too.  
"This is an only-in-New-York story," Commissioner Kelly said.  
Police suspected Mr Yates of having kept the tiger in his flat since it was a cub.  
It appears to have been one of an estimated 10,000 tigers kept by private citizens in 
America - that is more than remain in the wild. 
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I. Questions used in questionnaires for Stage 1 and Stage 3 of Chapter 6 
1. What emotion or emotions did you feel while reading this story? (e.g. interest, joy, 
 anger, surprise, sadness, contempt, fear, disgust) 
 
2. Please rate to what extent you felt up to three emotions out of 7 (1= very little, 7 = very 
 much) 
 
3. Please rate to what extent you believe this story to be plausible out of 7 (1= very 
 unlikely to have taken place, 7= likely to be true)  
 
4. Please rate how relevant you feel this story is to you and your life out of 7 (1 = very 
 little, 7 = very much) 
    
5. Please rate to what extent the story contains out of 7 (1 = very little, 7 = a lot) 
 
a. Information relevant to health and survival       
b.  Information concerning social interaction or relationships   
b. Behaviour stereotypical for either gender     
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J. List of legends sources for Chapter 7 
www.allpoetry.com/contest/638007-__blood_covered_mirror__  
www.americanfolklore.net/folklore/2009/10/bloody_mary.html  
www.halloween-website.com/bloody_mary_stories.htm  
www.halloween-website.com/bloody_mary_stories2.htm  
www.iusedtobelieve.com/make_believe/ghosts/bloody_mary/  
www.oocities.org/tragicpixie/FLbloodymary.html  
www.project2067.com/Urban%20Legends/Classic%20Horror/Bloody%20Mary.htm  
www.retrocrush.com/100monsters/69.html  
www.sfogszero.com/stories/bloody-mary  
www.snopes.com/horrors/ghosts/bloodymary.asp  
www.soccerpluscrap.8.forumer.com/viewtopic.php?t=196  
www.unsolvedmysteries.com/usm22697.html  
www.urbanlegends.about.com/od/horrors/a/bloody_mary.htm 
www.urbanlegends.about.com/u/ua/horrors/your_favorite_scary_urban_legends.03.htm  
www.urbanlegends.about.com/u/ua/horrors/your_favorite_scary_urban_legends.04.htm 
www.web.archive.org/web/20020602081747/http://www.mythologyweb.com/bloodymary.html  
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K. List of characters and coding used in Chapter 7. 
Character Trait  Coded As 
1 Mary  0 = Absent; 1 = Bloody Mary; 2 = Mary Worth 
2* Satan/Devil 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
3 Bathroom 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
4 Name summons 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
5 Belief summons 0 = Absent; 1 = ‘I believe in’; 2 = I don’t believe 
in’ 
6 ‘Come to/get me’ summons 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
7 Baby summons 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
8 Number of phrase repetitions 0 = Absent; 1 = Three; 2 = Seven; 3 = Thirteen; 4 
= Twenty; 5 = Unspecified; 6 = Five; 7 = Six; 8 = 
Fifty; 9 = Ten 
9 Beautiful woman disfigured 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
10 Mother of murdered children 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
11* Appearance of supernatural 
figure 
0 = Absent; 1 = Facially disfigured; 2 = Scissors in 
neck; 3 = Headless; 4 = Eyeless; 5 = Covered in 
blood; 6 = Old  
12 Fingernail scratches injury 0 = Absent; 1 = On Limbs; 2 = On Body; 3 = On 
Face 
13 Face scratched off 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
14 Clenched fist draws blood 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
15 Spinning/turning around 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
16* Supernatural figure appears 
from 
0 = Absent; 1 = Mirror; 2 = Bath/Sink/Toilet 
17 Ritual takes place at 
midnight/specific time 
0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
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18 Silence from room 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
19 Flushing toilet 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
20 Summoner dies/killed 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
21* Room goes cold 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
22* Something appears on mirror 0 = Absent; 1 = Blood; 2 = Writing 
23 Holding weapon 0 = Absent; 1 = Knife; 2 = Axe; 3 = Hooked Hand 
24* Fingernails reach out of mirror 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
25 Holding baby 0 = Absent; 1 = Dead baby; 2 = ‘Live’ baby; 3 = 
Doll 
26* Actions predicted by colour 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
27 Water thrown on mirror 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
28 Test to see if figure attacks you 0 = Absent; 1 = Given baby; 2 = Asked 
question(s) 
29 Candle(s) used in ritual 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
30* Means of protection/escape 0 = Absent; 1 = Turning on light; 2 = Ring of salt 
31 Holding rose 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
32 Candle is blown out 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
33* Blood flows from sink/bath 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
34 Slumber party/sleepover 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
35 Summoner is locked in room 0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
36* Figure descends down stairs in  
mirror 
0 = Absent; 1 = Present 
* Indicates characters coded as counterintuitive. 
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L. Table showing the individual RIs of each character in the Majority Rules and 
Strict Trees. 
Character Majority Tree RI Strict Tree RI counter/intuitive Frequency 
1 0.5 0.5 Intuitive 41 
2 1 1 Counterintuitive 2 
3 0.692 0.538 Intuitive 31 
4 0.786 0.643 Intuitive 30 
5 1 1 Intuitive 3 
6 0 0 Intuitive 2 
7 0.75 0.75 Intuitive 5 
8 0.385 0.385 Intuitive 40 
9 0.5 0.5 Intuitive 3 
10 0 0 Intuitive 2 
11 0.6 0 Counterintuitive 11 
12 0.333 0.222 Intuitive 12 
13 0.5 0.5 Intuitive 3 
14 1 0 Intuitive 2 
15 0.5 0.333 Intuitive 13 
16 0.385 0.385 Counterintuitive 33 
17 0.333 0.333 Intuitive 4 
18 0.5 0.5 Intuitive 5 
19 0 0 Intuitive 4 
20 0.647 0.647 Intuitive 18 
21 0 0 Counterintuitive 2 
22 0 0 Counterintuitive 4 
Appendices 
 
241 
 
23 0.714 0.714 Intuitive 9 
24 0.5 0.5 Counterintuitive 3 
25 0 0 Intuitive 1 
26 0 0 Counterintuitive 2 
27 0 0 Intuitive 2 
28 0 0 Intuitive 3 
29 0.375 0.375 Intuitive 9 
30 0.25 0.25 Counterintuitive 10 
31 1 1 Intuitive 2 
32 1 1 Intuitive 3 
33 0 0 Counterintuitive 2 
34 0.5 0.5 Intuitive 7 
35 0.5 0.5 Intuitive 5 
36 0 0 Counterintuitive 3 
  
